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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Delivering Bad News: The Processes and Consequences of Criminalizing Pregnancy  
By 
Laura Ann BrennanKane 
Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law and Society 
University of California, Irvine, 2016 
Professor Elliott Currie, Chair 
 
Legal, medical, and social regulation of pregnant women has been an understudied topic in 
sociology and criminology.  While difficult to say how pervasive this phenomenon is, Paltrow 
and Flavin (2013) have the most comprehensive research on its magnitude.  They documented 
413 women who were civilly or criminally confined because of their pregnancies.  My research 
sought to extend this work by understanding the processes, legal hurdles, and specific details of 
each woman’s story as she came under scrutiny during her pregnancy.  What was it about 
pregnancy that invoked the use of legal force to control a woman’s body?  How did doctors, 
nurses, and other medical professionals respond to women who had problematic pregnancies?  
Using 26 case studies of women who were criminalized based on their pregnant status, I 
  x 
examined the processes by which these women were regulated and why the regulation occurred.  
Although each case is unique, when taken as a whole, I found that the women were not trusted to 
make good decisions on behalf of their fetuses and that doctors, nurses, police, social workers, 
and judges intervened to take away their agency.  Criminal and civil laws were mobilized against 
women to force them to conform to the wishes of these social control actors.  I give several 
policy suggestions in order to effect change and argue that creating a culture of prevention would 
lead to better success at fostering good pregnancy behaviors and would ensure the goal of 
healthy children more than the current reliance on criminalization practices.  I suggest that 
prevention, not regulation would be a better process for both the mother and the baby because it 
reduces actual harm, but also because it has practical economic implications and gives doctors 
the ability to do what they do best: practice medicine, not law.
  1 
INTRODUCTION: The Problem 
I live in a world where each day I see progress toward equality for different groups of 
people; however, even with these steps forward, women still continue to face domination, hatred, 
and blame for processes and natural functions that are out of their control.  Women are subjected 
to multiple messages about their bodies throughout their lifetimes: the disgust of menstruation, 
the denial of access to birth control based on age or geographic location, differently enforced 
school dress codes, the necessity of shaving, and so on.  Even as legal rights have been extended 
to women, economically, politically, and socially, women are not equal to men in America.  The 
wage gap, the lack of a female President of the United States, and the “second shift” where 
women come home from work and take care of the household and children (Hochschild & 
Machung, 1989; Pew Research Center, 2015) are all telling of inequality that still exists between 
men and women. 
As I was studying in graduate school, I became concerned about all of the news stories I 
saw where mothers were arrested, jailed, and scrutinized for the actions they had taken with 
regard to their children.  Sometimes these practices were the best the mother could do due to her 
constrained set of choices, yet she was still penalized to the fullest extent of the law.  With a lack 
of compassion, authorities responded that their hands were tied and that they had little power to 
do anything but arrest them, prosecute them, and/or remove their children from the home.  From 
my view, the system felt broken that women were trying the best that they could and those 
choices resulted in very real consequences for them and/or their children.  Because a dissertation 
must be feasible in addition to significant (and interesting), I narrowed my project in scope from 
the larger topic of motherhood regulation to a realistic project on the criminalization of pregnant 
women.  Criminalization of pregnancy is brought about by many different agents of social 
  2 
control, including doctors, hospitals, courts, police, and politicians.  The process by which a 
normal life event becomes framed as a problem leads me to unpack how pregnancy is 
scrutinized, legislated, and criminalized.  Located on the University of California Irvine’s School 
of Social Ecology’s website, I strive to keep with the spirit of their mission: to do socially 
relevant research that exposes problems using multi-disciplinary and holistic lenses and offers 
real-world solutions. 
This work focuses on 26 pregnant women and their encounters with law enforcement, 
judges, and medical personnel.  I tell their stories: the details of their legal battles, their pleas for 
help and agency, and the processes through which social control mechanisms, those that are legal 
and medical, regulated and criminalized these women.  This monograph features women like 
Amanda Kimbrough who lost her son and sits in prison as she serves a sentence for violating the 
chemical endangerment law in Alabama, Christine Taylor who was arrested because hospital 
staff questioned her intentions when she fell down stairs at home in Iowa, Jennifer Johnson 
whose case had to go to the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) in order to vacate a 
conviction that she had delivered drugs to her newborn children from the time she had given 
birth to the time the umbilical cord was clamped, and Lisa Epsteen who felt bullied by and 
fearful of her medical team when she was threatened with law enforcement intervention if she 
did not have a cesarean-section (c-section) surgery.   
The similarity of the cases of each of these four women seems apparent at first blush.  
Obviously each of these women was expecting to be a mother at the time that her conduct caused 
others to take notice of her.  It should be noted that in all four cases the conduct of the women 
was scrutinized because of their common status: pregnant.  These four examples also show that 
at some point their conduct was considered and subsequently regulated at the federal or state 
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levels.  Moreover, to be clear, Kimbrough’s charge was because of her drug use, but she was not 
arrested for selling or possessing drugs.  Instead, she was charged under Alabama’s Code, §26-
15-3.2 (3): Alabama’s Chemical Endangerment Law, where the language for her offense reads, 
“Violates subdivision (1) and the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death 
of the child. A violation under this subdivision is a Class A felony.”  Kimbrough would not have 
been charged with violating this law if she had not been pregnant.  In fact, all four examples 
share what Paltrow and Flavin (2013) call the “‘but for’ factor” (p. 301).  There likely would not 
have been action taken against the women (drug testing of the newborn, questions about the 
woman’s accidental fall, speculation at what point drugs might have been delivered to the infant, 
threats because of a patient’s decision to avoid major surgery) “but for” the status of the women 
as pregnant.  McGinnis (1990) similarly argues that when drug use or alcohol use is not a crime 
in and of itself, for a crime to occur, the substance use must be accompanied with another harm, 
one that is regulated by law. Thus, if a pregnant woman uses drugs or alcohol, which are often 
not crimes themselves, and these women are arrested for drug or alcohol use without violating 
another law, then the pregnant drug use constitutes a “new status-based criminal offense” 
(McGinnis, 1990, p. 520).  Moreover, since Robinson v. California (1962), SCOTUS held that 
simply being a drug addict is not a criminalizable offense.  Consequently, McGinnis argues that 
the criminalization of pregnant drug addicts is doubly worrisome for it criminalizes two statuses 
that cannot be criminalized according to the Constitution: drug addict and pregnant.  “The result 
of criminalizing the coexistence of two unpunishable statuses- drug addiction and pregnancy- is 
the creation of a new status crime” (McGinnis, 1990, p. 520).  This use of status as a justification 
to regulate and/or criminalize the conduct of a woman calls into question whether women are 
then treated fairly (with regard to their constitutional protections like due process), without 
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prejudice because of their status, and are actually given resources to remedy any problems that 
caused them to come under scrutiny in the first place.  In many cases, the answers are no, no, and 
no.   
Why is this a concern? 
We regulate some women by status: the status of “pregnant.”  The process by which we 
regulate and criminalize these women is not transparent nor does it necessarily apply to all 
pregnant women equally.  The first major problem of regulating pregnancy is that we deem 
certain actions illegal for pregnant women but legal for others who are not pregnant.  Thus, it can 
be said that we are not actually regulating conduct, but status.  For example, Michelle Oberman 
(1992) claims that the only reason the women she reviews in her article were criminalized was 
not actually due to their actions, but rather that they were pregnant at the time they took those 
actions.  Society places special expectations on women who become pregnant because we value 
the children that these women bear.  In fact, Hulsey (2005) argues that “[s]ingling out pregnant 
women implies that they have a higher moral obligation to their children than do fathers or non-
pregnant mothers” (p. 94).  We obviously want pregnant mothers to take the best care of 
themselves and their future children in order to have the best society and future that we can.  We 
want to produce healthy, intelligent, capable minds, workers, and citizens, but should we regulate 
by status to accomplish this goal?   If society accepts that the goal is valid, does that in turn give 
us permission to regulate by status?  Is it always wrong to regulate by status?  For example, we 
do it for juveniles out of concern for their protection (i.e., parens patriae), but should we in all 
cases for pregnancy?  Where do the boundaries exist for this kind of paternalistic care?  The 
present chapter illustrates that criminalizing the status of pregnancy is problematic because it a) 
is discriminatory, b) pits mother against fetus, c) ignores greater social issues by framing the 
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problems as individual ones, d) ignores the context of women’s lives, e) possibly violates due 
process rights of the pregnant woman f) wrongly asks the criminal justice system to act as social 
service provider, and g) defaults to reactive practices, ignoring prevention.  
Criminalization of pregnancy not only targets women of a certain status, but also opens 
up these women to discriminatory practices— especially for those who possess multiple statuses, 
particularly those who are poor or who are minorities.  Intersectionality, the concept developed 
by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1998), is particularly salient to this work.  First, intersectionality 
necessitates that we consider how multiple statuses interact with one another, such that the 
effects are not simply additive or completely predictable.  Crenshaw (1998) argues that single 
attributes— like gender, race, age, and class— intersect to form complex statuses.  For example, 
in her work, she shows that even when one characteristic is shared by two groups (such as race), 
once a second characteristic is introduced (such as sex), the resulting treatment may not be equal 
for both groups.  Through analysis of court cases, Crenshaw shows that black women are not 
only treated differently from white women, but also from black men.  Women may face 
discrimination because of their sex, but black women face that discrimination in both similar and 
different ways from white women (and even black men). Instead, black women face challenges 
and receive benefits that are not predicated on black men’s or white women’s experiences.  
Instead, they have their own unique experiences because of the pairing of both race and sex- two 
statuses that cannot be decoupled.  Generally, research on sex discrimination focuses on the 
experiences of white women rather than a more holistic treatment of all groups of women. This 
point is salient for this work, as many of the women who experience criminalization have not 
just one status, but often, two or three (or more) and their types of statuses are ones that put 
women at risk of regulation and control.  While these ideas are crucial to thinking about which 
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groups are hit hardest by regulation, Crenshaw does not create a schema to help courts, police, or 
prosecutors to develop a policy that would recognize these compound statuses.  This work will 
attempt to help fill that gap.  As discussed above, in this piece I treat pregnancy as a status.  
Consequently, considering intersectionality, what are the implications for a pregnant woman of 
color, low income, and young age, if she comes under the surveillance of the criminal justice 
system?  Will her statuses dictate more lenient or harsher punishment compared to her non-
pregnant peers, pregnant women of means, or white women?  Will she be more likely or less 
likely than her peers to receive treatment and resources?  Second, women who are marginalized 
in multiple ways face barriers to resources that women who have fewer vulnerable statuses do 
not face.  Third, compared to women with access to resources, choices about behavior and 
conduct are more constrained for women who do not have resources (Maher, 1990).   
There has been some empirical research done on the intersectionality of pregnant women.  
Using interviews with pregnant women, Whiteford and Vitucci (1997) examined a Florida law 
that allowed public hospitals to drug test infants without parental consent.  Whiteford and 
Vitucci point out that many poor women and women of color are arrested for drug use (and thus 
endangerment to the child).  This is not necessarily because they use more drugs than other 
women, but because poor and minority women are subjected to drug tests more often than other 
women.  Therefore, it appears that more poor and women of color use drugs, when in reality, 
testing is not consistent between groups, leading to a selection bias.  In addition, at this time, 
doctors routinely tested for the presence of crack cocaine, a drug that has been linked to the 
African American population whereas alcohol, the choice of many European-American women, 
was excluded.  Noble (1997) also argues that medical practitioners in California are more likely 
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to report child abuse and the suspicion of drug use in women of color, women with lower 
socioeconomic statuses, and women on government insurance (e.g., Medicaid).   
Medically, pregnant women are treated as having different rights from other patients 
(Meredith, 2005; Johnsen 1987).  For example, a pregnant woman could be forced against her 
will to undergo a cesarean section surgery.  However, there is no statute that compels a mother to 
save the life of her dying, postnatal child through a medical procedure that she does not wish to 
have.  This raises questions of equity in that pregnant patients are different from other kinds of 
patients, but also shifts all of the bodily duties of care to one expecting parent, the pregnant 
woman.  There remains a question as to whether it is a concern, and if so, the extent of that 
concern, that doctors can mandate certain treatments, procedures, or surgeries for pregnant 
women that would not be mandated for non-pregnant patients.  It is further problematic that there 
is a lack of voice and agency ascribed to an entire class of people if pregnant women are not 
fully able to determine what happens to their bodies.   
Legally, for most of the country’s history, the pregnant woman and her fetus were 
considered one entity.  A trend that has been on the rise is the treatment of mother and fetus as 
separate legal entities while they share one body.  One obvious problem is the situation when the 
mother’s needs conflict with the needs of the fetus.  For example, if it is revealed that an early 
term pregnant woman has cancer and must undergo chemotherapy to survive, the prognosis for 
the fetus is poor.  If the mother decides to forego chemotherapy until after the birth, she may 
produce a healthy baby but die of cancer after the baby is born.  This scenario presents an actual 
medical dilemma that must be solved by the law since there is little that medicine can do to 
benefit both parties—a choice must be made where one life is prioritized.   
  8 
The reconciliation of the needs of the mother and the needs of the fetus can also be recast 
as the rights of the mother versus the rights of the fetus.  Katherine Beckett (1995) argues that 
“[t]he apparent independence of the fetus has given rise to a definition of pregnancy as a conflict 
of rights between a woman and her fetus” (p. 593).  As court cases reverse the earlier tendency to 
consider mother and fetus as one entity, this notion of independence opens the door to allow 
parents, especially mothers, to be liable for their conduct when pregnant.  Beckett notes that if a 
mother can be held liable for harm done to a fetus in the womb when she takes prescription drugs 
(p. 594), the slippery slope of liability is opened to allow other forms of conduct to be 
criminalized.  Can women who eat poorly or even engage in activities like strenuous exercise be 
held responsible for any harm that results from their conduct?  Moreover, would our society 
benefit from children being able to critique their mothers’ prenatal conduct, especially in a 
formal setting such as a court? 
The next area of concern revolves around the treatment of women’s pregnancies as 
matters of civil and criminal law that involve a dispute between two parties, the mother and the 
fetus who is represented by the state.  By allowing these matters to be addressed by courts, harms 
are framed as individual (and possibly rare) issues.  If problematic pregnancies are so harmful 
that we need to create criminal sanctions, we miss the bigger picture of an ill society when we 
only see individuals go to court.  Women who are labeled as bad pregnant mothers (especially 
those who take drugs or fail to seek medical care) are often viewed as individuals with problems, 
rather than framed as part of a larger, more systemic problem where many women are products 
of economic deprivation and lack of social supports.  Individual problems lead to responses that 
are individualistic as well.  Taking the example of the pregnant woman who avoids 
appointments, the response is often that there is right of protection and care due to the fetus that 
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was not adequately supplied by the mother.  As society sees the fetus as a being that cannot care 
for itself, its rights trump the mother’s rights to make personal, health care decisions for herself.  
Thus, the response is to reprimand the mother, an individual, and move on, rather than consider 
that there may be many more just like her, who lack economic resources or face barriers to 
adequate care.  The example of the pregnant drug user also elicits a response that is 
individualistic; one in which the user is treated as a deviant rather than sick or addicted.  Here a 
“social problem is recast as a crime problem” (Maher, 1990 p. 118; Stephenson & Wagner, 
1993).    
 While framing the problem of criminalization of pregnancy as a societal one is 
important, we should not focus so much on that general issue as to lose the context of each 
woman’s life.  Dawn Johnsen (1987) argues that it may be proper for society to consider that a 
mother does have a reasonable responsibility to care for a fetus while it is in the womb, but that it 
is inappropriate to judge that mother’s conduct post hoc, especially where hindsight is, as they 
say, 20-20.  Johnsen argues that at any point, any small decision could impact the life or health 
of the fetus.  Often her choices about the care for herself and her future child rest on her income, 
environment, and personal health.  There cannot be a “one size fits all” model of pregnancy 
because it ignores women’s real life situations.      
In addition, and of crucial importance, when a fetus and its mother are treated as separate 
entities, it opens the door for the fetus to go to court against the woman, but also for the state to 
prosecute the woman on behalf of a vulnerable victim.  First, it is confusing to scholars, policy 
makers, and the general public that the state can represent a being inside another being, thus 
giving both legal standing even though they share a body.  Second, most pregnant women do not 
go into pregnancy thinking that they will have to face legal challenges stemming from their 
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pregnancies.  By framing criminal conduct based on the status of pregnant, we ignore the cultural 
definition that many women assign to the time: a natural evolution of the growth of her family in 
which she must make choices on the behalf of her fetus, but also herself.  Thus, when such an 
occasion arises that she is charged by the state, for a woman to know that her actions are 
criminal, she must have “notice and fair warning” (McGinnis, 1990).  Without such warning, her 
due process rights may be violated.  McGinnis argues that prosecutions of pregnant drug users 
violate the due process rights of pregnant women in two ways: 1) women are not provided 
“notice and fair warning” and 2) legislatures, not judges, should define criminal conduct.  First, 
McGinnis claims that women must be provided some kind of notice that their conduct is 
criminal.  The legal justification for notice is derived from the ex post facto clause1 of Article 1, 
Section 9 of the Constitution.  Thus, if a judge were to “enlarge” a law to include conduct that 
previously had been ignored or was unpredictable in its inclusion, this might be considered a 
violation of a woman’s due process rights.  Second, McGinnis claims that courts should 
determine legislative intent when applying statutes so that courts are not the ones making law, 
but rather interpreting it.  This situation of the “enlargement” of laws is particularly salient for 
the criminalization of pregnancy because pregnant women are charged with child abuse, child 
endangerment, feticide, manslaughter, and other crimes that they do not expect.  Many of them 
might expect that they are violating drug possession laws, but some do not realize that they have 
committed a crime at all.  Certainly it would be a surprise to many women that a home birth 
would result in a child neglect charge.  Violation of due process is certainly one of the most 
                                                 
1 The ex post facto clause of the Constitution means that a new law cannot penalize those who violated the law 
before it was in effect.  Thus, for example, if walking barefoot outside becomes against the law tomorrow, I cannot 
be prosecuted tomorrow for having done it today (while it was still legal).   
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worrisome issues that can be extracted from the criminalization of a status since we consider due 
process rights to be fundamental rights of all citizens. 
Sociologist Kathryn Ann Farr (1995) argues that it has been the practice since the 1940s 
to allow parents to sue third parties for harm to the woman/fetus because they were considered 
one entity.  Third parties generally include the doctor and other medical staff who may have 
harmed the infant prenatally.  This definition did not include the conduct of the mother.  It was 
not until the 1970s with the decision of Roe v. Wade (1973) that fetal protection supporters felt 
threatened and subsequently mobilized. The term “fetal abuse,” she argues, refers “almost 
exclusively to the behavior of the pregnant woman, behavior that is perceived to be in direct 
conflict with the interests and ultimately the rights of the fetus” (Farr, 1995, p. 236).  
Importantly, this change in definition of fetal abuse has opened the door for the prosecution of 
drug-addicted women and even those who do not seek adequate medical care during pregnancy.  
The boundaries of the abusive behavior are not defined and due to precedent, any action a 
pregnant woman takes that is not in full benefit of the fetus, may result in a fetal abuse charge.   
Suppose for a moment that the conduct of a pregnant woman truly violates the law and 
she therefore deserves punishment and/or help from the criminal justice system.  Questions will 
always exist about what punishment and/or rehabilitation is appropriate for her situation, but 
what is often ignored is how the sanction also hurts her family, especially her fetus or newborn.  
For example, after a woman gives birth in custody, her baby is taken from her.  There is a 
potential for the child to suffer ill health effects from this separation (Hulsey, 2005).  The 
removal of the child prevents the formation of a mother-child bond and the benefits of breast 
milk.  A study of multiple facets of reproductive care in New York state prisons revealed that 
mothers who gave birth while serving their sentences were deprived of their state rights to have 
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their infants in their rooms with them because the infants were housed in the nursery and the 
mothers in a secure ward.  The ward and the nursery were far from each other and the ability to 
visit with, bond with, and breastfeed the child was out of the mother’s control and managed by 
the correctional officer and/or the nurses—often to the frustration of the mother.  The report 
recommends: 
Allowing mothers who want to breastfeed to do so is vital not only because all mothers 
deserve to have such choices respected but also because breastfeeding provides 
significant benefits. Nursing strengthens babies’ immune system, brain development and 
vision, and helps mothers physically recover from childbirth while lowering their risk of 
cancer, heart disease, hypertension, diabetes and high cholesterol. It also helps mothers 
and babies form critical early bonds. Establishing breastfeeding as soon as possible is 
important because it lays a foundation for successful breastfeeding and because mothers 
only produce colostrum – the first stage of breast milk that contains essential nutrients 
and antibodies – for a few days after delivery. (Kraft-Stoler, 2015, pp. 118-119) 
Additionally, for the woman, the criminal justice system is not an ideal place to seek 
treatment. This system has “historically poor systems in place to assist [pregnant drug users]” 
(Hulsey, 2005, p. 95).  By asking the criminal justice system to handle/manage even one type of 
problematic pregnancy (i.e., drug users), let alone others, we must consider the healthcare of the 
woman (pre- and postnatal).  Moreover, if we do ask the criminal justice system to handle all of 
these women, very specific resources must be in place, including “appropriate treatment services 
for substance abuse as well as prenatal care…for pregnant incarcerated women” (p. 95).  This 
problem has multiple facets that must be considered when placing the burden on a system that 
was not designed to provide social support.   
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One way to reduce reliance on the criminal justice system as an agent of change is to let 
nature take its course without intervention. Empirical research undertaken by Kreager, Matsueda, 
and Erosheva (2010) found that women in disadvantaged communities who transition to 
motherhood reduce their delinquency, smoking of marijuana, and drinking of alcohol.  The 
authors found that the transition to motherhood actually has a bigger impact than the transition to 
marriage on curbing delinquent behavior.  As this research supports, leaving pregnant women 
alone may do more good than harm. Without any external intervention, those who are involved 
in delinquent activities actually start to refrain once they are pregnant, thus giving less credibility 
to the concept of criminalizing all potentially problematic pregnancies.  It is clear that some 
women make good choices without being told to do so by formal social control entities. 
Finally, criminalization is a reactive practice that does not get to the root cause of 
behavior that society condemns.  It is often the recommendation of researchers to treat pregnant 
women with drug problems like other drug users: consider them to be ill (rather than deviant or 
harmful to society) and give them treatment (Farr, 1995; Hulsey 2005; Johnstone & Miller, 2008; 
Mariner, Glantz, & Annas, 1990; McGinnis, 1990; Nolan 1990; Paltrow, 1990).  For example, 
Logli2 (1990) says “society, including the medical and social welfare establishment, must be 
more responsive in providing readily accessible prenatal care and treatment alternatives for 
pregnant addicts” (p. 28).  Women who are not drug users, but rather encounter concern from 
doctors because of medical issues, may end up avoiding medical care or even becoming 
adversaries with their current doctors.  Stephenson and Wagner (1993) recommend that the best 
policies do not involve “coercive measures” but rather offer women access to medical services 
that they describe as “high quality and affordable” (p. 181).  
                                                 
2 Interesting because Logli actually served as the prosecutor trying to secure charges against Melanie Green when 
her baby died (which did not happen, the jury failed to indict).  
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Scope of the Problem 
Women’s reproduction has been the subject of numerous pieces of empirical research in 
numerous fields including medicine, public health, sociology, law, anthropology, political 
science, and many others.  Prominent scholars on reproduction and race, such as Dorothy 
Roberts, and reproduction and drugs, like Susan Boyd, address the real world and legal issues 
that women face as the legal and medical spheres overlap, but their work does not investigate the 
number of prosecutions or arrests of pregnant women. In fact, much of what we know about the 
magnitude of this problem comes from news articles, famous court cases, and law review 
articles.  For example, Professor of Law at Cleveland State University, April Cherry’s 2007 
article on the confinement of pregnant women for the protection of the fetus is mostly (and 
importantly) a legal analysis and not an assessment or census of the number of women who are 
subjected to such provisions.  Cherry’s analysis depends on court cases and case studies from 
newspapers to show exactly how certain women’s battles have gone in court when those women 
were faced with preventative incarceration.  The thorough analysis done by Cherry is important 
work in understanding how the law is constructed, framed, and used against these women but it 
does not give us greater insight into how many women are affected or the demographics of those 
women.  The numbers of women who are on preventative detention are hard to ascertain because 
of the lack of a paper trail.  Some women come to detention through doctors (and therefore the 
legal counsel of the hospital or through social services) and others through “deals” made off of 
the record with judges because these women are criminal defendants and can serve less jail time 
(or none) in the long run if they conform to standards to keep themselves healthy and crime-free 
throughout the pregnancy. 
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The most recent and comprehensive look into this problem comes from the research of 
Paltrow and Flavin in April 2013. Legal expert and activist Lynn Paltrow is the executive 
director and founder of the National Advocates for Pregnant Women.  In America, from 1973 to 
2005, Paltrow and Flavin documented 413 women whose pregnancies were “a necessary factor 
leading to the attempted and actual deprivations of her liberty in its most concrete sense: physical 
liberty” (p. 301). The period of 1973 to 2005 was chosen to exclude illegal abortions that 
occurred before the landmark court case, Roe v. Wade (1973) and up to 2005 to ensure that court 
cases had a conclusion (i.e., no pending appeals).  Paltrow and Flavin used numerous sources to 
obtain the cases that went into their dataset, including published works and searches of legal, 
medical, and news databases.  Finally, they used police and court records as primary documents 
to corroborate facts and personal interviews with participants when other documents were 
missing.  Paltrow and Flavin’s triangulation of the facts of the cases was strong, although it is 
clear that cases that were not part of the published literature (published articles, and/or any of the 
databases) would not have made the sample.  Therefore, the estimate that Paltrow and Flavin 
have provided is an underestimate of the number of women who have been affected by this 
phenomenon.  Moreover, women who were confined in hospitals or charged in tribal legal courts 
were less likely to be part of the sample and therefore the true number is underestimated because 
the records of these women do not exist or are less likely to be published than women who are a 
part of the U.S. legal criminal system (p. 304).  Paltrow and Flavin argue that while their study 
“undercounts” the actual number of women, this is the most inclusive study of the demographics 
and case histories of pregnant women who actually are criminalized (p. 305). 
Of these 413 cases, 56% were from southern states, 22% from the midwest, 15% from the 
west and Pacific, and 7% from the northeast.  One percent of the cases were considered under 
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federal jurisdiction.  Race of the woman was identified for almost 90% of the cases (n=368). 
Black women, 52% of the cases, were overly represented in the sample.  White women made up 
41% of the sample.  Women who were identified as American Indian made up 3% of the sample, 
as did women who were identified as Hispanic/Latina.  Women labeled as Asian/Pacific Islander 
comprised 1% of the sample.  As expected, the ages of the pregnant women fell into a well-
defined range, from 12 to 43.  In 60% of the cases, women were ages 21 to 30.  Notably, 71% of 
the sample was defined as “economically disadvantaged” by the fact that they qualified for a 
public defender.  Paltrow and Flavin found that the women in the sample did not receive 
automatic care for themselves, nor their fetus/child when in the custody of law enforcement.  In 
fact, the impetus to arrest these women to get them treatment rarely resulted in said treatment.  
Moreover, while women all over the country have experienced these interventions, women of 
color who live in the southern United States are disproportionately targeted. Women who are 
intersectional and who already face disadvantages in general, are especially at risk of 
discrimination and criminalization when coupled with the status of pregnant.   
Study Design 
 This dissertation seeks to add to the knowledge base of what is known about how and 
why pregnancy is criminalized in America today.  This dissertation is a piece of a larger body of 
work that examines the structural systems of control imposed on women’s bodies.  By narrowing 
to the time of pregnancy instead of all periods during which women’s bodies are scrutinized, I 
was able to look at how law, courts, police, hospitals, and doctors all play roles to regulate 
women’s conduct and their bodies (which are sometimes coupled and sometimes distinct 
elements).  To date, empirical studies on this topic as a holistic phenomenon are sparse.  Studies 
that do try to understand the relationship between pregnancy and crime often focus on drug use, 
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drug testing of pregnant women, or women who are in custody and pregnant (see Levi and 
Waldman, 2011) but little treatment is given to the process by which this relationship is formed 
and almost no work has been done to think holistically about multiple kinds of problematic 
pregnancies.  This dissertation has many goals.  One is to fill in the gaps of what we know about 
pregnancy and its criminalization through a thorough qualitative analysis—something only 
partially attempted by Paltrow and Flavin (2013).  
Using 26 case studies of women who encountered various forms of social control during 
their pregnancies, my goals were to take stock of this phenomenon, examine how it happens, and 
underscore the congruities through which these different methods manifest themselves.  My 
research is largely process-oriented and qualitative.  I used unobtrusive methods to gather data 
and open and focused coding procedures to analyze the data.  Second, the dissertation pulls from 
many different sources of information on pregnancy, women, crime, law, and medicine.  One of 
my intentions with the project was to seek out different angles through which pregnancy can be 
examined and get those literatures to speak to each other.  Finally, my last purpose was to not 
only report the process of criminalization and explain this phenomenon, but also to use those 
cases to develop a framework that actually attempts to remedy the problem.  In the penultimate 
chapter I outline ways to reconsider this problem such that fewer women will be impacted during 
this time in their lives through preventative, rather than criminalizing processes. 
Chapter Descriptions 
The dissertation is broken up into a beginning where I frame my study and explain my 
methods, followed by the actual data in narrative form, the analysis and finally policy 
recommendations and a conclusion.  Taking these chapters as a whole, I argue that the regulation 
of bodies of pregnant women comes in many forms that stem from multiple kinds of control 
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agents, including medical systems and law enforcement, and that this regulation is 
counterproductive and could be done in a better way.  Specifically, I set up the theoretical 
perspectives that are relevant to this project in Chapter 1.  I found it useful to consider literatures 
on law and crime: how law both limits and creates opportunities for crime, and why those 
mechanisms would be relevant for the policing of women’s bodies.  I also consider sociological 
scholarly works that explore the nature of a “good” versus “bad” mother and how those 
expectations might spill over to pregnant women and their behaviors.  In Chapter 2 I discuss the 
methodology, fleshing out my processes of gathering and analyzing data.  Chapter 3 is the data 
chapter where the women’s stories are presented in narrative form.  I give the reader the 
opportunity to really see how each woman’s story is unique, yet that there are patterns that 
undergird them even when the stories come from women who lead very different lives.  Chapter 
4 offers an analysis of the findings.  Here I lay out how the criminalization process happens, why 
it happens, and what it means.  First, it happens through creative use of current laws to pursue 
pregnant women when they otherwise might “get away” with their behaviors.  Most of the 
women also followed the predictable pattern of being informally controlled at a hospital that led 
to some kind of police or judicial involvement.  Generally, these processes show that women are 
not trusted to make good decisions, that structural problems are reduced to individual issues, and 
clarifying law means disruption in the lives of real women.  Finally, I examine the role of the 
criminal justice system specifically in these cases and how it is neither effective at controlling 
the behaviors of the women nor helping their babies.  Chapter 5 offers alternatives and policy 
recommendations.  The major thrust of that chapter is an argument that criminalization must end 
now and that a preventative alternative would be more effective, but also a necessary step to 
uphold social justice and human rights.  Chapter 6 wraps up the piece and offers suggestions for 
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future research.  This work is largely descriptive and analytical, seeking to account for the ways 
that pregnancy is framed as a status to be regulated, how it turns criminal, and the forces through 
which it does so.   
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CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Framework 
Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter I outline the theoretical perspectives that contribute to the framing of the 
criminalization of pregnancies.  Several theoretical viewpoints guide this project.  The debate on 
the purpose of law, the concepts of overreach of law and overcriminalization, rights discourse 
and the construction of problems, theories of punishment, feminist criminology, constructing bad 
mothers, and social control play the most prominent roles in framing the problem.  These 
particular lenses help to define the project as a whole, bounding it in scope, while illuminating 
debates and conversations that are relevant to the phenomenon of criminalization of pregnancy 
as a matter of law, but also of practical significance for social policy.   
Philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, and criminologists continue to debate 
which laws are necessary to regulate society and how to determine what those laws are.  Many 
criminologists argue in favor of keeping laws that prohibit conduct that harms others; however, 
they would decriminalize and/or continue to keep licit those behaviors that do not harm others, 
even if they cause self-harm.  The discussion of decriminalization of these victimless crimes 
(also known as vice crimes), including drug use/possession, is particularly important for this 
work because it includes many women who use drugs while pregnant.  Some background on the 
necessary bounds of law is needed to thoroughly consider drug use during pregnancy.   
Coupled with the appropriate scope of law must be a conversation surrounding “too much 
law” and what that means, especially when laws are created based on morality.  Morality, an 
ever-evolving set of ideas about what is right and just, probably does not make for a good basis 
for law because it 1) excludes (and possibly oppresses) the minority, but 2) also shifts over time 
as society changes and deviant behavior becomes normal.   
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Embedded within the term criminalization is an inherent allusion to the criminal justice 
system.  Thus, related to the scope of law, this work must be address questions of what is meant 
by punishment and how that punishment is meted out, but moreover, questions of suitability arise 
when one considers how pregnancies are actually handled in the criminal justice system’s 
physical locations (i.e., jails, prisons, court rooms, etc.) and who is actually affected by the 
punishment.   
Often in a discussion about pregnancy, politicians frame the issue in terms of rights.  This 
dissertation acknowledges that that framework exists, but chooses to couch the topic in terms of 
a social problem that is constructed.  Accepting that pregnancy regulation is a social process, it 
allows for understanding the impact of that regulation on pregnant women, their unborn children, 
other family members, and agents of social control without creating a hierarchy of deservedness.    
Feminist criminology has long chastised criminologists for ignoring women and their role 
in crime.  While both the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and the National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS) reveal that women do not commit crime at the same rates that men do, excluding 
women from the equation completely is shortsighted and problematic.  In this dissertation, at 
least some women are accused of committing crimes, so acknowledging the work that has been 
done to explore why and how women are framed as criminals is essential. 
While women is the sample are not technically mothers until they give birth, some are 
already mothers of additional children and even for those who are going to be first time mothers, 
society views them as soon-to-be-mothers; therefore mother is not an unreasonable title for an 
expectant mother.  Not all women in society are considered to be acceptable mothers, especially 
due to secondary characteristics like sexuality, sexual identity, socioeconomic status, and racial 
background.  This literature acknowledges that good/bad mothers are socially constructed by 
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society, something that has been extended to the time of pregnancy, leading to a framing of 
good/bad pregnancy behavior.   
Finally, social control is important for this piece as several agents of social control are 
called upon to regulate the acceptable behaviors of pregnant women. Also, it is important not 
only what happens but how the process happens.  If the public only sees the results of 
criminalization, the end may appear natural and inherent rather than a socially constructed 
process and a morally divisive issue.   
The Purpose of Law   
Debates about which behaviors should be regulated and criminalized are commonplace in 
the fields of sociology, criminology, and philosophy.  In the nineteenth century, one of the most 
influential philosophers was John Stuart Mill whose essay “On Liberty” spoke directly to the 
idea of limited formal social control over individuals in a free society (as cited in Meier & Geis, 
2006).   Mill argued that preventing harm to others must be the only reason that the state can 
wield power such that it curbs the free will of the public.  In fact, Mill argued that neither harm 
to self, nor conduct that was merely seen as immoral (or offensive) to others, were good enough 
reasons to criminalize behavior.  Prevention of harm to others would be the only good reason to 
criminalize behavior.  Mill’s work, while influential, did not lay out a specific way to determine 
how much harm to others would necessitate the criminalization of an activity.  It is easily 
understood that all activities carry some risk, but it is not clear that all harms must be prevented.  
Salient to this work is the question of those boundaries— should we regulate harm done to 
others, and if so, how much harm has to be done for us to criminalize it? 
Like Mill, Oberman (1992) also argues that we are using the criminal justice system to 
punish morality. She cites examples of women whom she argues were brought to court to 
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regulate their sexuality, addiction, or even their ability to become pregnant.  The specific women 
she cites are not only pregnant women, but also women of color, young women, and 
impoverished women. Like Crenshaw, Oberman recognizes that pregnancy is a status that is 
criminalized, but also the intersections of race, age, and class complicate it, such that new, 
compound statuses emerge that need to be considered.  This intersectionality is of crucial value 
when we ask if the punishments that are being doled out are fair, in that they are consistent 
among all types of women.  In addition to punishment, we must also ask if resources and 
services are equally distributed among all pregnant women.  Importantly for this work, it is not 
enough to just ask why certain women are targeted for punishment, but rather to understand 
whether those same women are given a chance to prevent a problematic pregnancy in the first 
place. 
  Herbert Packer (1968) frames his search for the limits of law through a discussion of 
morality.  He agrees with Mill that harm to others is a good criterion for categorizing offenses as 
criminal.   Packer rejects immorality as a reason to criminalize because it is not clear whose 
morality should dictate what is criminalized.  In fact, a “harm to others” type test prevents the 
use of morality as the basis of criminalizing behavior.  Harm to others also invites a discussion of 
costs and benefits, such that context and other considerations must be weighed before a final 
judgment of behavior as criminal can be established.  Again, like Mill, Packer does not answer 
the question of how harmful the conduct must be to others, but he does present a very important 
point about the need to balance harm and freedom of conduct without making decisions about 
the legality of behavior based on intuition or personal feelings.   
Stewart (2010), who takes a different view from Packer, argues that the harm principle, 
the prevention of harm through the regulation of conduct through law, should be considered 
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neither necessary nor sufficient as a standard for criminalization.  Although there are multiple 
definitions, the harm principle, as applied by Stewart, cannot allow the prevention of harm to be 
the only motivation to make some act criminal.  For example, cooking on a stove could lead to a 
fire, a gas leak, or burns to the chef.  Heated food is not essential to human survival and stoves 
could cause harm, but we do not ban them nor the practice of cooking.  Problematically, some 
crimes do not cause direct harms, yet they are crimes, like gambling, prostitution, and drug 
possession.  What do we do with those cases?   According to Stewart, the harm principle 
generally leaves open two ways to justify the criminalization of a behavior without direct harms: 
1) find an indirect harm and 2) not criminalize the conduct at all.  Stewart claims that neither of 
these options is all that desirable- the first takes harmless behavior and criminalizes it, but the 
second leaves criminal conduct legal.  Stewart favors the second option because the first expands 
the number of behaviors that we can criminalize, does exactly what the harm principle says it 
will not do- makes illegal behaviors that do not cause direct harm, and finally, criminalizes 
“harmless conduct on the ground that it causes fear, worry, and distress in others” (p. 34).  For 
this project, the problem with considering indirect harms is that those harms can be so broad that 
criminalization is no longer narrowly defined.  Consider a pregnant woman who smokes 
cigarettes.  She may be directly harming herself (and her fetus), but she is also indirectly 
polluting the air and possibly exposing others to second hand smoke.  Where does her liability 
for harm to others end if we criminalize cigarette smoking?  Instead of using the harm principle 
to decide what conduct should be considered illegal, Stewart offers the idea that all people have 
certain inalienable rights and that those rights should be considered before (and independently 
of) the rights that people have to activities that may cause harm.  If people have rights to do 
something because of their natural rights as citizens, it does not matter if their conduct causes 
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harm or not, they have the right to it and the conduct cannot be rendered illegal.  Also, by natural 
extension, if conduct infringes on another’s rights, even if no harm occurs, that conduct is 
sufficient, although not necessary, to justify criminalization.  Thus, coupling the harm principle 
with rights gives a foundation for criminalizing behaviors and narrows the number of behaviors 
that can be criminalized.  For this project, reframing the discussion to include the inalienable 
rights of pregnant women while considering the harm done to others is particularly compelling 
especially as questions abound about the harms done to the fetus and the state’s interest in 
propagation.   
Overreach of Law and Overcriminalization 
The debates about the proper reach of law, especially when it comes to morality, are also 
relevant for this project.  In an early discussion, Morris and Hawkins (1972) argue that many 
crimes including drug use, abortion, gambling, and vagrancy are actually regulations of morality 
and therefore the use of the law (and eventually law enforcement) to regulate these behaviors is 
inappropriate.  Morris and Hawkins argue that law’s primary purpose should be to “protect our 
persons and our property” (p. 2) in contrast to others, such as Lord Patrick Devlin, who argues 
that law is a codification of our moral beliefs (Meier & Geis, 2006).  Therefore, if law is only 
supposed to keep us from hurting others, it is overreaching into the private spheres when it seeks 
to regulate morality through control of behavior.  In fact, this overreach creates more crime by 1) 
classifying more behaviors as criminal that would not be if they were absent from the code, but 
2) producing logistic problems that help foster more crime.  Examples of these logistic problems 
may be corruption infiltrating legitimate businesses, drug users forming subcultures, or the 
diversion of police to do social work activities such that they do not protect society from serious 
crime.  Morris and Hawkins focus on crimes that are considered “victimless” such as gambling, 
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prostitution, drug use, drunkenness, and so forth.  This point is salient for this work, as the topic 
of criminalization of pregnancy may reflect this same kind of overreach of law.  In some cases, 
regulation of pregnancy is an example of the regulation of morality and determining the law’s 
proper reach when it comes to pregnancy is something that has not been adequately explored.  
This work seeks to address this deficiency.  Moreover, like the increase in the prisoner 
population and a disparate impact on men of color from our nation’s “War on Drugs,” 
criminalizing pregnancy through the use of social control agents may also have unanticipated 
consequences.     
Sanford Kadish (1967), similarly, notes that the criminal justice system is overly used to 
control behaviors that are antithetical to our morality.  At the time of his writing, many behaviors 
were illegal (e.g., homosexuality, abortion, etc.) that are now legal, but Kadish’s message is still 
relevant: all costs and benefits should be considered before we criminalize any behavior that we 
wish to regulate.  Without doing so, we may end up with laws that are on the books but are not 
prosecuted (what he calls “dead letter laws”).  While this seems trivial at first glance, it could be 
harmful.  First, laws that the legislature enacts but law enforcement does not enforce give the 
message to society that really the behavior is tolerable.  Second, although law enforcement may 
not act in most cases, leaving laws on the books means they could be used in a discriminatory 
fashion against certain groups.  Third, as the legislature adds more codes to the books, the police 
are left to figure out which laws are important to enforce and which are not.  Kadish, like Morris 
and Hawkins (1972), argues that leaving it up to the police to decide what is actually harmful 
could leave the door open for “genuinely threatening conduct” to go unenforced or at least 
under-enforced (p. 157).   Finally, as police are asked to wear multiple hats (e.g., law enforcer 
and social worker), Kadish argues that police are diverted away from protecting citizens from 
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crime due to the enormous amount of resources that are spent on providing social services.  If 
Kadish is right and laws and their application are confusing to police and citizens, how can we 
ensure they are used in a non-discriminatory manner?  For this project there is a growing concern 
that with so many laws on the books, it is easy to find or adapt regulations that fit our current 
worries about conduct during pregnancy (particularly pregnant drug use).  The use of law in this 
way does not address root causes of the actual problem.  Moreover, pregnancy requires services, 
at the very least basic health care and nutrition.  If we use the criminal justice system to handle 
problematic pregnancies, we are asking an already strained system to devote more of its 
resources to a few women and give less resources to deal with more pressing and larger scale 
issues (e.g., gun crime and white collar crime).  Economically we should ask if the criminal 
justice system is the best place to serve these women.  Morally we should ask the same thing. 
Finally, the present study engages with the concept that redundancies in the criminal code 
should be eliminated (Husak, 2008).  An example of this is driving while talking on a cell phone.  
It is already illegal to drive recklessly.  Thus, to Husak, this seems redundant; there is already a 
law and to add a subset to the law does not change the original law.  Therefore a driver talking 
on a cell phone could be charged with reckless driving without the need to add a cell phone 
clause (because we suppose that a driver using a cell phone who is not driving recklessly is not 
an actual problem).  He would argue that this additional law only serves to complicate the law 
and is actually superfluous.  This work will piece together the intent of the legislature to see if it 
is necessary to have specific language to warn pregnant women that their conduct is illegal or 
whether general laws will be sufficient.  For example, pregnant women who use drugs may know 
that they are violating drug laws, but may be surprised to find that they could also be prosecuted 
under child abuse statutes.   
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Theories of punishment 
Like the overcriminalization literature, punishment literature offers an important lens 
with which to view the criminalization of the behavior of pregnant women.  This literature 
suggests that defaulting to the criminal justice system creates a variety of potential unintended 
consequences.  For example, not only are those who are legally guilty punished, but the families 
of those in the criminal justice system also face difficulties.  Comfort (2007) describes the range 
of disadvantages that stem from incarceration including familial the economic pressures, the 
mental health of children whose parents are in custody, and the difficulties of finding of a job 
once back in society.  Those who have been through the criminal justice system retain vestiges of 
that period in the form of their criminal record.  This record can hurt one’s chances of getting a 
job, which affects one’s ability to provide for oneself and a family.  Pager (2003) shows that 
generally, men are less likely to get a follow-up interview when they have a record, but that 
black men are at a severe disadvantage compared to whites.  Similarly, Western (2006) found 
that once there is a record, wage levels are limited, types of jobs are limited, and wages over a 
lifetime have slow growth.  While not directly addressed in these studies, it is important to 
explore how pregnant women/recent mothers who have multiple statuses, especially poor, 
minority, and/or single parent, would be especially adversely affected by these impacts of 
criminal justice processing.  
 One reason that is given for arresting pregnant drug users is that their arrests will lead to 
treatment; however, as noted above in the problem section, the criminal justice system does a 
particularly poor job of actually treating women once they are in the system.  Similarly, von 
Hirsch and Maher (1992) point out that it is problematic to shift to a criminal justice system 
modeled on treatment alone.  They raise questions of fairness and proportionality of punishment 
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to sentence. If the criminal justice system is a system that punishes and “condemns,” (p. 27) how 
does one decide a sentence if treatment is the model?  The sentence length rests on the ability to 
rehabilitate.  Since one would not be rehabilitated in the same amount of time as those who 
commit like offenses, this leaves room for inequitable sentences.  Thus, von Hirsch and Maher 
note that a system designed to blame/condemn is using “social and personal characteristics” (p. 
28) to determine sentence length, which ultimately does not indicate to society exactly how bad 
we consider the behavior (assuming sentence length and harm done correlate).   Thus, if we 
move to a model of treatment only, 1) Can we expect that pregnant women will actually get the 
treatment they need in a prison?  2) How do we ensure that there is no discrimination against 
them because they are pregnant?  It would be easy to mandate jail time (with treatment) until a 
pregnant woman gives birth while giving a non-pregnant woman a shorter sentence.  3) Is the 
criminal justice system even the appropriate place for treatment to occur?  Prisons inherently 
condemn (von Hirsch & Maher) and it is unknown how likely it would be for them to shed their 
natural proclivity to sanction, and transition to a treatment-only system.  
Rights Discourse vs. Constructionist Perspective 
Rights discourse also provides an important perspective by raising questions of how we 
should consider the relationship between a woman and her fetus. For some scholars, this 
framework of rights is useful and productive.  For this paper, I avoid using rights as the sole 
vehicle to frame my discussion of pregnant women’s needs and agency.  For example, do both 
mother and fetus enjoy separate rights and if so, whose rights are preferred when those rights are 
in conflict with each other?  Using the rhetoric of rights only creates a balancing test; a clear-cut 
decision is impossible.  Using this framing, women should have the right to reproductive 
freedom (Smith, 2005).  If women have the right to reproductive freedom, this inherently allows 
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for a challenge from others to their rights as well.  It opens the door for the father to claim his 
right to have a child or from the fetus to assert its right to be born.  While this particular example 
focuses on abortion, the rights of the fetus and the rights of the woman as a separate entity are 
certainly unclear and cast questions such as: who has greater need, the woman or the fetus?  This 
potential antagonistic relationship between fetus and mother (Handwerker, 1994; Maher, 1990) 
creates what Johnsen (1987) calls a “new threat to pregnant women’s autonomy” (p. 33).  By 
placing the rights of the fetus in contention with the rights of the woman, Johnsen notes that 
there are constitutional issues present, but also that the connection of the fetus as part of the 
mother is denied.  The two are now seen as separate entities.  
Maher (1990) argues that couching women’s needs as rights- rights to bodily integrity, 
healthcare, abortion, and so forth— we lose out on attacking the social dimensions of the 
problem and the best we can get is a solution based in law where there are limits to those rights.  
Laws can easily give women the right to things (e.g., healthcare) but they do not provide for help 
with logistics, transportation, knowledge, and so on.  Moreover, a woman’s right to something is 
often limited in law to whatever the government has judged is adequate for the average citizen.  
This may not be adequate for all women, leaving some with no help because neither law nor 
social institution is there to support them.  Instead Lisa Maher (1990), Laura Gomez (1997), 
Susan Boyd (2004), and others frame their analyses in terms of how social problems are 
constructed.  Pertinent to this work, Maher notes that a rights based analysis sees criminalization 
as something that stems from moral conflicts or legal entitlements and that it fails to see that 
criminalization is actually a response to a social problem.  Since a rights based viewpoint does 
not consider the process through which some behaviors become criminal, it cannot ask questions 
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about the appropriateness of the problem being defined as criminal nor what we gain and lose 
from such a classification (Cohen, 1988 as cited in Maher, 1990, p. 125).   
Feminist Criminology 
Broadly, feminist theory identifies a gap in criminology— the lack of exploration of 
gender and sex roles in the crime and the criminal justice system.  While there are factions within 
feminist criminology, and there is no specific point of view that all feminists take, the following 
literature is useful for considering how the criminalization of pregnancy may be conceptualized.   
Law and its enforcement are considered by radical feminists to be part of a patriarchal 
system that is designed to keep men in power and control women and girls.  Often, the system is 
focused on controlling feminine sexuality (Chesney-Lind, 2006).  Moreover, the criminal justice 
system’s interests coincide with those of the patriarchy.  The criminal justice system reinforces 
class and racial privilege, which in turn maintains the patriarchy.  Feminist scholars argue that 
research and theory should “focus” on the effects of this reinforcement by looking at 
intersectionality (Chesney-Lind, 2006, p. 9).   
Carol Smart (1989) interprets the concept of power as being “refracted” rather than an 
absolute (p.97).  As medical technology has developed and we know more about the way 
women’s bodies work (and especially with regard to reproduction), we see that law’s evolution is 
not linear, but rather that it puts forth multiple definitions (refractions), ones that control 
women’s bodies (limits on abortion) but also allow freedoms (such as legal, early abortions).  In 
general, law appears generous and liberal, but under its veil is an intrusion into the most private 
spheres of life, including regulation of the physical body.   
 If we consider the law to be gendered, Snider (1998) argues that laws can hurt women 
because the interpretation of those laws is left to those who have power and women are unable to 
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reframe those interpretations.  She claims that “[l]aws, however complex and ambiguous, do not 
generally wreak havoc upon dominant groups.  They are practically never interpreted in ways 
which threaten the rights of males or upper class people, because both dominant ideology and 
social practice direct judges away from this reconstruction of reality….” (p. 254).  Thus, we 
should be concerned that for pregnant women, who are neither male, nor a dominant class, that 
the interpretation of broad laws may in fact hurt them.  Because “[h]istory illustrates that law has 
generally acted to reinforce dominant gender, race, and class patterns” (Snider, 1998, pg. 246) 
not only does the criminal justice system continue to bolster these patterns, but also the system is 
designed to transform criminals into outcasts or rebels, whereby they lose their voices and 
legitimacy.  In fact, she argues that such a system is a mechanism for social control, which 
changes the dynamic between those who are labeled criminals and those who are not.  Snider 
goes further to say that we can hardly attempt to change such an inherently rigid system.  Thus, 
the idea of transforming the criminal justice system into a system of resources or a mode of 
feminist empowerment is at the very least, difficult, if not impossible.  This again begs the 
question, if the criminal justice system cannot be molded into a system of treatment or resources, 
should the first step of addressing problematic behaviors be arrest for pregnant women? 
Most directly related to this work, Maher (1990) argues that it is both “discriminatory and 
unjust” to criminalize a woman’s conduct during pregnancy because many poor and minority 
women are left without access to resources (p. 119).  Maher examines the plight of women who 
do not have access to health care, education, or support networks.  Without those resources, their 
choices about their behavior are limited.  Maher does not include younger women (teenagers) as 
a category, but it is clear that these women often lack resources, especially knowledge of their 
own bodies, to make appropriate decisions about a pregnancy.   
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Not only does criminalization seem to target certain kinds of people, but also it is 
possible that this process intends to send a message to the broad communities of the ones who 
are prosecuted.  For example, as certain kinds of women disproportionally come under scrutiny, 
Maher (1990) suggests that from a social constructionist perspective, the agenda to criminalize 
pregnant drug use simultaneously corresponds to society’s need to “express animus, resentment, 
and disapprobation at women in general and, in particular… minorities, druggies, and women 
who fail to conform to engendered cultural expectations” (pgs. 123-124).   Thus, she argues that 
criminalization of pregnancy fits squarely within a process to redefine “cultural and moral 
boundaries” (p. 123) and is a tool of oppression that makes middle class and white America feel 
less threatened by a class of people who continually try to exercise their right to power (p. 124).   
 Finally, as we consider that some pregnant women commit very serious crimes, Daly 
(1998) challenges feminist criminologists’ thinking to not only describe women as victims of 
circumstance, but rather give some agency to their actions, even if it means we label them as 
criminal.   
Not surprisingly, initial feminist efforts to describe women lawbreakers discussed these 
women’s acts in the context of their economic survival and their history of physical or 
sexual victimization.  But where does victimization end and responsibility for acts that 
harm others begin? (Daly, 1998, p. 149)   
Important for this work going forward, not all of the women in the sample are model mothers.  In 
fact, at least one was charged with abusing her children by hitting them with a belt.  Daly 
questions, “how should feminist scholars represent women who abuse, harm, or hurt others?” (p. 
149).  This works takes into consideration that real women have real problems that might 
engender violence.  Expanding on Daly’s question of harm, I ask whether there should be a 
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bright line drawn between women who actually harm versus women who are perceived as 
harmful and whether that distinction is actually practiced by those who uphold the law.  Are all 
pregnant women painted with the same brush? 
Bad Mothers 
 Society often assumes that women have a natural ability to nurture, so much so that it is 
common parlance to speak of “maternal instinct.”  Dorothy Roberts (1993) argues that women 
who are not the stereotypical mother- women who are lesbians, single, poor, or of minority 
status, are treated differently by the law from other mothers because the law is created and 
framed around the mores and norms of middle-class, white men.  That difference comes from the 
belief that women who are not ideal mothers are not able to be rehabilitated, unlike other 
mothers who have been wayward and can be returned to their status as a fit mother.  Moreover, 
Roberts explains that black mothers and white mothers are not only treated differently by 
authorities, but the concept of black motherhood is regarded differently from white motherhood.  
Roberts argues that the law couches bad mothering in neutral terms where no specific type of 
woman is singled out, yet certain types of women are more likely to be regulated and controlled 
by the criminal justice system; thus discrimination takes place not at the level of the law on the 
books, but when law is actually utilized against women.  Likewise, Regina Austin (1989) has 
argued that women who commit atypical female crimes, crimes other than shoplifting or 
prostitution, are more likely to be seen as unfit mothers especially if those crimes run directly 
counter to the supposition that women are nurturers and protectors.  Violence is one category of 
crime that is particularly “unfeminine” where women may receive harsh penalties for violating 
the law and violating gender norms (Richer, 2000).  Additionally, the scrutiny of a woman’s 
conduct as “ideally feminine” begins well before the woman gives birth. 
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 Crucial to this piece, motherhood, like pregnancy, is not a static concept with an 
objective definition.   Instead, a single mother might view her own relationship with her child as 
empowering, whereas society might see that relationship as lacking in advantages for the child or 
as proscribed for children born out of wedlock (Austin, 1989).  It is possible that women who are 
poor, women who are unmarried, women of color, women who consider abortion, and women 
who are substance abusers may value their pregnancies and see them differently from others in 
the community and society at large who might be more apt to view these pregnant women as 
deviant or unworthy.   
Control 
David Garland (2001) argues that we adapt our social controls to fit the ever-changing 
nature of society, especially as economic conditions and social patterns that undergird society 
expand and contract.  From the late twentieth century until present day, with a retrenchment to 
politically conservative ideology coupled with more expanded standards of personal freedoms, 
we have seen an accelerated use of crime control policies to enhance governmental control.  This 
has led to harsh penalties and mass incarceration.  Currently, because we have become used to 
the controls around us, we may cease to question the motivations and the necessity of responses 
of control.  For criminalizing pregnancy, this is a useful framework to uncover the methods 
through which doctors, hospitals, police, and judges try to control undesirable situations and the 
pregnant women who cause them, especially when these controls are often seen as individual 
responses to individuals behaving badly, rather than systematic forms of punishment.  
Also salient to this work, Jonathan Simon (2007) argues that since the 1960s, politicians 
have moved to establish the average citizen as a potential crime victim.  Fear of crime rhetoric 
has allowed for a shift that expands social regulation from the government into other more local 
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bodies such as schools, families, communities, and businesses.  Importantly for this work, 
hospitals, which are generally considered to be healthcare facilities, not social control agencies, 
may be filling a need extended to them through this period of “governing through crime.”  For 
example, Simon says “we can expect people to deploy the category of crime to legitimate 
interventions that have other motivations” (p. 4), meaning that pregnancy is recast as a crime 
problem, especially with regard to women who harm a fetus through drug use, when in reality 
the underlying motivation to regulate pregnancy may have more to do with abortion politics than 
the health of children.  Simon argues that by framing the problem as an issue of crime, rather 
than a polarizing issue like abortion, there is support for legislation and acceptance of control of 
a social phenomenon.  
Relevance 
This chapter has laid out several ways in which scholars have considered, interpreted, and 
studied law, medicine, sociology, philosophy, and criminology that are informative to this 
project.  Because scholars have recognized that both micro processes of how meaning is made 
and more macro debates concerning the proper limits of criminal law are important objectives to 
understanding a social phenomenon, I have purposefully kept this dissertation open to multiple 
lenses and fields of study.  The dissertation is still bounded in scope and chooses to be informed 
more by some lenses than others (e.g., problem construction over rights rhetoric; limited 
exploration of abortion and politically charged literature).  I felt that to keep this expansive view, 
a qualitative case study approach was best.  In the next chapter I lay out my methodology: how I 
constructed the study, how I carried it out, and why I chose certain elements and processes.  
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CHAPTER 2: Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter I give details about the study design, implementation, and analysis of the 
data.  First, I outline the purpose of the project.  Next, I discuss the pros and cons of qualitative 
research generally.  Finally, I give the research questions, describe the data collection, and 
identify the type of data analysis.  Not included in this section, but rather addressed in the final 
chapter is an in-depth treatment of the strengths and limitations of this particular study, including 
threats to internal and external validity.  
Purpose 
The purpose of the project is to show that the criminalization of pregnancy should be 
examined in a holistic context, of which only small pieces have already been done.  Like a 
jigsaw puzzle in a box, each piece is important.  Each piece contains an image, but that image is 
only a small part of the whole.  The whole picture cannot be seen until the entire puzzle has been 
put together.  Criminalization of pregnancy is like the jigsaw puzzle: pieces have been carved out 
in the medical, feminist, law, and drug policy arenas, but these works do not all speak to each 
other such that they form a larger picture of the problem.  I seek to put together all of these 
snippets of the problem in a comprehensive way that explores its complexities.   
Research Questions 
 My research sought to understand the processes, legal hurdles, and specific details of 
each woman’s story as she came under scrutiny during her pregnancy.  What was it about 
pregnancy that invoked the use of legal force to control a woman’s body?  How did doctors, 
nurses, and other medical professionals respond to women who had problematic pregnancies?  
Was it only drug use or were there other reasons that women were arrested, detained, confined, 
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or threatened with legal action?  Mainly, I sought to uncover the ways that women came to the 
attention of the criminal justice system and other informal mechanisms of control.  In the same 
vein, once I documented the processes and outcomes, I asked if there could be a better way of 
handling these types of cases- a way in which long term success for all people, the mother, the 
baby, and the public alike, could be implemented.  I purposefully examined women who had 
dissimilar outcomes, looked at the multiple mechanisms by which they were controlled, and kept 
my search open to women from all different parts of the country- meaning they were subject to 
different laws under their particular jurisdictions, making comparison difficult.  I wanted to see 
the underlying threads to see how all of these women’s experiences were connected, but also 
what could be done differently to prevent and provide for better outcomes for women and 
children.   
Case Studies 
My research data consist of case studies of women who were subjected to regulation 
because they were pregnant.  According to Thomas (2011): 
Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The 
case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that 
provides an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is conducted and which 
the case illuminates and explicates. (p. 513) 
My subject is pregnancy, through which I analyze regulation of bodies by mechanisms of social 
control.  My outcome variable was regulation, allowing for multiple definitions of that 
phenomenon, including arrest, confinement, judicial intervention, surgery, and legal punishment. 
Researchers using case studies may feel that worried about the methodological rigor of 
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using a small sample size to expound upon a phenomenon.  This is common and usual: 
As the design of the case study is presented often as open-ended and untethered—and 
methodological eclecticism is emphasized in commentary on design—researchers may 
feel unguided about structure: Open-endedness is extended to an unwarranted expectation 
of structural looseness, and, in the absence of a structure that maps out potential routes to 
follow, important pointers may be missed. (Thomas, 2011, p. 519) 
However, because case studies do allow for an in-depth tracing of events, looking at both 
“within” a case (how did events play out within just one person’s story and their logical 
consistency) as well as “across cases” where processes and outcomes can be compared among 
cases, the small sample size is necessary to achieve feasibility.  Especially as the concept of 
regulating pregnancy is somewhat hard to operationalize, case studies allow for the broadening 
of the dependent variable, which may be hard to do with quantitative data.  As well, because of 
the nature of case studies, their structure allows for an in-depth understanding of the paths taken 
to achieve a certain outcome, even allowing for different paths to lead to the same outcome.  
This “equifinality,” allows for a researcher to better understand how a process unfolds and a 
better parsing out of which variables are important when noting a case’s trajectory (George & 
Bennett, 2005).  For this work, some women had very similar pregnancies and behaviors, but 
their regulation was very different; others had very different stories but similar outcomes. 
George and Bennett (2005) explain that a case study researcher must identify the research 
objective with regard to theory building.   I identify this study as a “Building Block” study 
where: “‘Building Block’ studies of particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon identify 
common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose” (p. 76).  This means that my 
purpose is not to test theory or only provide description of a phenomenon.  Instead, I allow for 
  40 
common patterns across cases that may seem dissimilar when taken separately, but speak to a 
larger process when grouped together.  Moreover:   
Each block- a study of each subtype- fills a “space” in the overall theory or in a 
typological theory. In addition, the component provided by each building block is itself a 
contribution to theory; though its scope is limited, it addresses the important problem or 
puzzle associated with the type of intervention that led to the selection and formulation of 
the research objective.  Its generalizations are more narrow and contingent than those of 
the general “covering laws” variety that some hold up as the ideal, but they are also more 
precise and may involve relations with higher probabilities.  In other words, the building 
block developed for a subtype is self-sufficient; its validity and usefulness do not depend 
upon the existence of other studies of different subclasses of that general phenomenon. 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 78) 
Thus, my study is not dependent on previous studies to be useful nor does it require that 
all cases be similar.  Each subtype of outcome (e.g., criminal arrest vs. civil confinement) 
may not produce generalizable knowledge, but it helps to understand the phenomenon of 
pregnancy regulation more holistically.    
 Christine Williams (1991) endorses the case study method for studying women, but 
makes it clear that one cannot have “unbounded” case studies.  One must select one’s subjects 
carefully based on a priori criteria.  To be included as a case study, women had to be pregnant 
when something happened to them because of their pregnancy or they were pregnant at the time 
of a crime. 
Data Collection 
My dissertation data have mainly come from three sources: a) published research b) 
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published law review articles and c) internet news sources.  Using a modified snowball sampling 
technique, I built up the 26 case studies.  Newspaper articles often mentioned one or two cases.  
As I researched those in depth, more cases came to light.  This was also true of books and 
published journal articles.  One famous case would be discussed in detail and that would prompt 
me to search for more information on that woman.  As I followed up, those sources sometimes 
added detail to the known case, but many also pointed to a new case.  I stopped adding cases 
when I felt that I started to see repeating patterns that were generalizable even though each 
woman’s story was different.  It is possible that there are more cases that exist that would bolster 
or even refute my claims.  Part of the issue with this subject is that it is not exactly clear how 
many women are affected by these regulatory processes.  After reading the stories, I imagine that 
many are forced into surgery, arrested, drug tested, or confined but they never go to court, hire a 
lawyer, contact a civil liberties group, or contact the press.  These processes may go unnoticed 
by many as not problematic, or are regarded as things that one has no power to control.  Lastly, 
dissertations must be completed in a reasonable number of years, and sifting through many more 
than a score of cases would add richness, but complicate one’s ability to be finished.   
 I do not claim that these 26 cases are necessarily generalizable to the broader pregnant 
American population.  I cannot even assert that these 26 cases are even representative of the 413 
cases that Paltrow and Flavin (2013) found.  Even though that may be true, the lives of these 26 
women were impacted by their status as pregnant and rich data can be extracted from even a few 
cases lending support for key patterns, processes, and outcomes for those who have been 
criminalized during their pregnancies.  I have not engaged in cherry picking (where the data I 
have selected specifically supports the argument I am trying to make) nor have I suppressed any 
details of any of the women’s stories in order to make the stories fit nicely together.  Any case 
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where a pregnant woman was confined, arrested, jailed, or legally threatened was a viable data 
point for this study and was included if there was enough information about her case.  One case, 
that of Monica Morillo Gonzalez, was rejected because of a dearth of information.  
Data Analysis 
 I used content analysis to extract meaning from my data.  First I read as many accounts as 
I could about each woman.  I then put each case into my own words, using words of the woman 
and those in her life (the doctor, a spouse, a child, an advocate etc.) as much as possible.  After 
each case was written, I read and reread my data.  I used each woman’s story as a “recording 
unit, the smallest body of content (or text) in which a reference appears and is noted” (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 298).  Next I asked the same set of questions to each recording 
unit.  I asked: 1) Who is the woman? (subject) 2) What is the conflict? (conflict) 3) How does the 
conflict unfold (process) 4) Where did the conflict take place? (location) 5) What was the 
resolution of the conflict? (ending) 6) What were the feelings, words, motivations, and interests 
of the actors in the story? (values) and 7) What goals were achieved/were attempted? (goals).  
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias call this “‘What It Said’ Categories” (p. 299).  Finally, I 
grouped the data thematically based on the answers to the above questions, specifically looking 
for underlying threads through multiple stories. 
Being the only researcher in a qualitative study is both a benefit and a drawback for 
coding reliability.  It is beneficial to only have one coder because all codes are consistent and 
there are no discrepancies (where there might be if there were two or more coders and inter-rater 
reliability would suffer); however, this is also where the difficulty lies.  Having more than one 
coder or allowing a comparison between the researcher’s code and that of the research subjects’ 
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would increase the likelihood that the researcher is accurately interpreting the data and not 
analyzing based on her own biases and/or point of view.  
Ethical Considerations 
 Although my data were publically available and thus the consent of my subjects was not 
an issue, it is still important for subjects to have privacy.  Photographs of the women were not 
included in this project nor are addresses beyond city and state.  Moreover, I was careful to note 
the tone and bias of each source of data so that I could assess the agenda and bias of the 
information.  
Biases and Personal Biography 
 Throughout this project I had to remain aware of and check my biases and my own 
statuses.  I am a white, liberal, heterosexual, middle class, well-educated woman who has never 
been pregnant.  I do not face institutional racism, issues of poverty, or drug addiction.  I self-
identify as a critical criminologist and have a stake in seeing the criminal justice system loosen 
its grip on people I believe could be better served through services than punishment.  By 
maintaining strict adherence to data inclusion criteria and coding schemata, I attempted to keep 
my own personal views from influencing the data and my analysis.      
Strengths of Archival Research 
 Archival research has many benefits.  First, archival data is a type of unobtrusive 
measure.  Data are not manipulated by the researcher- the data existed in their current state 
before the research study began and remain after the research study has concluded.  Second, 
research subjects cannot be influenced by researcher bias as they might be in interviews.  Third, 
my data are publically available, which means that one can corroborate and replicate my findings 
with ease.   
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Limitations of Archival Research 
 Archival research suffers from multiple forms of censorship.  Because I used newspaper 
accounts, court cases, and published works, there were limits on the amount of space that was 
used to examine and explain each of the women’s stories.  Second, while quotes from the women 
did accompany many of the newspaper stories, official court case records and previously 
published works often summarized details, editing the history and not allowing the woman to 
make meaning of it herself.   
The Case for Qualitative Research on Women 
Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988) suggest that because of the focus on men in past research 
on crime, we must start over to understand how women fit into the equation of crime.  Moreover, 
it is not sufficient to just add in women to what we already know.  The feminist analysis 
specifically revolves around the claim that gender is a social and complex phenomenon that is 
rooted in biological sex and reproductive ability, although not defined by it, such that just adding 
in women would not fully capture the process or the intricacy that women and their place in the 
social structure add (Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988).  Thus, they suggest that until the 1980s there 
was restraint on delving in depth into the lives of women and girls.  It is clear that feminist 
theory and criminology have both come far since the 1980s, but the topic of regulating women 
by the status of pregnant is current and needs to be fleshed out.  For example, Purvi Patel was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison when she did not properly seek medical care to either end her 
pregnancy or save her baby when she did give birth.  Patel’s case made national news as women 
began to worry about how they themselves might be regulated just like Patel.  First, these cases 
are actually important to the everyday woman and scholars who study women’s issues should be 
leading the charge to find out why this regulation is happening and what can be done to fix it.  
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Moreover, these cases are not isolated events.  If the media is the only entity that takes up the 
mantle to report these plights, when the next big news story hits, the problem will fade from the 
country’s consciousness and the opportunity to see significant patterns will be lost.  It is 
therefore the job of scholars to find and understand big social problems, including how women’s 
bodies are regulated in multiple ways.   
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CHAPTER 3: The Women’s Stories 
Chapter Overview 
 My task for this chapter is to give details of the lives of some of the women affected by 
regulations, policies, and laws when these women were pregnant.  Many women came under 
scrutiny for using drugs and others for merely seeking care while pregnant.  My first goal of this 
chapter is to acquaint the reader with the stories of the pregnant women.  I provide “facts”3 rather 
than commentary in this chapter in order to paint a picture of these women’s paths to regulation.  
 I present 26 stories in this chapter.  To make them manageable and organized, I have 
grouped them by several analytic themes.  Each theme speaks to the conflict that brought about 
the regulation of the pregnant woman by an authority.  All of the conflicts ended with some kind 
of initial regulation, but the actual process for each woman was different.  The conflicts are 
broken down into the driving force of the case- why the woman was regulated.  For example, 
some cases are primarily about cesarean sections, while others are about the death of a fetus or 
infant.  The timing of regulation also differed for each type of case.  Some women were 
regulated well after the conflict took place, others immediately after the conflict was identified.  
Below, I give a brief introduction to each theme, but largely allow the reader freedom to read 
each story without much commentary.  Many of the women’s stories could fit in one or more of 
the themes that I have developed below.  I have purposefully chosen what I consider to be the 
most important point of that story and placed it with stories that have the same message, but in 
the chapter that follows I will preserve the fluidity of each story, allowing them to overlap and 
                                                 
3 Facts are often subjective and vary according to the person or document telling the story.  I have tried to 
triangulate data to provide the most accurate description of events.  
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speak to one another.  In the analysis chapter I report trends, processes, outcomes, legal issues, 
and medical ramifications at work in the lives of pregnant women.   
Death of the fetus 
 This first theme encompasses the women whose babies were stillborn.  Each woman was 
blamed for the death of her fetus and charged with a type of murder or feticide (the willful killing 
of a fetus).  These women were accused of committing the most heinous crimes of the sample: 
culpable homicide, homicide by child abuse, depraved-heart murder, and feticide.    
Nina Buckhalter (2009) 
At 31 weeks pregnant, Nina Buckhalter gave birth to a daughter, but she was stillborn.  
She was indicted by a grand jury for “culpable-negligence manslaughter” where Buckhalter was 
charged that she: 
did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, kill Hayley Jade Buckhalter, a human being, by 
culpable negligence, contrary to and in violation of Section 97-3-47, of the Mississippi 
Code of 1972, as amended; against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. 
(State v. Buckhalter, 2013). 
The indictment did not specify that she had taken drugs or how Buckhalter had killed her 
daughter. 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi found two things: 1) This was an inappropriate charge 
because Buckhalter should have been charged under another specific criminal statute about 
pregnant women who take drugs.   She could only be charged on the manslaughter charge if she 
could not face another charge and the Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that she should 
have been charged under two other sections of 97.  Specifically, 1) Section 97-3-3: “Any person 
wilfully [sic] and knowingly causing, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other 
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means whatsoever, any woman pregnant with child to abort or miscarry . . . shall be guilty of a 
felony unless the same were done by a duly licensed, practicing physician” or 2) Section 97-3-19 
(1): “The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner 
shall be murder . . . (d) when done with deliberate design to effect the death of an unborn child.”  
The state court did not address whether Buckhalter could be the killer of her own fetus in the 
manner described by the manslaughter statute.  The statute states that manslaughter occurs 
through the actions of “another.”  This issue remains in Mississippi: Can a pregnant woman be 
considered the “another” who kills her own fetus?   
 This case ended by affirming the lower court’s ruling, the indictment against Buckhalter 
was dismissed even though the issues brought forth by both the state and the appellee were not 
addressed.  Buckhalter could still be indicted again with different charges from before, especially 
ones that were specifically spelled out by the state court as acceptable. 
Rennie Gibbs (2006-2014) 
In 2006, Rennie Gibbs, a 16-year-old, gave birth to a stillborn child.  The child was born 
with her umbilical cord wrapped around her neck.  The post-mortem showed that the child had 
traces of byproducts of cocaine in her system, although cocaine itself was not present.  Gibbs 
was charged with “depraved-heart murder.”  Mississippi Code § 97-3-19-1 (b) states:  
1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any 
manner shall be murder in the following cases: (b) When done in the commission of an 
act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human 
life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular 
individual.   
This is a second-degree murder charge and can carry a penalty of up to life in prison.  
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I could not find out what happened between 2006 and 2014, (it is possible that she was 
imprisoned) but she went in front of a judge on April 3, 2014 and her case was dismissed.   
Citing precedent established in State v. Buckhalter (2013), the case was thrown out, but Gibbs 
could be retried if indicted on separate charges (not unlike Buckhalter, herself).   
Regina McKnight (1999-2008) 
 Regina McKnight, 22, homeless and with an IQ of 72, gave birth to a stillborn baby girl 
on May 15, 1999.  She weighed 5 pounds and was between 34 and 37 weeks old. The baby had 
benzoylecgonine in her system.  The pathologist who testified in the case stated that the only 
way for that substance to be in her system was through cocaine use.  McKnight was charged with 
homicide by child abuse.  According to the court case, Dr. Proctor, a criminal pathologist, 
examined the baby.  By South Carolina law, a viable fetus is considered a person, therefore the 
charge of homicide was applied instead of the charge of feticide, for which McKnight may or 
may not have been eligible depending on the prosecutor’s interpretation of her drug use.  At her 
first trial the jury could not decide in one day and was sent home.  Some members of the jury 
researched medical conditions at home and a mistrial was declared.  There was a second trial.  
She was found guilty in a half an hour by the jury and sentenced to 20 years in prison, eight of 
which were suspended. McKnight had no criminal record prior to this conviction.  Upon appeal, 
the court decided that the PCR (post-conviction relief) court had erred such that the new court 
granted relief to McKnight based on her ineffective assistance of counsel where her counsel 
could have argued that other factors had caused the stillbirth.  Convicted in 2001, McKnight’s 
relief came in 2008, seven years into her 12-year sentence.   
Purvi Patel (2013) 
  50 
Purvi Patel, 33, of Indiana went to the hospital with heavy bleeding.  After questions 
from the hospital staff, Patel admitted to giving birth to a baby and discarding it in a dumpster.  
After a search for the body of the dead fetus, police interrogated her in her hospital room after 
surgery was performed to remove the placenta.  Patel claimed that the baby was born dead (i.e., a 
stillborn).   There was controversy at the trial about the state of the baby at birth (i.e., alive or 
dead).  One expert testified that the fetus was only 24 weeks at the time of birth and therefore not 
viable.  Another expert claimed the baby was born alive and took at least one breath.  It is clear 
from medical science that there is great dispute among pathologists about how to tell if a baby 
were alive at birth via the lungs.  One test used at the trial was the “floating lung test” which has 
not been clearly established by medical science as a valid test (and may be subject to an appeal 
via Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) or incompetence of counsel claim for not 
adequately challenging the test).  The prosecution argued that had the baby been born alive, Patel 
did not do enough to save it.   
 Second, Patel lived in a household where she hid her pregnancy from her parents and her 
father even testified at the trial that he taught her not to have sexual intercourse until marriage.  
Patel testified that she panicked when the baby was born dead.  Not knowing what else to do she 
wrapped the body and threw it in a dumpster behind a local store. 
 Finally, Patel ordered abortifacients from Hong Kong according to text messages that she 
exchanged with a friend.  At the trial one medical professional testified that had Patel taken the 
drugs, but there was no evidence in her toxicology screen.  Another medical expert testified that 
the drugs she did order would only be effective in aborting a pregnancy if Patel were nine or 
fewer weeks pregnant.  Clearly, if she had tried to abort the baby herself, she was unsuccessful.  
She was still found guilty of feticide.  Feticide in Indiana is:  
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A person who knowingly or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an 
intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide, a 
Level 3 felony. This section does not apply to an abortion performed in compliance 
with…. (Indiana Code §35-42-1-6) 
The prosecutor claimed that she was guilty if she had tried to “terminate” the pregnancy, 
regardless of her success.  This does not comport with the actual legal language.   
 Patel, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison on both the neglect and feticide charges, is 
currently in prison waiting to appeal.  She was sentenced to 30 years for felony neglect, but 10 of 
those years were suspended.  She is also serving a concurrent sentence of six years for feticide.  
Her appeal will be handled by those who work on cases of wrongful convictions (Chowdhury, 
2015). 
Drug deliverers 
 Two of the four women in this section could have easily fit into the category above— 
they had babies who died; however, all of the women in this section had babies who were born 
alive, making them distinct from the stillborn cases above.  All four women faced sanctions, but 
less severe charges than the ones above.  The cases below turn not on the outcome of the baby 
(dead or alive) but rather on the conduct of the mother, specifically, her drug use.  Each case is 
framed based on drug use as means to deliver drugs to the fetus/child.   
Melanie Green (1989) 
In February 1989, 24-year-old Melanie Green of Illinois and her newborn girl tested 
positive for cocaine.  According to the pathologists at the hospital, the placenta had ruptured due 
to cocaine use and the fetus was deprived of oxygen before and during the birth.  The lack of 
oxygen caused the brain to swell and the baby died after two days of life (Logli, 1990).  On May 
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9, 1989, Green was charged with involuntary manslaughter and delivery of a controlled 
substance.  The Grand Jury declined to indict.  Reasons for a failure to indict are secret (as well 
as Grand Jury deliberations), thus, we do not know why Green was not indicted. 
Amanda Kimbrough (2008) 
Amanda Kimbrough had her third child at age 28.  Her son, Timmy Jr. was born on April 
29, 2008, prematurely.  At 25 weeks and 5 days of gestation, Timmy Jr. weighed only 2.1 
pounds and lived for only 19 minutes.  The court documents detail the day that Kimbrough went 
into labor.  She experienced labor pains and went to the hospital even though she was preterm.  
Her doctor diagnosed her with said preterm labor and “occult cord prolapse.”  This means that 
the umbilical cord enters the birth canal ahead of the fetus thereby cutting off the blood flow.  
The doctor also ordered a urine test to screen for drugs.  Her test came back positive for 
methamphetamine.  The doctor and her husband both questioned her about drug use during 
pregnancy but she denied it to both men.   
After undergoing a c-section, Timmy was born but complications were present.  Timmy 
was not breathing and his heart rate was low for a newborn.  Hospital staff performed CPR to the 
point where he was stable enough to be intubated.  After intubation, Timmy’s condition 
deteriorated and he died.  The pediatric doctor thought that Timmy died of “respiratory arrest 
secondary to prematurity” (court document, p. 8) (which makes sense that his lungs were not 
developed enough to sustain his life) but the medical examiner determined that Timmy died of 
“acute methamphetamine intoxication” (court document, p. 8) when she performed the autopsy.   
Methamphetamine was present in Timmy’s blood and liver at the autopsy.   
Kimbrough’s two children were immediately removed from the home and placed with the 
children’s maternal grandmother when Kimbrough tested positive at the hospital.  No date was 
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given in the court report.  Allegedly, Kimbrough admitted to the social worker that she had 
smoked meth with a friend three days before she had the labor pains.  In July 2008 the children 
were returned to their home and to Kimbrough’s custody when the Department of Human 
Resources (i.e., child protective services) determined that the kids would be safe in her charge.  
The New York Times article says that Kimbrough was only allowed supervised visits of her 
children while they were with their grandmother and that Kimbrough was required to attend 
parenting classes and drug treatment.  These statements do not appear in the court report.   
In September 2008, after the birth and death of her son, Kimbrough was charged with 
violating Code, §26-15-3.2 (3): Alabama’s Chemical Endangerment Law, where the language for 
her offense reads, “Violates subdivision (1) and the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact 
results in the death of the child. A violation under this subdivision is a Class A felony.”  
Kimbrough would not have been charged with violating this law if she had not been pregnant.  
Facing a penalty of 10 years to life, Kimbrough pleaded guilty at the behest of her lawyer and 
received the minimum sentence of 10 years. 
Particularly important to the case, Kimbrough argued multiple times that the definition of 
the word “child” in the law should not have included her fetus.  Kimbrough claimed that she was 
not given notice that the law was employing an expansive definition to include born and unborn 
offspring, thus violating her due process rights.   Ultimately the Supreme Court of Alabama did 
not agree that the word child was vague.   
Two poignant pieces of information from the New York Times article are: 1) “There have 
been approximately 60 chemical-endangerment prosecutions of new mothers in Alabama since 
2006, the year the statute was enacted. Originally created to protect children from potentially 
explosive meth labs, Alabama’s chemical-endangerment law prohibits a ‘responsible person’ 
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from ‘exposing a child to an environment in which he or she . . . knowingly, recklessly or 
intentionally causes or permits a child to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact 
with a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug paraphernalia’” (Calhoun, 2012) and 2) 
“Criminal convictions of women for their newborns’ positive drug tests are rare in other states, 
lawyers familiar with these cases say. In most places, maternal drug use is considered a matter 
for child protective services, not for law enforcement” (Calhoun, 2012). 
Hope Ankrom (2009) 
 On January 31, 2009, Hope Ankrom, 26, gave birth to a son.  She tested positive for 
cocaine before the birth and her son tested positive for cocaine after he was born.  Records from 
the doctor and self-report to the Department of Human Resources caseworker established that 
Hope had used marijuana.  The doctor’s records showed cocaine use through the pregnancy, but 
Hope denied cocaine use to the caseworker.  She was arrested on February 18, 2009 and on 
August 25, 2009 a grand jury indicted her for violating the Alabama’s chemical endangerment 
law.  She was denied her motion to dismiss the case (by the trial court on October 15, 2009) and 
pled guilty to the charge on April 1, 2010.  She was sentenced to three years in prison but ended 
up with a suspended sentence and one year’s probation.  
Importantly, it was in the motion to dismiss that Ankrom argued that the term “fetus” 
never was intended to mean “child” in the chemical endangerment law and that it shouldn’t 
apply to her because her fetus was not a child, it is against public policy, she was not accorded 
fair notice that her conduct was illegal because the statute did not specify a fetus, and that the 
state could have, but refused to, include language in the statute that specifically addressed the 
harm of a fetus as part of the chemical endangerment law.  The court reasoned that none of the 
above mattered, rather that because her child was born and tested positive after being born, this 
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counts as delivering drugs to a child.  Note that her conduct before she gave birth resulted in her 
delivering drugs to child through her umbilical cord.  Had the baby been born dead, it is not clear 
that she could have been charged.  This seems to present an equal protection violation, because 
women who engage in the same conduct while pregnant, namely taking drugs, would have 
charges brought only if the baby died.  This is not consistent with other types of laws regarding 
harm to individuals.  Neither the defense nor the court addressed the issue of harm.  It is not clear 
that the conduct (taking drugs) produced harm to the fetus/baby.   
Jennifer Clarice Johnson (1989) 
Florida resident Jennifer Johnson, 26 at the time her conviction was vacated, a black 
woman, was charged with delivering drugs to minor children (Boyd, 2004).  The delivery 
allegedly happened between the time that she gave birth and before the umbilical cord was cut.  
The “delivery” occurred through the umbilical cord.  Johnson was charged for using cocaine and 
subsequently delivering that cocaine through her blood into both her son (born in 1987) and 
daughter (born in 1989) through the umbilical cord.  Both children tested positive for cocaine 
and Johnson admitted to using before the births (Lewin, 1992).  Testimony indicated that there 
was about 60-90 seconds between the birth and the severing of the cord in the case of both 
babies.  It is clear that Johnson had a drug addiction.  It is also clear that she was forthcoming 
about her drug use and sought help for her fetus on at least one occasion after she became 
worried about her drug use during her pregnancy.  It is possible that Johnson did pass the drugs 
onto both babies, but the manner in which the drugs passed was likely during gestation, not 
actually from the time of birth to the cutting of the cord.  Johnson was found guilty of two counts 
of drug delivery and sentenced to 15 years of probation in July of 1989 (Lewin, 1992).  The Fifth 
District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in April 1991 (Lewin, 1992).  In July 1992, the 
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Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a) the legislature had never intended for delivery of 
drugs to a minor to occur in this manner, and there is no precedent for blood flow that one cannot 
control (i.e., intent to deliver) and b) laws that are unclear must be interpreted loosely in favor of 
the accused, rather than strictly where the favor is for the state, and c) that it is unfair to treat 
drug use during the birthing process as criminal when drug use during a pregnancy (i.e., in utero) 
is not a criminal behavior.  Moreover, the court suggested that should it be of interest to the state 
to include pregnancy in the definition of the illegality of delivering drugs to a minor, the law 
needs to be amended to clarify their stance on pregnancy transmission.   
Repeat offenders: Unresolved underlying issues  
 The two women in this section have slightly different stories from the rest of the women.  
Both women had past encounters with the criminal justice system and their pregnancies, while 
relevant, were more at the periphery of their stories than the other women in the sample.  
Johnson went to court and had her fertility regulated seemingly because she was pregnant and 
had a past with child abuse.  Greywind, a repeat offender, was charged with reckless 
endangerment for sniffing paint, lost custody of the rest of her children, was a repeat drug 
offender, and was homeless.  These women are not ideal mothers and are likely the some of the 
least sympathetic of sample.  The regulation that occurred did not get at the root of many of the 
issues that each woman had, especially violent tendencies, drug addiction, and lack of shelter.   
Darlene Johnson (1990-1991) 
I was unable to secure the case (People v. Johnson (1991)); however, I was able to glean 
several facts from published sources.  Johnson, 27, was pregnant when charged with child abuse 
from beating two of her four children with a belt.  She was sentenced to use a hormonal birth 
control implant rod, Norplant, that is injected into the arm of a woman.  At the time of Johnson’s 
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hearing, the drug had been recently approved by the FDA.  The condition to use the birth control 
as part of her probation came as a surprise to both Johnson and her lawyer as it was not part of 
the plea bargain to which she had agreed (1 year of jail and 3 years of probation).  Johnson’s 
lawyer was not present for her sentencing because he felt that the terms were clearly specified 
and allowed a colleague to take his place.  Johnson agreed to the jail, probation, and implant 
sentences at the sentencing, but her lawyer returned and tried to vacate her acceptance based on 
the fact that she probably did not fully understand about the drug and that she was diabetic and 
therefore not necessarily a good candidate for this drug.  Her retraction was denied by the 
sentencing judge.  She appealed the denial and was waiting for the appellate hearing when she 
was caught4 using cocaine.  She was sentenced to prison for five years and her probation was 
revoked.  The Court of Appeals (California) was never able to review this issue or deliver an 
opinion.   
Martina Greywind (1992) 
Martina Greywind, 28, a homeless American Indian woman, was arrested on February 7, 
1992 in Fargo, ND.  She was charged with reckless endangerment for sniffing paint.  She was 
approximately 12 weeks pregnant.  Importantly, Greywind had several children who were 
previously taken from her by the state.  On February 10, 1992 she pled guilty without a lawyer.  
She was sentenced to 9 months on a state prison farm in order to participate in a chemical 
dependency program (State v. Greywind, 1992).  Greywind became embroiled in a battle for her 
fetus.  There were multiple parties who were interested in whether she kept or aborted her fetus.  
                                                 
4 I use the term “caught” here, but I am not sure if she came forward about her drug use or if she was 
suspected of it by her probation officer and somehow it was shown that she had used cocaine (i.e., actual 
drugs found, toxicology screen, lie detector test, suspicious behavior, alert by another (“snitch”), or other 
means.  The point is that the reader should pay less attention to the word used to express her capture and 
more to the fact that she went to prison for her drug use.   
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Members of the religious group Lambs of God were in jail with Greywind and found out about 
her pregnancy.  The group then a) offered her money to bail her out if she kept the baby and b) 
filed a petition to have her brother declared her legal guardian.  The result of the petition was 
decided by a judge but the parties were told not to disclose the result.  Part of the affidavit that 
the brother provided included facts that Greywind had been abusing drugs since the age of 10 
and she had been arrested a dozen times in the past year.   
Kolata (1992) reports that she faced 1 year in prison and a $1000 fine.  On February 12, 
1992 she withdrew her plea because her lawyer claimed that she did not understand the charge.  
She pled not guilty. A judge allowed her to leave the jail to go to a medical appointment (or 
appointments) to have an abortion.  On March 30, 1992 she filed to drop the charges.  The 
assistant prosecutor did dismiss the charges with prejudice (meaning that she cannot be retried 
for this offense), stating:  
On February 10, 1992 [Martina Greywind] was charged with the offense of Reckless 
Endangerment, a class A misdemeanor. The defendant has recently undergone treatment 
at the North Dakota State Hospital and is presently in custody at the Cass County Jail on 
a subsequent and pending charge of Inhalation of Volatile Chemicals in violation of 
N.D.C.C. Section 12.1-31-06. Defendant has made it known to the State that she has 
terminated her pregnancy. Consequently, the controversial legal issues presented are no 
longer ripe for litigation. Further, the likelihood of this extreme factual situation recurring 
is limited. In the interest of preserving limited prosecutorial and judicial resources, 
Plaintiff hereby moves to dismiss the Complaint in this action with prejudice. (State v. 
Greywind, 1992) 
Confined against their will 
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The women in this section faced confinement in hospitals, treatment programs, and jails.  
In this section, it is clear that the purpose of confinement was for the protection or best outcome 
for the fetus, even if against the woman’s wishes.  Moreover, at least one woman was confined 
even though no actual problem had been corrected; her regulation was based on rules rather than 
context. 
Kari Parsons (2005) 
In 2005 in Maryland, Kari Parsons, a convicted shoplifter, was sentenced to probation 
that included mandatory drug screens.  Once she tested positive, the seven-month pregnant 
woman went in front of a judge who placed her in jail for the protection of her fetus.  Three 
weeks later Parsons gave birth to her son alone in a jail cell.  Parsons knew that she was in labor 
and the other women helped time her contractions.  After she repeatedly asked for transportation 
to a hospital, the guards placed Parsons alone in a cell.  The cell contained little more than a 
toilet and bed without sheets.  She gave birth alone.  She and the baby were healthy, but her son 
developed an infection because of the dirty conditions of the cell.  Obviously, the judge’s 
concern for her fetus was ignored in practice. 
Julie Starks (1999) 
“Julie Starks, a twenty-five-year-old white pregnant woman in Oklahoma, was arrested in 
a trailer that was allegedly being used, or that had once been used, to manufacture 
methamphetamine” (Paltrow & Flavin, 2013, p. 318).  As per the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
facts, Starks was arrested for production and possession of methamphetamine.  She and the 
father of her unborn child were both arrested.  His bail was set at $25,000 and hers at $25,000 
and raised to $200,000.  After the raise in bail, an emergency hearing was held where Starks was 
without counsel.  The trial court initiated the hearing and it was used to determine the custody of 
  60 
Starks’ fetus.  Because the fetus was viable, and the state has an interest in the survival of a 
viable fetus, the state (the trial court) took temporary, emergency custody of her fetus.  After 
some more hearings (attempts to vacate the judgment and bail decrease) it was confirmed that 
not only was the fetus in the custody of the Department of Human Services, but that should 
Starks post bail, she might be placed in a foster home and/or in a secure birthing facility for the 
actual birth.  Additionally the state filed a petition to name the fetus as “deprived” (i.e., abused, 
neglected, or abandoned) under Oklahoma Children’s Code. 
“While incarcerated in the county jail, Starks experienced dehydration and premature 
labor, developed urinary tract infections and sinus problems, and lost twelve pounds” (Paltrow & 
Flavin, 2013, p. 319).  She spent more than a month in jail before the bail was lowered (Paltrow 
& Flavin, 2013). 
 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reduced her bail to the original amount (equal to that of 
her male companion) and found that the order that she give birth in a secure facility to be “an 
unauthorized application of judicial force” (court opinion, paragraph 6).  The trial court then held 
another hearing where it imposed other restrictions on Starks should she post bail (urine drug 
tests at random times, disclosure of current residence, drug and alcohol “assessment,” and at 
least one pre-natal visit per week).  They also continued to maintain that DHS had custody of her 
fetus. 
 Starks’ baby was born on November 2, 1999.  On November 3, the trial court placed the 
baby in DHS custody.  On November 12, the DA changed the petition to say that the infant 
(rather than the fetus) was a “deprived child” based on the Oklahoma Children’s Code and it was 
all based on Starks’ conduct on August 23, 1999, the date of her arrest.  A jury found her guilty 
of depriving her child, even though no evidence of deprivation since the birth was presented.   
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 The court found that the Oklahoma Children’s Code cannot apply to a fetus- regardless of 
whether it is viable or not.  They based their decision on the interpretation of legislative intent 
and the definition of child as it had been applied to laws and court cases before (stare decisis).    
Rachael Lowe (2005) 
Rachael Lowe, 20, went voluntarily to get treatment for her Oxycontin addiction at 
Waukesha Memorial Hospital in Wisconsin.  She was reported by medical personnel at the 
hospital under the “cocaine mom law” where:  
An order of the judge if made upon a showing satisfactory to the judge that due to the 
adult expectant mother's habitual lack of self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, 
controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, there 
is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child, and of the child when 
born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the adult expectant mother is taken 
into custody and that the adult expectant mother is refusing or has refused to accept any 
alcohol or other drug abuse services offered to her or is not making or has not made a 
good faith effort to participate in any alcohol or other drug abuse services offered to her. 
The order shall specify that the adult expectant mother be held in custody under s. 48.207 
(1m). 
From there, she was taken to St. Luke’s Hospital (an hour from her residence) and detained in 
the psychiatric ward against her will.  She remained there for 12 days before a hearing was 
convened.  She was prescribed drugs in the ward and not given an appointment to see an 
obstetrician.  She was apparently being treated for her substance abuse although prescribed more 
drugs (anti-anxiety, sleeping pills, and nasal congestion relief ).  She was eventually released and 
required to “provide urine samples and to cooperate with law enforcement and health 
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professionals” (Paltrow and Flavin, 2013, p. 307-308).  Also Paltrow and Flavin indicate that the 
husband had to take time off to deal with this situation and she actually lost her job.   
Alicia Beltran (2013) 
On July 18, 2013 Alicia Beltran from Wisconsin was arrested when she was 14 weeks 
pregnant.  Taken from her home to a holding cell and later in shackles to family court, Beltran 
was told that her doctor and a social worker had spoken and were worried about Beltran’s former 
Percocet addiction.  She was given a prescription for Suboxone, a treatment for opiate addiction.  
Beltran said that she could not afford the prescription and instead got some from a friend.  By 
taking the prescribed drug and stepping down her dosage, she weaned herself off of medication 
altogether.  At that appointment Beltran tested positive for some of the Suboxone, but no other 
drugs.  Later, her urine tested negative for all drugs.  After her appointment, the social worker 
came to her house and told her to restart the anti-addiction treatment (Suboxone).  Beltran 
claimed that she was free of the addiction and did not want to recommence treatment.  Two days 
after the visit, she was taken into custody.  She was charged with endangering her fetus by not 
going on an anti-addiction drug.   At the hearing, an obstetrician made a statement that Beltran 
“exhibits lack of self-control and refuses the treatment we have offered her.”  This doctor did not 
meet Beltran prior to issuing that statement in court.  Further, the doctor said, “The child’s life 
depends on action in this case.” 
 Beltran, 28, was confined for 78 days in a drug-treatment center.  At the court, she asked 
for a lawyer, but was not given one.  Her fetus was appointed a guardian ad litem. She was 
confined under Wisconsin’s “cocaine mom” law (see above in the Lowe case) where any 
pregnant woman who does not conform to alcohol or drug standards (meaning she takes drugs or 
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alcohol “to a severe degree” or does not attend treatment) can be legally confined against her 
will.   
 Beltran lost her job and was scared: “this is supposed to be the happiest part of my 
pregnancy, and I’m just terrified” (Eckholm, 2013).   
Samantha Burton (2009) 
At age 26, Samantha Burton was on her third pregnancy.  Burton, not exactly a model 
pregnant woman, had a hard time giving up smoking during her pregnancy.   At 25 weeks she 
experienced pre-labor pains and was sent to a hospital to be examined.  Once the pregnancy was 
stabilized (such that she did not give birth early) Burton was ordered to remain on bed rest at that 
hospital for the remainder of her pregnancy.  Burton neither liked her physician at the hospital 
nor did she consider this advice practical given her status as mother and employee (Fish, 2010).  
The hospital stepped in to make sure that she did not leave and a lawyer on behalf of the hospital 
contacted a judge to get a court order that she remain.  The court agreed that Burton should stay 
at the hospital, submit to treatments and procedures, and not be allowed to change hospitals or 
seek a second medical opinion.  After three days of confinement, Burton miscarried and she was 
released.   
 Burton appealed the decision of the emergency trial court even though her claim about 
confinement was now moot.  In a 2-1 decision, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First 
District found that the State of Florida had indeed not proven its claim of compelling interest 
such that it violated Burton’s rights and reversed the trial court’s decision.   
Florida precedent, In re Dubreuil (1994) suggests that women may not be compelled to 
submit to medical procedures to save their own lives.  The Dubreuil decision hinges on multiple 
factors not present in this case (such as the life of the pregnant women was in jeopardy, the child 
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was already born when the medical action was taken against Dubreuil to save her life, and the 
argument was whether she should live or not to take care of her children) nevertheless, this 
precedent is key.  Dubreuil coupled with Burton’s constitutional right to refuse medical attention, 
made it clear that the trial court erred.  First, for a state to have a compelling interest in the life of 
an unborn child such that it overrides the pregnant women’s constitutional rights to bodily 
integrity and decision-making, the fetus must be viable.  The state made no such claim of 
viability at the trial. Even if they had, they would still have to pursue action that would affect the 
pregnant woman’s rights as little as possible.  With no comment, the court found that the state 
had not correctly balanced the interests of the state against the rights of Burton and reversed.    
Treatment by their own rules 
 All of the women in this section fit into at least one other section, especially Laura 
Pemberton who fits into the category of compelled surgeries (see below).  This category 
specifically speaks to how pregnant women might delay medical treatment or choose alternative 
birth scenarios that go against customary medical advice.  Here, I have highlighted the women’s 
unwillingness to follow directives that led to their regulation.   
Pamela Rae Stewart Monson (1987) 
A white woman from San Diego, Pamela Stewart Monson, age 27 in 1987, was charged 
with “failing to summon medical” attention promptly when she went into labor (Chambers).  
Ignoring the advice of her doctor, Stewart Monson used amphetamines, had sexual intercourse 
with her husband, and delayed getting medical attention when she started bleeding.  She waited 
about 6 hours to go to the hospital.  Stewart Monson’s son was born with brain damage and did 
not live for more than two months.  Stewart Monson was charged under California Penal Code 
Section 270, which reads:  
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If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary 
clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he 
or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars 
($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication 
in either a civil or a criminal action that a person is the parent of a minor child and the 
person has notice of such adjudication and he or she then willfully omits, without lawful 
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance or other remedial 
care for his or her child, this conduct is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one year or in a state prison for a determinate term of one year and one day, or 
by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. This statute shall not be construed so as to relieve such parent from the 
criminal liability defined herein for such omission merely because the other parent of such 
child is legally entitled to the custody of such child nor because the other parent of such 
child or any other person or organization voluntarily or involuntarily furnishes such 
necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care for such 
child or undertakes to do so. 
Further: 
Proof of abandonment or desertion of a child by such parent, or the omission by such 
parent to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial 
care for his or her child is prima facie evidence that such abandonment or desertion or 
omission to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or other 
remedial care is willful and without lawful excuse. 
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 The Municipal Court Judge dismissed the charges determining that the law (above) under 
which she was charged, was improperly applied— it was meant for collecting support from 
absent spouses, not to be used against the pregnant woman herself.  The spirit of the law was 
largely about money, not medical attention.  
Melissa Ann Rowland (2004) 
In 2004, Melissa Rowland, 28, was charged with first-degree murder for delaying a c-
section that might have saved the life of one of her twin children.  Rowland did seek care and 
obtained medical advice about how to proceed with giving birth.  She refused that advice that she 
sought.  The doctor recommended an emergency c-section because of low amniotic fluid and 
poor fetal vital signs.  For about two weeks Rowland continued the pregnancy without surgery.  
On January 13, 2004 she consented to the surgery where the female twin was born alive and the 
male twin was a stillborn.  The daughter tested positive for cocaine and alcohol.  Rowland 
willingly gave up the daughter for adoption; one report even indicates that that is the reason she 
went to Utah—their lenient adoption statutes (Pollitt, 2004). 
Medical examiners testified that had the surgery been scheduled for earlier in January, 
both twins would have survived.  Rowland was charged with murder of the stillborn male due to 
her apparent indifference for his wellbeing (instead of being charged with manslaughter).  This 
was not Rowland’s first time in court.  She had been adjudicated for larceny and child 
endangerment in her past.  Despite her record, because of her mental illness (Rowland had been 
diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder) and her suicide attempts in jail, the prosecution 
dropped the charge in exchange for a plea bargain.  By pleading to a lesser charge of two counts 
of child endangerment, Rowland was able to leave jail and serve out a term of 18 months of 
probation.  Rowland was also compelled to go to drug treatment.  
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Laura Pemberton (1996) 
Laura Pemberton, a white resident of Florida, had a c-section with her first child and the 
complication of the c-section incision (vertical and quite deep compared to the more standard 
horizontal one) made it so that no doctor would agree to allow Pemberton to try a vaginal birth 
after cesarean (VBAC) with her second child.  After attempting a home delivery with a midwife, 
she became dehydrated.  She tried to get fluids at the local hospital but the doctor she saw 
refused to help her.  “Dr. Thompson declined to assist in that plan by ordering only an IV and 
instead notified hospital officials of the situation. Hospital officials set about securing additional 
opinions from board certified obstetricians Dr. A.J. Brickler and Dr. David R. O'Bryan, the 
chairman of the hospital's obstetrics staff. Dr. Brickler and Dr. O'Bryan each separately 
concurred in the determination that a caesarean was medically necessary” (Pemberton v. 
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical).  Both doctors asserted that a vaginal birth would be 
significantly risky, possibly causing uterine rupture and the death of the baby.   
The Pembertons returned home without care.  In Florida, a procedure cannot occur 
without a patient’s consent unless a court orders it (due process is a requirement) so the hospital 
called a judge to come and rule.  A hearing began without the patient present and the judge 
ordered that she return.  Pemberton was escorted by a police officer and a person working with 
the hospital against her will (in an ambulance).  The hearing then resumed at the hospital.  She 
was given a chance to speak to the judge, but no lawyer was provided.  She was compelled to 
have the c-section.  Paltrow and Flavin (2013) note that she gave birth to three more children 
after this event via VBAC.  They note the grossly exaggerated danger she faced— she and her 
children survived the subsequent vaginal births. 
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Three years after the surgery, Pemberton sued the hospital seeking damages from the 
hospital in federal court.  The hospital moved for summary judgment and the District Judge 
granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital.   
Seeking help   
 This section encompasses the women who needed assistance but were criminalized 
instead.  Their stories include regulation after a home accident, domestic violence, a miscarriage, 
an ectopic pregnancy, and suicide.  All spent time in jail.  One woman even died because she did 
not get adequate care.  The following stories emphasize suspicion and/or concern for rules over 
compassion for the women and their circumstances.   
Diane Pfannenstiel (1990) 
Pfannenstiel, 29, was charged with drinking while pregnant and prosecuted for felony 
child abuse in 1990 in Wyoming.  Pfannelstiel, who was 4 months pregnant at the time, returned 
home from an alcohol rehabilitation program and her husband assaulted her (Goodman, 1990).  
She left home and contacted a local group that helps domestic violence victims.  The group 
brought her to the hospital because they felt that it was important that her injuries be examined.  
Due to her intoxication, she was arrested and jailed.  Later she was charged with felony child 
abuse for drinking alcohol.  At trial the judge did dismiss the charges (Roth, 2000) but she did 
serve at least a day in jail during the arrest and her husband served no time for beating her.  The 
judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution could not show that harm had come to the 
fetus (Lewin, 1990).  At the time (and as far as I know now), drinking while pregnant was not a 
crime in Wyoming and Pfannenstiel was old enough to legally drink alcohol.    
Michelle Marie Greenup (2004) 
  69 
Michelle Marie Greenup, a 26 year old black woman from Louisiana, was charged with 
second degree murder and jailed after going to a hospital where she complained of pain and 
bleeding.  After questioning her, doctors suspected that the baby had been born alive.  She was 
then questioned by police and finally told them the baby had indeed been born alive.  In reality, 
she had miscarried and her fetus was only 11-15 weeks old.  That fact was only established after 
her counsel obtained her medical records while she was in jail.  It could be that her birth control 
shot (“Depo-Provera”) caused the miscarriage- as it can after being given to someone who is 
pregnant.  Greenup pled guilty to violating the public health law about disposing of human 
remains.  This is a misdemeanor.  Paltrow and Flavin (2013) make it clear that this public health 
law was not designed to be used against pregnant women after a miscarriage.   
Bei Bei Shuai (2010) 
Bei Bei Shuai, a resident of Indiana, was pregnant and recently upset by the breakup with 
her boyfriend, the father of the unborn child.  On December 31, 2010, after her boyfriend left to 
return to his wife, Shuai attempted suicide by ingesting rat poison (Pollitt, 2012).  Her friends 
rescued her before she died and she was hospitalized.  Shaui was 33 weeks pregnant.  The baby 
was delivered by c-section, but died a few days later. 
Shuai continued treatment in the hospital for depression/mental health issues after the 
baby died (Rovner, 2012).  Once Shuai was released she returned to her life and work.  In March 
2011 she was arrested for attempted feticide and murder.  On Friday, August 2, 2013 a plea deal 
was reached such that Shuai pled guilty to criminal recklessness (Turner, 2013).  Her sentence 
carried a 178 day jail term, but since Shuai got credit for the 435 days that she served, she was 
released from jail (Turner, 2013).  The original charges of murder and attempted feticide would 
have carried a penalty of up to 65 years in prison (Turner, 2013). 
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Christine Taylor (2010) 
In 2010, at age 22, Taylor fell down the stairs of her home in Iowa.  She called 
paramedics.  She was checked out by the medical professionals and cleared but she chose to go 
to the hospital to make sure that she and the baby were both okay.  While in the hospital she 
allegedly admitted to the nurse (or doctor) that she was estranged from her husband and that she 
had considered aborting the fetus or giving up the baby for adoption.  She felt that a third child 
might be too much to take care of as a single mother.  She claimed that she changed her mind 
and wanted to keep it.  Police were called and interrogated her.   She was charged under Iowa’s 
feticide law for “attempted feticide.”  She spent two days in jail.  Taylor was in her second 
trimester, not her third so the law was not applicable and charges were dropped.  Three weeks 
after the arrest, the prosecutor claimed that it was the hospital doctors who erred in determining 
how far along she was. 
Jamie Lynn Fisher Russell (2013) 
In Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, Jamie Lynn Russell (also known as Jamie Lynn Fisher (her 
maiden name); Russell will be used in this document) went to the emergency room complaining 
of pain.  A report states that she was in so much pain that she could not lie down and asked for 
pain medication.  News articles report that she was considered combative by the staff.  As such, 
the hospital labeled her uncooperative and a nurse asked a police officer to help.  The hospital 
asked her to leave and the officer helped her to pack her belongings and found pill bottles 
containing controlled substances (Oxycodone (opioid, a pain medication), Alprazolam (generic 
of Xanax, an anti-anxiety medication) that were not prescribed to her.  A family member did say 
that the pills were the medications of a different family member and the officer noted it, but 
arrested Russell anyway claiming that he did not have time to investigate the matter.  Russell 
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was arrested for possession of a controlled, dangerous substance.  According to the law firm 
hired by Russell’s family to investigate this matter, Russell was drug tested upon admission to 
the hospital and the tests came back negative.  The hospital did release her (considering the 
whole reason the officer was there was to help her leave anyway), stating that she was “fit for 
incarceration” (Kemp, 2013).  Russell was placed in a holding cell in the jail and found 
unresponsive two hours after she was booked.  She was taken back to the hospital that had 
released her where she died the next day.  The medical examiner ruled that the cause of her death 
was an ectopic pregnancy.  Russell was 33 and the mother of a 10-year-old son.  After the 
Oklahoma State Bureau conducted an investigation, no criminal charges have been filed nor are 
charges expected to be filed in the future.   
Unwanted surgeries 
 In this final section, each woman was compelled to undergo surgery.  Two of the three 
cases involve a cesarean surgery where the woman and the baby lived.  One case involves 
cesarean surgery where neither the mother nor the child survived.   
Angela Carder (1987) 
Angela Carder had cancer when she was a teenager.  In remission, at age 27, Carder 
married and became pregnant.  At 25 weeks of pregnancy, doctors found an inoperable tumor in 
Carder’s lung that would kill her.  Carder agreed to have life promoting treatments done to 
extend her life so that her fetus would have a chance at being viable (being able to live outside of 
the womb).  Her condition deteriorated more rapidly than the doctors expected and in her 26th 
week a c-section was needed to deliver the baby.  The hospital asked for a court decision about 
whether to perform the c-section because Carder could no longer make her wishes known.  A 
doctor testified that the fetus had a 50-60% chance of survival if the c-section were performed.  
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The court granted the c-section on the grounds that without knowing what Carder wanted, and 
the baby being viable, it was enough that the District of Columbia (Washington D.C.) had a 
compelling interest in saving the life of the unborn child.  Angela Carder’s baby died two hours 
after the surgery and Carder herself died two days later.   
Evidence from the facts presented at the trial show conflicts between how much Carder 
wanted treatment for herself and for her child.  Since her tumor was inoperable, she was able to 
have chemotherapy and other treatments that would harm her fetus. The trial revealed that she 
wanted medications to keep her comfortable even though they may have harmed the fetus.  Also, 
Carder first accepted the court order for the c-section but then suddenly changed her mind and 
mouthed that she did not want to undergo the procedure.  It is possible that the c-section hastened 
her death.  Eventually, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals heard the appeal and found that 
if a patient cannot make a decision about her own medical treatment (in this case Carder was too 
sedated to do so), a process called substituted judgment may be used (“substitute itself as nearly 
as may be for the incompetent, and ... act upon the same motives and considerations as would 
have moved her” (in Re AC (1990)).  Basically, someone must act as a proxy for the person who 
cannot chose for herself.  The court acknowledged that this is often used in cases where the 
patient would prefer to die (known as “right to die”).  The court vacated the ruling and remanded 
the case back down to be tried again.   
Jennifer Goodall (2014) 
Goodall, a 29-year-old Florida mother, had three previous cesarean section surgeries (c-
sections).  The trouble started when Goodall entered into her fourth pregnancy and wanted to try 
to have a VBAC instead of defaulting to a c-section.  Women who have had c-sections in the 
past are often counseled to have them again (for both medical reasons and convenience), 
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although a trial of labor after cesarean (TOLAC) is recommended by the America College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists for women with low risk factors and at medical facilities that 
can provide emergency surgery should it become necessary.  Goodall was allegedly counseled at 
her medical appointments to schedule a c-section even though she wanted to do a trial of labor 
(the process of trying a vaginal birth, that if successful leads to a vaginally born baby (vbac)).  
To be clear, Goodall was not a patient who thwarted her doctors at every turn or made rash 
decisions.  Instead, she rationally considered the available research and her options.  She released 
a statement saying, “My decision to allow labor to proceed before consenting to a surgical 
intervention is based on years of research, careful consideration of the risks to me and my baby, 
and my family’s needs.  All I want is to be able to go to the hospital when I’m in labor and have 
my medical decisions respected -- and my decision is to proceed with a trial of labor and not 
have cesarean surgery unless some medical complication arises that makes cesarean surgery 
necessary for my or my baby’s health” (Mosbergen, 2014).   
On July 10, 2014 Goodall received a letter written by the CFO of her hospital that sums 
up conversations that she had had with her doctors about intentions she had for her delivery and 
her refusal to schedule a c-section.  The letter also contained three paths of action that the 
hospital intended to follow after her case was reviewed by the hospital’s Ethics Committee.  
One, the hospital was going to contact the Department of Children and Family Services about her 
refusal to undergo the c-section.  Two, the hospital was going to ask a judge to intervene to 
decide about her treatment and care.  Three, should she go to that hospital while in labor, a c-
section would be performed with or without her consent.  Goodall changed hospitals and was 
able to try a trial of labor that she did eventually abandon for a c-section because the labor was 
not progressing.   
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 On Saturday, July 26, 2014 Goodall posted to her Facebook the following message:  
“This was all I wanted to begin with.  I am grateful to the medical staff at another hospital who 
assisted us in a safe and healthy delivery. Now, my family's focus is on welcoming our newborn 
into our family with love, and on my physical and emotional recovery from the intensity of the 
last few days.” (Gluck, 2014; Mosbergen, 2014). 
Lisa Epsteen (2013) 
Lisa Epsteen, 35, was pregnant with her fifth child in 2013 in Florida.  Tuesday, March 5, 
2013, Epsteen was past due and went in for a checkup.  Her exam showed that the fetus was in 
distress and that both the mother’s condition (gestational diabetes) and the fetus’ position made 
her a good candidate for cesarean surgery.   As well, Epsteen’s previous births were by c-section 
and although Epsteen had wanted to do a VBAC (vaginal birth after cesarean) she agreed to go 
in on Friday, March 8 for a planned c-section.  Her concerns about doing it on Tuesday were 
twofold: 1) she was driving the only family car and was not sure how her husband would get to 
the hospital and 2) her child would have no child care if she had to give birth right then.  The 
language of the article does not make it clear whether the child was with her and she would not 
be able to get him/her to a stable location or if the child was already being cared for by someone 
else in another location and it would have been a problem for the caregiver to retain temporary 
physical custody of that child.  Either way, her concerns, while ordinary, were important as 
Epsteen made her decision. 
 Wednesday she had an email from her doctor, which provided both a level of concern 
about her fetus and a threat with action by law enforcement.  The email read: “‘I am deeply 
concerned that you are contributing to a very high probability that your fetus will die or your 
child will incur brain damage if born alive. At this time, you must come in for delivery.  I would 
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hate to move to the most extreme option, which is having law enforcement pick you up at your 
home and bring you in, but you are leaving the providers of USF/TGH no choice’” (Stein, 2013).  
Epsteen’s response was to get the National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW) involved.  
The NAPW had a lawyer return an email to the doctor that told him to cease his threats against 
Epsteen.  
 “‘Honestly, I feel abandoned. There has to be a level of trust between provider and 
patient, and that has been betrayed,’ said Epsteen, who said she now fears returning to USF and 
Tampa General for her planned delivery. ‘It's circumstances like this that make women feel like 
they have no options but to birth their babies on their own — and put themselves in more 
dangerous circumstances — because they feel bullied’” (Stein, 2013).  Epsteen in her own words 
felt 1) abandoned, 2) betrayed, and 3) bullied by a doctor which seems to go against their 
medical ethics of not doing harm.  The case ended with her having the c-section surgery on 
Friday as planned where she gave birth to a healthy 11-pound boy.   
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CHAPTER 4: Analysis of the Regulatory Process 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter takes stock of the cases and the patterns that undergird them.  As I described 
in Chapter 3, the women’s stories are all different, but several themes and patterns flow through 
them.  These underlying themes appear again and again throughout the cases, manifested in 
different scenarios, such that we should be concerned about how pregnant women are treated in 
American society. 
In this chapter I lay out the processes by which several different kinds of pregnant 
women have been regulated.  At first blush, some of their stories seem too disparate to have 
anything in common other than that they involve pregnant women, but that is actually only one 
very basic pattern that applies to them.  In this chapter I first explain how this regulation 
manifests itself in most cases showing how both status and the medical system are key players in 
how a woman begins the process of regulation.  Next I move into questions of why this 
regulation happens, noting several consistencies among their stories, and finally I move into 
questions of what this actually means and why we should care.   
How?  Pregnant Status Offenses 
 As I have noted above, obviously, the data all contain women who were pregnant.  More 
important than just this fact, that status has an active part in how the women were actually 
regulated.  This is not necessarily worrisome on its face: society may wish for pregnant women 
to be treated differently from the rest of the population.  Women who are pregnant may need 
specific services, help, treatment, and so forth such that differential treatment may not a bad 
thing.  What is worrisome is the sort of treatment that actually results when pregnant women are 
targeted.  The main way I see this regulation by status as problematic is what I call “creative 
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criminal justice.”  Using coercive powers that are delegated to them, such as arrest, charging, 
bail, and sentencing discretion, criminal justice entities were able to selectively target pregnant 
women for excessive or distinct punishment based on status.   
Creative criminal justice.  First, Julie Starks was not arrested for her status of pregnant; 
she was arrested just like her male companion for drug possession and drug production.  This 
seems fair and unbiased at first glance, but her status mattered greatly in the way she was treated 
once she was in the criminal justice system: her bail was raised to an amount eight times that of 
her non-pregnant companion even though they were arrested at the same time in the same 
location.  Immediately after her bail was raised, a hearing was held for the custody of her fetus.  
It is very clear that the state took an interest in regulating Stark due to her pregnancy and not 
because of her specific crime or past offenses.  
Alicia Beltran, who did not break the law, was arrested for failing to take an anti-
addiction drug after she had already beaten her drug addiction.  Even though Wisconsin has the 
“Cocaine Mom” law that allows for the legal confinement of a pregnant person if there is severe 
drug or alcohol use, Beltran did not qualify to be arrested under this law because she had stopped 
taking drugs.  Creatively, she was charged with endangering her fetus by not taking the 
prescription drugs and a doctor whom Beltran had never seen testified against her at her hearing 
giving references to her character that could not be substantiated.  As a society we should worry 
that a person can be arrested for failing to take prescription drugs, even if those drugs are for the 
benefit of the woman and her fetus.  In general, people do not always make the healthiest choices 
for themselves when it comes to exercise, healthful foods, and nutrition, but American culture 
allows for us (and often encourages us) to decide what we do with our bodies.  Even the right 
amount of exercise or which foods are healthful are debated by experts and often requirements 
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vary from person to person.  There is no one size fits all model of health.  Taking this a step 
further, we know that prescription medications may cause harmful side effects and that only after 
weighing those effects with the purpose and need of the medication, should a doctor and patient 
make an informed choice about usage.  Moreover, it is not clear that in this case that those drugs 
would have benefitted Beltran or her fetus and it is contrary to the medical ethos of “do no harm” 
to require that a person take legal drugs that are not helpful to a person’s wellbeing.  Here, 
Beltran was regulated by the medical system because she was pregnant, but the reason that she 
ended up in a drug treatment center was not due to her need for treatment, but because her doctor 
and a social worker mobilized the formal use of the criminal justice system- an arrest coupled 
with expert testimony that she could not contradict.  It is very likely that had Beltran not been 
pregnant, medication and confinement would not have been forced on her.  Finally, there is an 
argument to be made that Beltran’s status of pregnant determined her legal intervention forcing 
her to take prescription medication.  The Cocaine Mom law cannot be used against non-pregnant 
people, but moreover, there are only limited populations who are forced to take medication- 
children, those in psychiatric care, those in prison, and those in the hospital, but Beltran was 
arrested and forced to take prescription medication when she was not a criminal, sound of mind, 
and rid of her addiction.  There are many reasons that we do not want precedent that forces 
people to take medication through court order.  First, even after extensive testing, not all 
prescription medications are safe, not all people will remember to take their medications, some 
will take them improperly, not all people can afford prescription medications (including Beltran 
herself), and ultimately, it is an overreach of government power to tell people which substances 
to ingest for their health.  Law is largely proscriptive, thus the government telling people what 
not to do is normal, but mandating that someone ingest prescription medication is an overreach 
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of the law that should only be reserved for the most serious of cases where a severe mental 
illness has been diagnosed or criminal guilt has been proven.   
In Laura Pemberton’s case, the hospital used the criminal justice system to make sure that 
a police officer took her into custody so that she would have to attend a hearing (as mandated by 
the state for any procedure that is not agreed to by the patient) so that Pemberton would be 
forced to deliver her child by c-section.  While not the most egregious use of the criminal justice 
system, it is problematic that a hospital would send police to a patient’s home in order to make 
sure that the hospital was conforming to the guidelines of the law.  Of course hospitals and 
doctors need to protect themselves from lawsuits, but here we have a case where the letter of the 
law is upheld, but not the spirit of it.  This use of law enforcement to make sure that Pemberton 
had her “fair” hearing should be concerning to us because the hearing itself could never be fair.  
First, Pemberton did not have access to legal counsel, but more importantly she could never be in 
a position to adequately speak on her own behalf.  She was under duress (i.e., labor and forced 
relocation to the hospital).  It is clear that once she was forcibly removed from her home and 
taken to the hospital, a chain of events began that proposed little chance for Pemberton being 
able to choose the manner in which she gave birth.  Do we want to live in a world where 
hospitals and police decide our medical care for us? 
Jennifer Clarice Johnson was charged with delivering drugs to her newborn children via 
the umbilical cord moments between birth and the severing of the umbilical cord.  This is the 
most creative charge of the sample because Johnson could not be a drug deliverer to minors 
while she was still pregnant and once the cord was clamped, she would no longer be responsible 
for any drug transmission that was done through bodily exchange, thus the only choice the 
prosecution had was to charge her with drug delivery during the 60 to 90 seconds that the 
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children were alive but not yet separated from her.  This case is worrisome because the charge is 
so specific in nature (i.e., after birth, before clamping) but there is little evidence that can be used 
to verify this process and it used a perverted definition of drug deliverer, inconsistent with the 
intent of the legislature.  This case is problematic because it looks like the justice system went 
out of its way to try to pin something on Johnson when no other criminal offenses seemed to fit. 
This case reads almost as a vendetta that her drug use during pregnancy could not go 
unpunished.  First, Johnson sought help during her pregnancies for her drug use- clearly she was 
not negligent.  Second, Johnson’s status as a drug user neither prompted help nor action against 
her while she was not pregnant.  Once she was pregnant and continuing to use drugs, still 
nothing was done.  When she was ready to give birth there was a distinct shift in the attention she 
received.  On both occasions, the doctors quickly acted to test the infants for drugs.  Thus it was 
the presence of a potential life that prompted action, not a concern for a current life: a person 
who needed (and asked for) help.  The lesson that the public takes away from this case is that 
babies’ lives matter more than other bodies’ lives do.  If one is a drug user and not pregnant, 
nothing is done.  Once a fetus or an infant is involved, formal mechanisms of social control grind 
into gear in ways that penalize the pregnant body.  The pregnant person suffers a formal 
punishment that the non-pregnant body does not.  We should be wary of a criminal justice 
system that seeks to scrutinize our every behavior in order to accuse us of breaking the law, 
especially if a reading of that law is twisted to create a transgression.  Ideally, Americans are 
entitled to the predictability of law.  Pregnant women should not be an exception to this 
principle.  Even more noteworthy, related to status, pregnant bodies should not be more 
monitored than other bodies for the same behaviors and issues (e.g., drug addiction) for the 
purposes of punishment or to shore up the collective conscience.  Pregnant women do face 
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increased surveillance because of very public, physical changes, but also because many seek 
medical care as they navigate nine months of these changes.  These codified penalties and 
punishments attached to behaviors during pregnancy and the additional chance of detection 
creates a situation where a pregnant person can be at the mercy of the doctor or law enforcement 
when she does something that is judged to be not in the best interest of the fetus. 
Finally, the most telling example of this regulation by status theme is the creative use of 
sentencing by the judge in Darlene Johnson’s case.  Johnson’s case is not about her pregnancy 
per se, but rather the active sentencing condition that she not become pregnant again.  Beyond 
the personal medical implications for Johnson, it is inappropriate for a judge to regulate the 
fertility of an offender even when she is clearly not a good parent.  First, judges are not equipped 
to prescribe a medical device or medication; this is out of the purview of their duty and expertise.  
Second, it is unclear if the judge would have sentenced her to birth control had she not been 
pregnant at her sentencing hearing, but even if her status of pregnant did not dictate this creative 
addition to her sentence, her status as a potential pregnant woman certainly did.  Arguably, this 
control of fertility also applies to Purvi Patel who was sentenced to 20 years in prison.  Should 
she serve the full sentence, Patel will be 53 when she returns to the civilian life.  One 
consequence of such a lengthy sentence is that it is likely that she will not be able to conceive 
another child at that age.  The prison sentence effectively curtails her ability to ever become a 
biological mother.  Both of these cases call attention to the fact that the criminal justice system, 
whether purposefully or by collateral consequence, is actually determining that there are some 
women who are so unfit to be mothers that if we sentence them to a long enough term or demand 
that they use birth control as part of their probation, we will not have to worry about them 
fulfilling that undesirable role of bad mother.  Both cases present dangerous precedents for 
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problematic women who come after them.  These future pregnant women may actually turn out 
to be decent mothers but need a second chance and/or help, but may not get what they need to be 
successful.  Giving the criminal justice system the power to regulate fertility through punishment 
is a very scary prospect indeed.  Should Americans see this power as legitimate without 
considering the sexist and racist implications of these punishments, it becomes the latest 
manifestation of patriarchal control of women’s bodies and certainly has ties to the vestiges of 
slavery where regulation of the fertility of bodies of color was common (Roberts, 1997).   
Clearly, regulation by status is present in all of the cases.  Thus, regulation by status is a 
clear and obvious theme that brings all of these cases together, but more important questions 
about why this happens and what it means remain to be answered.  Regulation by status is only 
the beginning of the story.  I suggest that while I explore several different questions related to the 
process of regulation in this section, this regulation by status is a very important variable and for 
those scholars interested in women’s treatment by social institutions, this is a tactic that is used 
to promote conformity to rules and laws.  
How?  Hospital-to-Prison Pipeline 
The second obvious pattern in the data was that virtually all of the cases in my study 
included a visit to a hospital or doctor that prompted law enforcement action.  Only four women, 
Greywind (directly arrested on the street for sniffing paint), Darlene Johnson (arrested for child 
abuse), Starks (directly arrested for manufacturing/possessing methamphetamines), and Parsons 
(failed a drug test while on probation) came to law enforcement attention without going to a 
hospital or doctor first.  While these women are not a part of the hospital-to-prison pipeline, it 
should be noted that if one were to view this as a broader category of tracking the behavior of 
women by social control agents, Parsons would qualify because her behavior was monitored as 
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part of her probation.  Therefore, since the justice system is so intrinsically linked to the medical 
realm in most cases, it is problematic to separate these two spheres of influence.   
A critique that is often levied on the school-to-prison pipeline is that police and school 
resource officers are used to respond to disciplinary issues that have traditionally been handled 
by teachers and administrators (Simon, 2007; ACLU, 2016).  The same kind of critique can be 
applied to what I call the hospital-to-prison pipeline.  First, doctors and hospitals are quick to 
mobilize law enforcement agents, particularly police and judges without thinking about the 
ramifications of that referral.  This played out in especially harsh ways for Jamie Fisher Russell 
and Diane Pfannenstiel.  Second, it is clear that this quick use of law is inappropriate and 
shortsighted.  Hospitals and their staff should not practice law, take law into their own hands, or 
do anything beyond their medical competency especially when they are ignorant of the letter of 
the law.   
Arguably, Russell is probably the most gripping story of how not to treat an ill person. 
Russell was seeking treatment for pain and could not relax enough to get a proper diagnosis. 
There are many things that the hospital staff could have done to help her be less combative other 
than involve security which would not have resulted in them turning her away from receiving a 
diagnosis and/or treatment.  Mechanisms like pain management, help from family to calm her, 
anti-anxiety drugs, a friendly staff person who could comfort her, and other measures could have 
been utilized before police were asked to escort her out.  If her behavior had continued to 
escalate and police were absolutely necessary, once controlled substances were found in her 
possessions she was not in a position to defend the pill bottles due to her pain.  At that point, a 
reasonable guardian should have been appointed so that she could receive medical care and the 
issue of arrest could be handled at a later date.  The hospital could have retained custody of 
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Russell while the police officer spent time investigating the pill possession.  It is possible that 
Russell was the legal or de facto guardian of a family member for whom the medications were 
prescribed.  It is not unreasonable to expect competent adults to handle medications of those who 
cannot: such as children, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. A family member did say that 
the pills were those of another family member.  Had there been an investigation, a reasonable 
answer to her possession could have been substantiated.  Russell paid for the hospital’s quick 
dismissal of her symptoms with her life.   
Pfannenstiel, who lived through her experience, had similarly horrifying treatment.  I do 
not know the exact nature of how the hospital staff treated her (it is possible that they were 
pleasant and respectful to Pfannenstiel) but they took a woman who had been injured by her 
spouse and contacted police because she was pregnant and drunk.  The hospital staff had a duty 
to examine and treat Pfannenstiel’s injuries inflicted by her husband, her intoxication 
notwithstanding.  It is inappropriate to refer drunk or high patients to law enforcement unless 
those patients are a danger to themselves or others and even then a hospital can serve as a secure 
facility to correctly decide how to handle the person.  Even if the hospital personnel felt that 
Pfannenstiel had harmed her fetus by drinking, they would have been the ones who could 
intervene with medical techniques to try to mitigate the damage.  Jail cells cannot and will not 
help fetuses.   
 It should strike reasonable citizens as a miscarriage of justice that an abused person spent 
a night in jail awaiting adjudication after seeking medical treatment for injuries.  Medical doctors 
are not legal experts who know when their states require them to drug test or report when they 
suspect their patients of drug use.  The 2016 Guttmacher Institute report details how pregnant 
drug use is codified (criminal, child abuse, or legal grounds for civil confinement), what must be 
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done when the drug use is suspected (report and/or test), and available treatment for pregnant 
drug users (targeted treatment programs, priority admission into established general drug 
treatment programs, pregnant women considered a protected class who are not allowed to be 
discriminated against in admission to drug programs funded by public monies).  Only 15 states 
require reporting when drug use is suspected.  Of those states, only three require drug testing.  
One state, Kentucky, requires testing but not reporting.  All told, 16 states require testing, 
reporting, or both.  It is clear based on this small sample of women that doctors do not know the 
law and routinely and inappropriately default to using law enforcement help for women with 
addictions to both legal drugs (i.e., prescription pills, alcohol, and cigarettes) and illicit drugs.   
 This automatic application of an unnecessary system does have practical and legal 
implications for women.  Consider Christine Taylor who confided in the nurses and doctors at 
the hospital that she had considered options other than keeping the baby because of the economic 
and practical concerns of being a single mother of three.  After her arrest Taylor was detained for 
two days and eventually the charges were dropped.  She will always have the arrest on her record 
unless she files paperwork and pays money to have it expunged.  This small mistake by hospital 
staff may cost Taylor economic troubles such as the loss of her job or government assistance and 
could make her more estranged from her community, neighbors, family, and friends.   
Why?  Women are not Trusted to Make Good Decisions 
 In the last chapter I established that the regulation of pregnant women occurs under a 
variety of circumstances such as during the actual birthing process, through routine medical 
examinations, during scheduled surgeries, and through various interactions with doctors, social 
workers, nurses, and other care givers; interactions that often lead to criminal justice 
involvement in some form.  This section begins the exploration of the question of what the data 
  86 
reveal about why this regulatory process is happening.  Again, because each case has different 
circumstances, is located within different jurisdictions from the others, and involves women who 
come from a variety of socioeconomic and racial statuses, these underlying threads are not due to 
one causal variable or isolated to one kind of woman.  Rather, this theme that women cannot be 
trusted underpins several of the stories and speaks to why this type of regulation is so compelling 
to many agents of social control. 
Miscarriages.  First, it is very concerning that there is not a clear message throughout the 
country as to what women should expect when a miscarriage occurs.  Miscarriages are not 
uncommon.  The rate is approximately 15-20% in women who know they are pregnant (U.S. 
National Library of Medicine, 2016).  This is likely a conservative estimate, because 
miscarriages probably do occur to women who do not know that they are pregnant.  Therefore 
the rate of miscarriages among all pregnant women is likely higher.  Miscarriages are defined as 
the loss of a pregnancy before 20 weeks of gestation, but most miscarriages occur before week 
13.  This is why there is a culture of silence surrounding pregnancy announcements.  Women are 
cautioned to keep news of a pregnancy within a small circle of family members until the 
beginning of the second trimester when the danger of miscarriage has passed.  Stillbirths are rare, 
but not unheard of.  According to the World Health Organization, the recommended definition of 
a stillborn is a baby born without life signs or a baby born after 28 weeks of gestation without 
life signs.  Approximately 1% of pregnancies in America end in a stillbirth, averaging about 
24,000 babies per year (MacDorman & Gregory, 2015).   In total, “there are more than 1 million 
lost pregnancies each year in the United States” (MacDorman & Gregory, 2015, p. 1).  From 
1995 to 2013, the stillborn rate for non-Hispanic, Black women was approximately twice (or 
more) than that of non-Hispanic White women (MacDorman & Gregory, 2015) Thus, there is 
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evidence that miscarriages and stillbirths do affect a significant percentage of pregnant women; 
therefore, it should not be shocking to doctors to have patients who experience a pregnancy loss.  
Moreover, even though the rate of stillbirths is low, the fact that a Black woman is at least two 
times as likely to have a stillbirth than a White woman suggests that a doctor should not be 
suspicious about having more Black patients who suffer miscarriages than White patients.   
Several of the women in the study miscarried or had stillborn babies.  Many women make 
good decisions when it comes to getting help for a spontaneous abortion- they seek medical 
attention when they notice symptoms of a miscarriage, like bleeding or pain; however, not all 
women may handle stress and scary medical situations in a calm manner.  Medical research is 
still unable to predict which women will have stillbirths, although we now know some factors 
that are associated with them. 
The NIH network researchers also found that most stillbirths could not be accounted for 
by pregnancy history and other maternal characteristics at the time the women in the 
study learned they were pregnant. However, the researchers found that some 
characteristics were associated with an increase in risk for stillbirth. These include a 
previous stillbirth, being a first-time mother, a history of miscarriage in earlier 
pregnancies, gestational diabetes, AB blood type, drug addiction, smoking three months 
before getting pregnant and maternal overweight and obesity. The researchers could 
identify a probable cause of death in 61 percent of cases and a probable or possible cause 
of death in 76 percent of cases. (NIH, 2011) 
Thus, it is not a rare occurrence, but it is also hard for doctors and women to know whether they 
will experience a miscarriage or a stillbirth.  Because women do not expect this outcome, some 
women panic or handle the situation in a way that seems cruel, such as Purvi Patel’s discarding 
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of the body of the stillborn baby in a dumpster.  We can condemn Patel and claim that at 33 
years old she should have known to call 911 and seek medical help.  It is reasonable that Patel’s 
age makes us less sympathetic to her reaction, but her familial situation was extreme.  She was 
employed by and living with her family, yet acting contrary to their expectations and wishes.  It 
is possible that when the baby was born dead that she hoped to preserve the fiction that she was 
following the rules outlined by her family of not having sex before marriage; after all there was 
nothing that could be done for the baby and it is not clear that Patel would have any means of 
financial support or housing if her family disowned her.  Patel’s story expresses a need for both 
more cultural understanding of pregnancy as an unhappy event for some such that abortion and 
adoption are necessary services, but also for good doctors who can not only identify physical 
needs for the pregnant woman and her fetus, but also things that they may need to have a healthy 
baby that are beyond medical care including a supportive environment and shelter.   
 Even women who do the right thing and go to professionals for help may be criminalized. 
Michelle Marie Greenup sought medical attention when she experienced pain and bleeding.  
Greenup was pressured by police to admit that she had given birth to a live baby even though in 
reality she had had a miscarriage.  Even after being arrested, jailed, and having the charges 
dropped, she still had to plead guilty to violating a human remains disposal law.  This raises 
several concerns.  First, this law was not meant to be used against pregnant women (Paltrow & 
Flavin, 2013) but second, how do women know what to do if they do have a miscarriage at 
home?  Is it the responsibility of a pregnant woman to anticipate that she might lose her baby and 
have a plan if that reality unfolds?  It seems likely that should society deem miscarriage and 
stillbirth education to be so important, the burden actually falls on the medical system to tell 
patients what to do and whom to contact.  We do not criminalize people when they have 
  89 
emergency medical events like strokes and heart attacks, why should miscarriages be viewed 
differently? 
 Legislators certainly are interested in codifying miscarriages.  Representative Bobby 
Franklin of Georgia presented a bill (HB1) in 2010-2011 to curtail abortions by focusing on what 
he called “prenatal murder.” 
“Prenatal murder” means the intentional removal of a fetus from a woman with an 
intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus; provided, however, 
that if a physician makes a medically justified effort to save the lives of both the mother 
and the fetus and the fetus does not survive, such action shall not be prenatal murder. 
Such term does not include a naturally occurring expulsion of a fetus known medically as 
a “spontaneous abortion” and popularly as a “miscarriage” so long as there is no human 
involvement whatsoever in the causation of such event.  
It is clear from Franklin’s wording that natural miscarriages would not be criminal, but how 
would one establish that a miscarriage had no human involvement?  Would all miscarriages be 
investigated?  This bill did not pass.  Before Franklin’s bill, Senator Mark Obenshain of Virginia 
introduced SB 962 in 2009, a bill that actually spelled out what must happen in the event of each 
miscarriage.  The bill would require that any miscarriage be reported to the police.  A summary 
of the bill reads: 
Requires that when a fetal death occurs without medical attendance upon the mother at or 
after the delivery or abortion, the mother or someone acting on her behalf, within 24 
hours, report the fetal death, location of the remains, and identity of the mother to the 
local or state police or sheriff's department of the city or county where the fetal death 
occurred. The bill also specifies that no one shall remove, destroy, or otherwise dispose 
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of any remains without the express authorization of law-enforcement officials or the 
medical examiner, and that a violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
Like Franklin’s bill, this bill also did not pass, but the fact that two state legislators in two states 
have recently tried to tie miscarriages to abortions shows legislators are interested in 
investigating miscarriages to make sure that they are not abortions.   
It is a slippery slope to investigate and criminalize all miscarriages. First, because it is a 
common event, investigations will tie up resources.  Second, medical professionals and 
researchers are not really sure why women have miscarriages, investigating all of them may not 
provide answers and might cause more suspicion on the woman and her actions during the 
pregnancy.  Third, it may be emotionally traumatic for a woman to relive the miscarriage if it 
was a wanted pregnancy.  Finally, it calls into question what might be gained by the knowledge 
of the cause of expiration- do we arrest the woman, make her go on mandatory birth control, 
monitor her every behavior while pregnant in the future?  It is unclear what the purpose and 
consequences would be if investigations became mandatory, possibly with detrimental and 
deterrent effects to women. 
C-sections.  Not all of the women in the data set committed a crime or were investigated 
for a crime.  Some women were just trying to have their babies and were subjected to regulation 
by doctors.  This section unpacks how women’s bodies were regulated through coercion and 
threats.   
First, women in the sample were not always given a choice about how to proceed with 
their birth, even after reasonable attempts at open and honest communication by the patient to 
uncover her options.  Jennifer Goodall was a model patient.  She carefully weighed her options, 
was open with her doctors about wanting to try a trial of labor after cesarean (TOLAC), she 
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realized that she might have to have surgery if the TOLAC was unsuccessful, and she was 
concerned about her own wellbeing and the welfare of her fetus.  Even after having a rational 
and informed discussion, the hospital still threatened her with referrals to child and family 
services, judicial intervention to force her to have surgery, and surgery against her will should 
she arrive at the hospital while in labor.  This is a prime example of how the best of pregnant 
patients, even when informed, compromising, and rational are not trusted to make good decisions 
about their own healthcare.   
Consequently, it is not surprising that if we cannot trust rational, well-informed women to 
make decisions on their own behalf, there is little hope for those who are not model patients. 
Samantha Burton and Melissa Rowland provide excellent examples of women who refused to be 
model patients, even at the expense of the health of their fetuses.  It seems at first that I am 
actually arguing that these women did deserve to be regulated because they made choices 
antithetical to their potential offspring, but in fact it is precisely these women who need more 
help and to be treated on case-by-case basis by those who are in a position to provide services.   
Burton was a mother, had a job, and refused to quit smoking during her third pregnancy.  
Ordered to stay in her current hospital and submit to all procedures (including surgery should the 
doctors so choose) by court order, she felt that confinement in a hospital for the duration of her 
pregnancy was not an option.  On top of that, she did not even like her doctor.  Here, regardless 
of how obstinate, difficult, or combative a patient, a woman must be given freedom and 
flexibility to see a doctor of her choice.  Even women at low-income clinics are still able to 
choose their doctors and switch if they are displeased, even if the choices are more constrained 
than those with private insurance.  Smoking does have adverse effects on the growth and 
development of a fetus (CDC, 2016), but that does not mean that a woman should not have 
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access to a second opinion from another doctor before civil confinement is imposed.  The 
appeals court did find that the trial court had violated Burton’s rights, but not before Burton 
endured three days of confinement and the loss of her fetus.  I do not suggest here that the 
miscarriage could have been prevented at that stage, but potentially Burton would have 
benefitted from a program that allowed her to try to quit while she continued to work and mother 
her children at the start of her pregnancy such that drastic measures, ones that were against her 
rights, but also against her practical needs, could have been avoided completely.  Working with 
pregnant women in the beginning of their pregnancies (or before them!) allows women to make 
better decisions for themselves and their fetuses.   
Melissa Rowland is arguably one of the most egregious cases of worrisome women in 
this data set: a woman many would be quick to judge deserving of punishment for her failure to 
act, causing one of her twins to be born stillborn.  She has a criminal history and a mental illness 
diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder.  Disregarding these two very serious issues, Rowland 
did two things right: she sought medical advice and she moved to a state where she would be 
able to put up her future children for adoption, knowing that she would not be able to care for 
them.  What she could have done better was to actually follow the advice that she had sought.  
Knowing that she had a mental disorder that caused her to be resistant to advice that she did 
seek, a treatment team or others whom Rowland trusted could have helped her to make a better 
decision for her twins.  Moreover, it is imperative that we ask if Rowland’s failure to act on 
behalf of the fetus such that the best course of action would entail major surgery for Rowland is 
really a crime that the justice system wants to a) prosecute and b) punish.  Does a pregnant 
woman have the duty to care for her child even before she has given birth?  Arguably she does.  
At the current stage of medical science, however, this is never a burden that a man has to carry, 
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nor is it one for which he can be subjected to penalties.  This is true even if he is the father and 
will have that duty of care once the child is born; his duty of care begins at birth, not a moment 
before.  Bearing the species puts an enormous burden on women that it does not put on men and 
if prosecution and punishment are added to that burden, services to help women through difficult 
times, including managing mental illness while pregnant, must be paramount, otherwise it is 
difficult to imagine how prosecuting a woman for not having surgery is just.  Rowland may not 
be a sympathetic woman and her inaction may make many question her fitness to be able to birth 
children at all, but those attitudes miss the point.  Questioning a woman’s ability to be a good 
parent as a prerequisite to be allowed to procreate harkens back to American eugenics where 
forced sterilization was a practice that was both legal and deemed good public policy to thwart 
the expected problem of “degenerates” who might rely on government assistance (Buck v. Bell, 
1927; Ko, 2016).  Instead I suggest that Rowland and the problematic women like her will 
continue to exist because humans are not perfect.  They mess up.  We would do better and be 
less likely to have events where we consider these women to be monsters if we gave them 
support along the way, recognizing their shortcomings and needs.  
Law in hospital rooms.  We trust women so little that we decide their fate at the worst 
time for them: while they are vulnerable.  In this section I note several women whose medical or 
legal status was decided when they most needed the protections of the Fifth Amendment and the 
legal right to counsel. The language of the Fifth Amendment makes it so that this protection is 
clearly applied against self-incrimination in criminal cases, but Kastigar v. United States (1972) 
allows for it to be used in any type of proceeding, including civil and investigatory ones such 
that: 
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There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important of which 
is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege 
reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important 
advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against 
any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal 
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been 
zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege.  
It is unclear that most of the women thought to use this privilege when speaking to their doctors 
or that it would even be useful or necessary for them to employ it.  Additionally, the right to 
counsel only exists when one is under criminal arrest, a condition that was not clearly satisfied 
for any of the women in the sample.  Angela Carder, Laura Pemberton, and Purvi Patel all had 
people in their hospital rooms who decided matters for them.  For Carder it was a c-section 
surgery, for Pemberton, civil confinement, and for Patel it was doctors and police who 
questioned her about the circumstances under which she gave birth.   
Laura Pemberton’s hearing to determine how she would give birth started before she 
arrived at the hospital, after she had started the labor process, and after being forcibly escorted 
from her home to the hospital.  Pemberton was not given a lawyer, but allowed to speak on her 
own behalf to the judge.  Clearly after being in labor for hours where she was dehydrated, 
Pemberton was not in the best place to be her own advocate for birth.  Pemberton was compelled 
to have the surgery.  Like Pemberton, Angela Carder was compelled to have surgery, one that it 
is not clear that she wanted and one that possibly hastened her terminal condition.    Pemberton 
and the hospital should have worked out her birthing procedure well before the date of delivery 
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since typically one has months to do this.  A common consensus could have been reached had 
the two parties trusted each other enough to reason out a procedure that made sense to both 
parties.  The Carder case is less problematic and more instructive- not all women are healthy 
enough to make decisions for themselves at the time of birth.  Doctors and patients need to have 
candid conversations about who will make decisions on behalf of the patient should she become 
incapacitated and unable to decide for herself in the moment.  This conversation must happen 
well before the actual birth takes place.   
Another concerning case is that of Julie Starks who was under arrest for production and 
possession of drugs.  Once under arrest, a court hearing was held to determine the custody of her 
fetus.  Custody hearings are not criminal cases and therefore Starks had no right to counsel of her 
own and because she was under arrest already, it is likely that she did not have many resources to 
mobilize in order to hire counsel to attend the court hearing with her.  It is clear here that even 
though the state had legal custody over Starks and physical custody over her body (she was in 
jail) the state made sure that it retained control of her body even outside of the jail through the 
use of the fetus’ custody hearing.  In this way, the government found a loophole to continue to 
regulate Starks’ behavior under the guise of only regulating the fetus (which is regulating her by 
default since they are physically inseparable beings until birth).   
Purvi Patel is clearly an example of what we do not want for women who are in a 
vulnerable position. A woman’s flight risk before and after labor is questionable (Levi & 
Waldman, 2011).  Just having left surgery and having experienced a stillbirth, Patel was not 
going anywhere; questioning her could have waited until she was formerly under arrest and 
moved to the jail.   Not only does questioning someone in their hospital room create an 
atmosphere where the patient feels inferior (e.g., lack of proper clothes, literal subordinate 
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position on a bed, limited ability to control one’s environment) in Patel’s case, it was not clear 
that she was ever under arrest, that she could have requested counsel, or that she could have 
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights.  She could have requested counsel or stayed silent 
regardless of her arrest status, but she may not have known that nor taken questioning by the 
police as a serious event until she realized that she was under arrest.  In general, people should 
know if they are under arrest before they are questioned by the police.  Police and hospital 
collusion has not always been supported by the courts.  The US Supreme Court did find that state 
hospitals and police working together, even when the aim is drug treatment and/or crime control, 
may not develop policies that have the primary purpose of collecting evidence to aid law 
enforcement.  In Ferguson v. The City of Charleston, South Carolina (2001) SCOTUS found that 
using diagnostic tests (like drug tests) as evidence for law enforcement when the tests are not 
voluntary or performed without patient consent is in violation of the Fourth Amendment where 
the search is considered unreasonable.  This case may be useful for Patel’s case and cases like it, 
in that there may be more room for courts to look at police intervention in a vulnerable place like 
a hospital room since they were unwilling to let police and hospitals work together solely for 
crime control, even crime that is legitimately important to the state to control. 
Legal Medications.  None of the women in my sample were incarcerated solely because 
of their illegal5 drug possession.  Above I discussed the creative charging of women who were 
using illegal drugs and how simple drug possession was not a charge that was employed even 
when applicable and that other laws were mobilized against women who used drugs who could 
be charged with neither distribution nor possession.  Here I discuss legal drugs and medications 
                                                 
5 Jamie Fisher Russell was not arrested for the possession of an illegal drug, but rather the possession of a 
controlled substance (prescription medication) that was not hers, and Julie Starks was arrested for both 
possession and production of methamphetamine.   
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that women used during their pregnancies and how even though they were trying their best 
through difficult circumstances such that in every case someone intervened, not to help, but to 
make decisions on behalf of the woman. 
Legally, those addicted to drugs may not be arrested or charged on those grounds alone as 
established in Robinson v. California (1962): the criminalization of a status, drug addict, is 
contrary to the Eighth Amendment. Boiled down, this means that Americans are legally allowed 
to be drug addicts and should not fear criminal prosecution.  Restricted by this precedent, 
Wisconsin has found a loophole.  Those addicts who are not arrested for production, possession, 
or sale can still be controlled and civilly confined via Wisconsin’s Cocaine Mom law under the 
guise of treatment.  Alicia Beltran and Rachel Lowe were both legally allowed to be drug addicts 
but their pregnancies set them apart from others of the same status.  What is particularly striking 
about both cases is that Beltran did not need help and Lowe sought help, yet both had to go to 
court and were legally compelled to get treatment (needed or not).  Lowe, who asked for help, 
was prescribed medications beyond those to treat an opioid addiction, was expected to cooperate 
with law enforcement (even though she had not been arrested), and she lost her job.   Beltran’s 
case is worse in that she was compelled to fight an addiction that she had already overcome and 
she also lost her job.  The application of a law that specifically was meant for women who had 
refused drug treatment or who had been lax about participating in services is problematic when 
used in a punitive way.  It is clear that both Beltran and Lowe were trying to do the best that they 
could for their fetuses such that wielding law as a weapon to make sure that they submitted to the 
will of the state is an obvious display of lack of trust on behalf of these women to do the right 
thing.   
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Voluntariness.  Each woman sought medical attention of her own volition.  Without 
coercion, these women were trying to seek routine or emergency care.  Yes, some of the women 
can be criticized for seeking attention too late or making poor decisions out of panic or pain, but 
holistically these women did the best they could based on their own set of circumstances.  
Problematically, at least Lisa Epsteen felt bullied and was not sure about her future care.  She felt 
that she might consider home birth instead of facing continued coercion.  If women are not 
trusted to make good decisions and should medical care be forced upon women, they may choose 
never to return. 
Why?  Institutional Problems are Cast as Individual Troubles 
 C. Wright Mills, creator of the concept of the sociological imagination, believed that 
personal troubles and larger societal issues are actually linked, such that something with which 
an individual struggles is often rooted in larger, public structures and policies (Mills, 1959). 
From this perspective, we note that an individual’s drug use is certainly a personal trouble, but 
cultural and recreational drug use, drug laws, drug availability, the profitability of drugs, and so 
forth are actually rooted in macrosocial processes and institutions, not individuals.  Thus this 
section fleshes out the consequences of treating these women as if they are individuals with 
troubles while the larger systemic issues are ignored. 
 Rennie Gibbs was 16 years old when she gave birth, Regina McKnight had an IQ of 72, 
Purvi Patel lived with a family where sex was prohibited until marriage, Martina Greywind was 
homeless, Darlene Johnson beat her children, Kari Parsons was a shoplifter, Samantha Burton 
was a smoker, Melissa Rowland was mentally ill, Diane Pfannenstiel was abused by her spouse, 
Bei Bei Shuai was suicidal, Angela Carder was dying, Christine Taylor was overwhelmed about 
a third child, and several other women were drug addicts or had had previous c-sections.  These 
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women could easily be defined by their own problems (she is a drug addict or she is a shoplifter) 
and we could consider them in isolation, but especially drug use or things done in desperation 
(e.g., suicide attempts, wrapping a fetus in plastic and putting it in a dumpster, confessing feeling 
overwhelmed by a third child and an estranger husband) it is clear that these women did not all 
start using drugs just because they thought they might like to try them or become desperate 
suddenly.  Drug use, mental illness, low IQ, teen pregnancy, domestic violence, and so forth are 
systemic and societal concerns, not just the mere problems that affect these particular women.   
 Consider Bei Bei Shuai and Christine Taylor as examples of when only personal troubles 
are taken into account and the roots of issues are not contemplated.  Both Shuai and Taylor were 
harmed by an incident at home, Shuai’s purposeful ingestion of rat poison in a suicide attempt 
and Taylor’s accidental fall down the stairs.  Shuai survived but her baby did not.  Even though 
Shuai was so upset by her circumstances that she tried to kill herself (not the fetus, although the 
fetus would have expired with her by extension), the fact that her life was turned upside down by 
the want of her romantic partner and that she was likely clinically depressed were not considered.  
The root of her fetus’ demise was not Shuai’s maltreatment of the fetus, but rather that she did 
not want to continue living.  It is unreasonable to assume that women with mental health issues 
will not get pregnant.  In a similar vein, Taylor was estranged from her husband, raising two 
children as a single mother, and considered (but did not act on) abortion and adoption as avenues 
for her third pregnancy.  It is also unreasonable to expect that women who are single, in poverty, 
young, drug addicted, and so forth will wait until their circumstances change to have a child at 
the perfect time for them.  For many women, there is no such thing as the perfect time to have a 
child.  Moreover, some women will never leave poverty or get married.  Should we penalize 
them or overly scrutinize women because they do not fit our idea of motherhood?  
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What does this mean? Women Become Legal System Experiments 
Given that children are a vulnerable population who are unable to care for themselves 
outright, parents have a duty to them to see that they are given the essentials to thrive.  The 
charges against Buckhalter (culpable negligent manslaughter), Gibbs (depraved-heart murder), 
McKnight (homicide by child abuse), and Patel (feticide and neglect) should be taken very 
seriously as they represent some of the most heinous crimes in our criminal code and they 
involve a population that is vulnerable.  Because of the gravity of the charges (and their 
penalties), society’s desire for children to be nurtured, and the desire to be clear on the conduct 
that the state will and will not tolerate, all of these court cases should have been handled with the 
utmost scrutiny and attention to detail to make sure that the precedent that was created was 
accurate.  Three of four of the cases were overturned in some way.  Buckhalter’s and Gibbs’ 
indictments were dismissed, McKnight’s conviction was vacated, and Patel’s convictions are 
currently being appealed.  Due to the adversarial nature of the court system, the prosecution and 
defense weave stories that implicate or render innocent a defendant that may confuse juries, but 
it is incumbent upon the judge of the court, a trained and credentialed professional, to correctly 
allow evidence and experts to become part of the proceedings.  Without this honing of relevant 
material, appeals are brought forth and indictments are thrown out.  These trials are actually 
quite serious because they disrupt the lives of women waiting to be tried and women waiting for 
their appeals.  A second issue is that it sends the wrong message to the public when there is no 
consistent message about lawful behavior.  The maximum amount of care should be taken to 
make sure that the defendant is appropriately charged, the evidence in the court is accurately 
presented, and that the defendant is not subjected to extra-legal punishment by awaiting her trial.    
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It might be reasonable to investigate women whose fetuses expire or whose babies die, 
but many of the women in the data set who were arrested, prosecuted, and/or went to court were 
brought into the criminal justice system because of harm done to the fetus/baby.  Moreover, 
these women like Melanie Green, who was not indicted, Jennifer Johnson, whose conviction was 
vacated, Martina Greywind who was arrested but charges were dropped, Julie Starks whose child 
deprivation adjudication was overturned, Samantha Burton whose civil confinement violated her 
rights, Pamela Stewart Monson whose charges were dismissed, Dianne Pfannenstiel whose 
charges were dismissed, and Christine Taylor whose charges were dropped, all had to wait for 
the justice system to catch up with them.  Many of the women tried for murder, manslaughter, 
drug charges, and other offenses were imprisoned and then let out later.  Because the law does 
not account for every contingency or circumstance, these women had to go through the courts 
where eventually it was decided that they did not violate the law or that their rights had actually 
been violated.  This is not necessarily a negative result, but rather the way that law is made and 
refined, but it still calls into question the upheaval that some must face in order to figure out the 
application of law.  In some cases, like Stewart Monson’s case, the law was clear, but when the 
law was written, the intended offender was a deadbeat dad, not the pregnant woman.  As we 
make legislation, we should consider the impact that it does have on those who are innocent, 
especially those who lose their jobs, friends, money, and other sources of support while awaiting 
“justice.” 
What does this mean?  Women are Left Without Resources 
Powerlessness.  Medical professionals worked with courts and/or law enforcement to get 
what they wanted in each case.  When women became uncooperative, they were threatened with 
police or court action as well as actually arrested.  From the ER doctor who reported Taylor, the 
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ER that labeled Russell, the doctor who threatened Epsteen, the hospital that got a court order to 
confine Burton, to the hospital that threatened multiple sanctions against Goodall, all of these 
medical professionals went outside of their authority and jurisdiction in order to be buttressed by 
another institution of social control.  These women were always in the subordinate position such 
that none had a lawyer at the time of the conduct nor connections to change the situation for 
themselves, nor did they have any institutional back up like the doctors did.   
Sans Dignity.  A theme that is coupled with powerlessness is the absence of dignity.  
This is an overall theme among the women: dignity is missing.  Some of these women, like Lisa 
Epsteen , Laura Pemberton, and Jennifer Goodall, just wanted compassion for their attempt at a 
non-surgical birth.  Others like Rachel Lowe and Jennifer Johnson were upfront about their 
addictions and wanted help to stop using drugs.  Doctors, law enforcement, judges, social 
workers, prosecutors and others seemed to have little compassion for these women and their 
problems as these agents tried to uphold the law, and did not consider the wishes, feelings, and 
limitations of the women.  Women, once regulated to a status of powerless, have little ability to 
communicate their wishes for a vaginal birth if the doctor sees them as uninformed or difficult 
patients.  It is even harder for a powerless women to tell a judge that she refuses to have a 
hearing in her hospital room while she is wearing a hospital gown and chained to myriad 
instruments.  The ultimate loss of power and dignity belongs to the women who were imprisoned 
(both in hospitals and carceral settings) where they had no control over their medications, 
clothing, movement, diet, or medical appointments.   
Without dignity in the process of childbirth, when we strip away the sense that these 
women are human and are worthy of compassionate care, what hope can society possibly have 
for them to raise children who will feel included by a society that has rejected their mothers?  At 
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a time when women feel uncomfortable from all of the physical changes and the new routines 
that pregnancy brings, preserving their dignity in everyday encounters is a small price to pay.  
What does this mean? Children are not served 
Some who read these cases may still argue that even though women were treated poorly 
that the end results justifies the means.  Moreover, helping a vulnerable population may just be 
worth it, even if it means that women are targeted to receive treatment and/or punishment.  The 
problem is that these data reveal that children did not necessarily have good outcomes because 
more social control was applied.  While this study is not comparative in that it does not include 
women who were not regulated, thus making a discussion of relative outcomes impossible, it is 
not without merit to discuss the circumstances of the fetuses, children, and women even without 
the comparison group.   
Rachel Lowe was not allowed to see an obstetrician while she was confined under a law 
that specifically was designed to prevent harm to a fetus.  Not being able to see a doctor who is 
specialized in the care of the fetus certainly does not help the fetus.  Julie Starks was held in a 
cell where she did not have sanitary conditions nor did she receive adequate health care (she lost 
12 pounds).  The fetuses of many of the women expired because law enforcement and/or doctors 
acted in a reactive capacity where women were investigated after drug use was suspected or 
when a cause of death was sought.  Moreover, Rachel Lowe and Alicia Beltran lost their jobs, 
leaving less money to take care of their babies once they were born.  Certainly having precarious 
financial stability does not help future children. 
Criminal Justice Issues 
Currently the trend in criminal justice is to use risk analysis software (e.g., realignment in 
California and Ohio’s use of ORAS) to let out prisoners who pose little threat of harm to the 
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community (Walker, 2013).  In April 2014 the United States Sentencing Commission changed 
the federal guidelines for drug trafficking offenses, lowering the levels, which effectively makes 
sentences shorter. In July 2014 the US Sentencing Commission voted to approve an amendment 
that allows low-level drug offenders to also be retroactively eligible for early release.  The 
coupling of these measures, risk analysis and changes in guidelines, means that we should expect 
fewer people sentenced to long terms in prison for drugs.  What it does not mean is that drug 
offenders will automatically get more services, such as treatment or diversion out of jail and 
prisons to treatment facilities.  In fact, “from 1986 to 1996, despite the fact that the rate at which 
women used drugs actually declined substantially, the number of women incarcerated in state 
facilities for drug offenses increased by 888%, compared to a rise of 129% for non-drug 
offenses” (The Sentencing Project, 2007). 
An important finding in this dissertation is that women who used drugs while pregnant 
and were criminally charged were not charged with simple possession, but rather much worse 
crimes like manslaughter, murder, child abuse, child endangerment, and so forth.  Even in the 
wake of ratcheting down sentences for drug addicts, some of these women who are also addicts 
will not benefit from the use of new guidelines because of the severity of their crimes. Their 
punishment may be longer than their non-pregnant counterparts for the same drug problem.  
Moreover, because their crimes are against family members, they are at risk of losing custody of 
their current and/or future children, a sanction that is not usually imposed on others who are 
similarly situated. The loss of custody may be permanent, leaving pregnant women without the 
option of making better choices.  We must ask ourselves if we really want a justice system that 
does not make room for people to have second chances.   
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It is not clear how any of these women benefitted by the treatment that they received.  Jail 
time did not change the fact that Taylor fell down the stairs.  Russell’s two hours in the jail cell 
might actually have killed her.  Epsteen had to hire a lawyer to tell the doctor to cease his threats, 
but she still underwent the same procedure like she had planned.  Burton was compelled to do as 
the doctors required, but this treatment did not save her fetus.  
An overarching theme of this dissertation has been to highlight the ways in which a 
pregnant woman’s status affects the ways in which she is treated: specifically, with regard to the 
threat of sanction and the actual sanctions she receives.  Thus, if pregnant women and non-
pregnant people commit the same crime under the same circumstances that result in different 
charges, one likely possibility is it is the status of pregnant that determines the charge and the 
sanction.  It is clear then, that by continuing to regulate pregnant women differently from non-
pregnant women and men, especially in a climate where drug use is being less scrutinized than 
previously, drug use surveillance during pregnancy is not just about saving a vulnerable fetus 
since little is done to actually ensure healthy deliveries.  Instead it must be construed as an attack 
on the way that women make choices about their own reproduction and their behavior during 
that reproductive stage.  Here we see that this attack fits nicely within the bad mothering 
framework that others (e.g., Roberts (1993), Schiff (1997), and Austin (1989)) have described.  
In fact, the results of this dissertation extend those ideas.  It is not just that women are taking 
power from the patriarchy, or that they commit crimes that are not appropriate to the female 
gender, or even that they face a double standard such that fathers can commit crimes without 
worry that they have violated gender norms.  Instead, it is all of these things and two more.  First, 
these women not only violate female norms, but the supposed innate trait that all women have: 
maternal instinct.  To some, this in and of itself is a violation deserving of punishment (Stone-
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Manista, 2009), but second, these women have committed crimes against their own children at a 
time when no one can remove them to another environment.  Other than outright murdering 
one’s child, harm in the womb is possibly one of the most offensive crimes women can commit 
against their own children— and therefore an expression of the most heinous violations of 
female norms and expectations.  These women are solely responsible for continuing to gestate 
the fetus until it is viable outside of the womb, therefore giving pregnant women power.  Thus, 
even though there is mass critique of the overreach of the criminal justice system and there are 
attempts to cut back on the number of citizens who are behind bars, we see a continuation of 
prosecutions, arrests, civil confinements, and legal actions against pregnant women because the 
state has recognized that in order to maintain its dominance, pregnant women’s power must be 
surveilled, regulated, and curtailed. 
Even more than a sanction for bad behavior, some of these sentences leave women 
unable to procreate after prison, another enhanced punishment for straying outside of the norms 
of motherhood.  American legal precedent has upheld the right of women to use multiple forms 
of medications, prophylactics (i.e., condoms), devices, and surgeries to control their fertility 
through landmark court cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird 
(1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973).  As noted above, it is possible that one reason extensive 
penalties are applied to women who lose their babies is that the state purposefully makes it so 
that they will not be able to be mothers to children who have been removed from their care and 
they will be too old to procreate when they are released from prison.  This effectively means that 
they can never be mothers.  Without grave harm, women should not be behind bars so long as to 
have their fertility expire.  It is not the duty of the court to decide what kind of future mother a 
woman might be, only what punishment she must serve for her current crime.  To do otherwise 
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would be an overreach of the law that extends beyond its right to punish harms that have been 
done; the court is actually doing violence to women when they are not able to choose for 
themselves.  In fact, this overreach suggests a particularly slippery slope where entire groups of 
undesirable women can be rendered sterile by exploiting the passage of time.  Moreover, these 
long sentences do not allow for women to have second chances at being good mothers.  For 
some, they will never be able to bear a child again.  For others, it may be a struggle to regain 
custody of a child.  Still, for others, custody may no longer be an option as a woman may be 
away too long for her child to be reunited with her in a legal parent-child relationship.  As such, 
this piece highlights the need for women to be allowed to make their own fertility choices, which 
means giving reasonable sentences based on the harm done.  The next chapter explores ways to 
prevent the need for the criminal justice system to be involved in healthcare decisions, but also 
tackles the issues of what it should do if it must become involved. 
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CHAPTER 5: Policy Implications 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter I suggest multiple policies that are informed by evidence-based research, 
practices recommended by professional medical bodies, and hallmarks of successful programs 
that promote healthy mothers and babies.  I start with the argument that our first step is to stop 
the criminalization and regulation of the practices, statuses, and misfortunes of pregnant women 
by the legal and medical systems.  Based on previous chapters, force and penalties do not seem 
to be good motivators for change, they are not cost effective, and they do not produce results that 
maximize benefits for healthy women and children.  Second, while simultaneously changing the 
legal and medical responses, I suggest that prevention of harm be a primary mission for health 
officials.  I offer several aspects of care on which we should focus and include replicable model 
programs.  Finally, intervention, when necessary, should be planned and coordinated based on 
real obstacles that women face.   
Having analyzed several different cases where a woman’s status of pregnant or conduct 
while pregnant has led to regulation, two things are quite clear.  First, criminalization of 
pregnancy does not prevent the morbidity or mortality of babies, thus not advancing the goals of 
society to have safe, healthy children.  Therefore, the first step to remedying this problem is to 
stop criminalizing these women.  Second, since this approach does not work, there needs to be an 
alternative that actually works to accomplish justice and prevent harm— both for women and 
their children.  Below I give several suggestions about how to proceed by addressing an 
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inherently healthcare-related problem with healthcare-related solutions.  In this chapter my goal 
is to give the reader a guide for better outcomes for these women and women like them. 
Stop Criminalization 
The first step in helping pregnant women and their future children is to stop using the 
criminal justice system (and all of its components including police, jails, judges, prisons, and 
lawyers) as the default mechanism by which to regulate status and behavior.  This step needs to 
occur immediately and apply to all women regardless of jurisdiction.  Below I give five reasons 
for this argument including a) it is discriminatory, b) it furthers problems already encountered by 
the justice system, c) it is against human rights and social justice, d) it creates a fetal and 
maternal rights conflict, and e) it does not work. 
Discrimination.  The criminalization of pregnancy is discriminatory in three ways.  First, 
the methods of discovery of drug use vary between pregnant women.  Second, the types of drugs 
that women use are differentially targeted.  Third, the charges that are brought against pregnant 
women are different from non-pregnant people, even for the same behavior.    
Many scholars (Beckett, 1995; Boyd, 2004; Roberts, 1997) have found evidence that 
pregnant women who are poor and women of color are more likely to be drug tested.  As well, 
women are tested for certain drugs over others, regardless of the amount of harm done by a drug.  
For example, according to the facts of the case in Ferguson v. Charleston, in Charleston, South 
Carolina the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) created a protocol to screen the 
urine of women who fit one or more of the following nine criteria:  
1. No prenatal care 
2. Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation 
3. Incomplete prenatal care 
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4. Abruptio placentae [separation of the placenta from the uterus before birth] 
5. Intrauterine fetal death 
6. Preterm labor “of no obvious cause” 
7. IUGR [intrauterine growth retardation] “of no obvious cause” 
8. Previously known drug or alcohol abuse 
9. Unexplained congenital anomalies 
The women who fit these criteria were screened only for evidence of cocaine use and it is has 
been argued that the policy itself was racist.  First, the women’s positive results were turned over 
to law enforcement, although later they were given a choice of being arrested or agreeing to start 
drug treatment.  Second, 29 of 30 women who were arrested were black.  In a final review of the 
policy, SCOTUS found in favor of the drug-tested women because the policy violated the 
women’s Fourth Amendment rights, namely the right of protection from unreasonable searches 
by the government.  The hospital was the only public hospital that served poor women in the area 
(Roth, 2002) and its public nature makes it bound by constitutional protections.  The women 
were not told that they were being tested, they were not asked for consent, and the nature of the 
policy was such that the Court found the objective to be a law enforcement goal rather than a 
health-oriented one.  This case alone gives evidence that pregnant women are screened when 
non-pregnant people are not (and if they are screened, not turned over to law enforcement) and 
pregnant women who use public hospitals are more likely to be women of color and little means, 
thus setting up those populations to be scrutinized more than their pregnant peers.   
Second, Kadish (1967) was also concerned about who applies the laws and to whom they 
are applied.  This manifests itself in the criminalization of pregnancy in two ways: 1) police and 
doctors effectively make law instead of legislatures (which judges then have to spend time 
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overturning) and as I have argued above, 2) pregnant women are treated differently from their 
non-pregnant counterparts both in surveillance by doctors and through the criminal charging 
process.  From a democratic perspective, citizens should be concerned about nonelected 
authorities making and enforcing rules that are not sanctioned by elected officials.  Moreover, as 
the courts have determined, at least in part, when legislatures do their jobs and enact law, it is 
expected that those laws will be enforced by their spirit under which they were created.  Instead 
this dissertation has highlighted the creative use to “seize” people who otherwise could not be 
charged, could be charged under a more narrow crime, or should not be included, but through 
reinterpretation of the letter of the law includes pregnant women when they were never intended 
as a target of the law.    
Pregnant women suffer two biases: they are treated differently from non-pregnant people 
but they are also treated differently from each other.  By using discretion we risk discriminately 
finding fault with a few kinds of women (e.g., poor, homeless, women of color, drug addicts, 
single mothers, the mentally ill, those in pain, etc.).  If we do regulate some kinds of women for 
their conduct and/or status and depend on the criminal justice system to handle that regulation, 
we will continue to unfairly apply the law.  
Contributes to a Broken System.  Many criminologists have critiqued the current 
penology, namely, the crisis of mass incarceration and its collateral and lasting effects that 
extend into civilian life (for example see: Clear, 2008; Pager, 2003; Pettit & Western, 2004).  
Legal scholars such as Michelle Alexander have offered a critique that the criminal justice 
system is now just the newest iteration of codes that keep certain people’s (in particular Black 
men’s) rights in check— Alexander (2010) finds that on its surface the criminal justice system 
acts as colorblind and race-neutral, but its underlying logic and devastating effects are actually a 
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function of systematic racial control.  To many it is clear that the shift from a more rehabilitative 
ideology to mass incarceration as the dominant paradigm has not been successful in that we 
incarcerate far too many people now.  For example, California was recently found to be in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment due to overcrowded prisons and was forced to remedy it with 
haste (Brown v. Plata, 2011).  Criminalizing pregnancy adds to the problems of overcrowding if 
women are sentenced to jails and prisons.   
Even though there is change, it is not clear how fast or what its magnitude will be, 
especially for women.  Even though legal changes are reducing the number of prisoners, most 
prisoners are men. Based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics report by Glaze and Kaeble (2014), 
at the end of 2013 women accounted for approximately 18% of the correctional population, 
including jail, prison, parole, and probation.  From 2000 to 2010 correctional populations of both 
men and women grew although women’s annual growth rate was approximately twice as fast as 
men’s. In 2000 there were approximately 5 times as many men as women in the correctional 
system (5,389,600 men and 1,078,400 women).  By 2013 that ratio had dropped to 
approximately 4.5 times (5,642,700 men and 1,256,300 women). A report on the state and 
federal policies and conditions for incarcerated pregnant women argues that not only have we 
seen an increase in the number of female prisoners, but that women have “borne a 
disproportionate burden of the war on drugs, resulting in a monumental increase of women who 
are facing incarceration for the first time, overwhelmingly for non-violent offenses” (Saada Saar 
& Morrison, 2010, p. 5).  Criminalization of pregnancies contributes to the growing problem of 
mass incarceration. 
Another cost of criminalizing pregnancy is the conditions we have chosen to regulate, 
like stillbirths, drug use, and non-compliant patients, once regulated, leave little room for 
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discussions about the actual harm done, the frequency of the behavior, and the likelihood a 
woman will do it again.  Once these behaviors are criminalized, there is no consideration of 
mitigating factors like how the behavior may be a one time event or that the drug used may not 
actually cause harm.  Legislation, once passed, is hard to repeal even when research reveals 
competing findings.  The war on drugs is a good example of how penalties became severe 
without much empirical backing and law has been slow to change to undo its mistakes. 
Moreover, pregnancies are now scrutinized such that for nine months a woman has to be 
on her best behavior and a model patient or risk being questioned about every choice she makes.  
This type of surveillance upon private life is worrisome from the government, but also from 
hospitals where power is unchecked.  While the Constitution provides some protections here 
from illegal search and seizure and from unlawful detention, by reframing behaviors as criminal 
instead of health-related, those protections offer very little real help.  If a woman’s behavior is 
grave enough that there is probable cause to arrest her, she may legally be searched (e.g., drug 
tested) and lose her liberty.   
Many women in the current study had health issues, drug addictions, and mental 
illnesses.  These conditions are not dissimilar from health problems that plague women in 
prisons where more than one half of women in both state and federal prison report having one or 
more illnesses (Maruschak, 2008).  Using law to control, although not to solve, health issues is 
an overreach of criminal law into extra-legal affairs.  Even more problematically, the law is 
sometimes used to force women into treatment, into having surgery, or into confinement.  Here 
law is active; a force wielded against pregnant women.  This coercive use of law is certainly an 
overreach of law if law is meant to be a harm reduction mechanism, a set of codified norms, or 
rules by which we live.  
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Against Human Rights.  The tacit acceptance of prioritizing the health of the fetus by 
regulating women’s bodies is contrary to principles of human rights.  First, as a fundamental 
right as a human, women must be able to choose whether or not to procreate, with whom, and 
how.  To violate any of those principles leads to slavery of a pregnant body where a woman 
becomes a mere vessel for genesis.  This dissertation has revealed that those basic rights have 
been narrowed in scope as fetal personhood becomes more legally entrenched— not just in terms 
of abortion; women who fully intend to carry a fetus to term are also regulated.  Second, there 
are more humane ways of treating women who need help than putting them in prisons or jails or 
confining them in hospitals, especially because they do not get adequate and context-specific 
care in these settings.  Shackling of pregnant prisoners, lack of obstetric care, mandatory 
prescription pills, and lack of drug treatment are all practices that diminish dignity.       
Dorothy Roberts (1997) argues that reproductive limitations, because they are so tied 
with race, are violations of liberty and equality.  As the basis for one of her arguments, she 
situates reproductive oppression within the Thirteenth Amendment, claiming that not allowing 
black women complete control over their reproduction it is just another “badge of slavery” (p. 
304).  Similarly, I believe that this can be argued for all women- it should be a fundamental 
human right to choose to procreate and the manner in which it is done.  Equally important, by 
criminalizing pregnancy we do not fulfill a social justice goal of ensuring that all women have 
equal access to healthcare.  As revealed above, the access to healthcare that these women receive 
in jails and prisons is minimal at best and sometimes nonexistent at worst.  This criminalization 
also does nothing to alleviate structural issues like poverty and access to good healthcare, or 
individual problems like drug addiction or depression.   
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Against Social Justice. Third, criminalizing pregnancy does the opposite of what social 
justice principles advocate.  Social justice for pregnant women demands at least two things: 1) a 
more equitable access to resources for all women and 2) comprehensive and quality healthcare.  
The criminal justice system does not provide education for pregnant women and limits their 
access to food stamps and other government assistance upon reentry.  It simply tells women not 
to do that behavior, but does not offer an alternative.  For women who enter the justice system 
during pregnancy, their care is not necessarily better than on the outside, but for women who are 
arrested post-partum, they did not necessarily receive good healthcare during their pregnancies.  
In order to utilize the criminal justice system as a help mechanism, it is necessary for women to 
commit a crime to benefit from help.  First, it is not clear how helpful this system really is, but 
second, that premise means that it would only be designed to help some women and possibly 
punish them at the same time.  The criminal justice system, as social justice demands, cannot 
actively help all pregnant women get better medical treatment.  Finally, as Beckett and Herbert 
(2009) have argued: 
One of our core arguments is that it is a flawed endeavor to use the criminal justice 
system to address the manifestations of social disadvantage.  This is especially obvious 
when one considers behaviors such as injection drug use or chronic alcoholism.  As much 
as we might hope that the threat of punishment would hasten the cessation of these 
behaviors, this is wishful thinking in a vast number of cases. (pgs. 153-154) 
Women who have problematic pregnancies often face some kind of disadvantage, if not multiple 
kinds.  These women may try to fix their behaviors, but without a supportive system that tries to 
manage the multiple dimensions of their problems, it is unclear how the criminal justice system 
can hope to fix a person when several issues may prevent that change.  Threatening punishment 
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to deter behaviors like substance use or questioning a doctor’s recommendation does not 
necessarily lead to a cessation of the behaviors, and in some cases, like Goodall’s, it can enhance 
those behaviors.  Finally, Richer (2000) argues that the criminal justice system “must be weary 
[sic] of criminalizing actions based on traditional gender stereotypes, especially when society has 
also failed to help those women in compromising circumstances through other means” (p. 1142).  
Richer’s point is well taken: the first thing society could do is help, rather than condemn, but 
policies and laws should not be based on myths that are perpetuated about the female sex and the 
ideal mother or pregnancy.   
Fetal vs. maternal rights.  Legal and medical criminalization hinges on the proposition 
that the fetus is a person with rights and therefore can be harmed and should be protected 
because of its vulnerable status.  Having healthy babies is a noble and worthy goal of social 
policy.  The problem occurs when this protection pits two entities who share the same body 
against each other.  In these situations, at worst, in order to reach an outcome, there is no 
compromise; only one party is satisfied.  This of course is not necessary, there are ways in which 
both entities may be mutually satisfied and actions benefit both.  Regulating and criminalizing 
women prevents this second scenario where compromises are possible, aiding both woman and 
fetus.  Moreover, using this framework of rights, we sometimes come to an impasse where no 
matter what one entity will be harmed.  Ignoring context and situation-dependent variables does 
not allow for the possibility that sometimes we must choose to save only one life.  What is best 
for the fetus may not be possible for the pregnant woman and vice versa.  Alternatives that 
precede criminalization may preempt the need to choose if conflicts are averted.   
Does not work.  Finally, if the above reasons were not enough to stop this practice of 
criminalizing pregnancy, the bottom line is that it does not work. First, using legal sanctions as a 
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method of deterring people from committing crime has not been borne out empirically as an 
effective approach to crime reduction.  Of the three principles of the theory, certainty of getting 
caught has been the strongest motivator for people not to commit crime (compared to quickly 
being caught or the severity of the punishment) although that certainty is often misperceived 
(Akers & Sellers, 2009).  In fact, more empirical support has been offered for informal social 
controls that govern us (Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).  For example, the wish to please our 
parents, feeling the embarrassment of being arrested if it were to become known to our friends 
and neighbors, rules ingrained by religion, and keeping our jobs are informal reasons for us not 
to break the law.  For this project, not only is it clear that women were surprised about medical, 
judicial, and police regulation of their pregnancies, but for some extra-legal factors played more 
of a role in shaping their conduct than formal laws did.  Thus, it is clear that a reason to stop 
criminalizing is that the deterrence of behaviors that concern us are not well regulated by law and 
could be more accurately regulated by informal social controls. Thus, a clear reason to stop using 
criminal law as a mechanism to stop behaviors that concern us is that we have a better and more 
effective alternative.  This reduction of problem behaviors is more likely to be accomplished by 
informal social controls.   
A second and even more critical issue is that prisons and jails are not good places for 
women to be pregnant.  Like the case of Kari Parsons, who was imprisoned for the benefit of her 
fetus and then gave birth alone in her cell, most woman do not get the healthcare that they need 
in a carceral setting.  Some might argue that Parsons was just one woman and we should not 
draw conclusions based on one person’s experience, but the phenomenon is larger than just her 
case.  In fact, 
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Forty-three states [86%] do not require medical examinations as a component of prenatal 
care [in carceral settings].  Forty-one states [82%] do not require prenatal nutrition 
counseling or the provision of appropriate nutrition to incarcerated pregnant women.  
Thirty-four states [68%] do not require screening and treatment for women with high-risk 
pregnancies. (Saada Saar & Morrison, 2010, p. 6) 
It is clear that if 86% of states do not even have policies that require medical exams as part of the 
care that women should receive while they are incarcerated, this is not the system in which to 
place pregnant women in order to get them care, much less quality healthcare.  Other aspects of 
pregnancy services are also limited in prisons and jails.  In New York, pregnant women are 
deprived of good nutrition, adequate amounts of food, seasonally appropriate clothing, and 
subjected to uncomfortable pat downs and strip searches (Kraft-Stolar, 2015).  On the whole, 
because carceral healthcare facilities are modeled on sex-neutral policies (Hotelling, 2008), they 
are not equipped to give pregnant women good healthcare and should not be a reason that a 
judge sends a woman to jail or prison.  
Moreover, if protection of the fetus is the reason to send women to jail and it clearly does 
not result in adequate care for the pregnant woman, what of the child after it is born?  In many 
settings, if the mother is not released with the child at birth, the infant must be picked up by a 
relative or the infant is moved into the foster care system (Hotelling, 2008).  For this particular 
project, it is not clear that any of the sampled women would have been released on the birth of 
their babies and of course some women were arrested after the birth of their children.  If 
separation of mother and child occurs, scholars are concerned with at least two aspects of child 
and maternal development.  First, the mother-child bond that many women and their babies share 
at birth may be disrupted, which may lead to attachment problems with the child.  Second, 
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mothers must learn some skills to be good mothers (e.g., how to correctly hold a baby, how to 
get a baby to latch correctly for feeding, how and when to burp a baby, what different cries might 
signify, when to let a baby explore and when to intervene, etc.).  Cassidy et al. (2010) found that 
women who participated in a diversion program had outcomes that were similar to low-risk 
mothers on both attachment and skills (what they call maternal sensitivity).  Moreover, children 
who breastfeed receive protection from certain illnesses, diseases, and ailments (Ip et al., 2007).  
Mothers may benefit from breastfeeding by possible weight loss and possible reduced chance of 
breast and ovarian cancer.  Ip et al. (2007) did find an increased risk of postpartum depression 
with short-term breastfeeding or not breastfeeding at all.  More must go into understanding this 
process and its association, but until that relationship is better understood, it is better for criminal 
justice agencies to be aware of the potential risks of separating mother and child.  To date, the 
literature suggests that it is better for mothers and their newborns to be together.  
Finally, this dissertation has addressed the intended function of criminalizing pregnancy 
and how it plays out in practice.  If the purpose is to ensure healthy pregnancies with optimal 
outcome for the babies, by criminalizing women we are not addressing the root of the problem 
that actually leads to problematic pregnancies.  In actuality it is a myriad of factors, none of 
which are addressed by regulation.  As well, turning to the criminal justice system and hospital 
directives to solve problematic pregnancies comes at a point where there is already a problem to 
be fixed.  It is too late to establish mutually beneficent behaviors, solutions, and agreements 
between the pregnant woman and the system when regulation is imposed.  Instead of a source of 
help, regulation functions as a punishment mechanism, often unfairly to women who had few 
choices or too little information to make better, more reasoned decisions. It is better to intercede 
well before problems develop, not after they are firmly entrenched.  Regulation and 
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criminalization are not capable of meeting this obligation as they currently operate and a better 
alternative must be developed.  
How do we fix this? 
 Unlike Martinson (1974), whose skepticism about rehabilitation in the penal system led 
to the “nothing works” rhetoric and an unanticipated death of the treatment ideal in incarceration, 
this dissertation attempts to offer certain solutions to the problem at hand, mainly social and 
structural issues that prevent pregnant women from maximizing their agency and obtaining 
quality healthcare.  I refuse to declare that “nothing works” or that this problem is hopeless.  As I 
argued above, criminalizing pregnancy is not helping, but this does not mean that there is 
nothing we can do.  In this section I argue that the main ways to address the problem are to 
change our views on healthcare, give women information to make good choices, spend money on 
prevention, and have a safety net in place to catch women via intervention.  The last section 
gives key aspects of programs that we should consider as we work to help pregnant women as 
well as model programs that have been assessed.   
Change our views on healthcare 
By rejecting women’s abilities to make decisions about their own bodies without risk or 
fear of punishment, we return to a model of medical care that is outdated.  The doctor-patient 
relationship is an important one.  Women who are pregnant need to receive standard, regular 
care.  There are multiple models that give patients agency over their care as opposed to the 
paternalistic model, where the doctor only provides medical information such that the patient has 
little to no choice in her decision, which leaves women without agency.  This model is deemed 
inappropriate for any reasonable woman and only recommended in emergency situations where 
the patient is not able to weight the risks and benefits of treatment and no proxy is available to do 
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so for her.  Technically, this model, while not recommended for most women, would actually be 
acceptable as long as a woman is given the option to choose this model over others.  Should a 
woman do whatever her doctor suggests and she is fine with that situation, she should be allowed 
to have that relationship with her doctor.  Other models that the American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recommends include an informative model (the doctor 
provides information only and does not offer a recommendation, although this is probably not 
ideal in establishing a true partnership), the interpretive model (this lets the doctor present 
multiple options and allows the patient to suss out the right option for her based on the 
information provided and how it accords with her values and background), and the deliberative 
model (whereby the doctor provides information about care as well as his/her own values and 
uses morality to help guide the discussion) (ACOG, 2008).  It is clear that one of the most 
important things to emerge from the themes in the previous chapter is that patients and doctors 
should have better communication and choices about care should be carefully and openly 
considered by both parties. 
A finding from this dissertation is that there is a power imbalance that exists in the 
doctor-patient relationship.  First, doctors are professionals who have expertise in medical 
matters through education and experience.  This status of expert can contrast vastly with the 
backgrounds and experiences of some women such that doctors must consider their words and 
actions carefully.  Second, the responses of the doctors in these situations were disproportionate 
to the problems that existed.  Epsteen was so affected by the threat against her that she had to 
change hospitals.  This is not a reasonable expectation for all pregnant women.  Logistic, 
economic, distance, trust, and insurance concerns all play a part in where a woman decides to 
receive her care.  Some women may literally not have a choice about where they receive care 
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(e.g., women on public assistance, women in rural areas, etc.).  Finally, it is clear that doctors are 
experts at medicine and should function only as medical providers.  Police serve and protect their 
citizens and courts dispense justice and resolve disputes.  Should a dispute arise between an 
individual and an entire medical team or hospital, the individual is at a disadvantage because she 
is as Galanter (1974) says, “a one-shotter” (p. 97).  As hospitals (or health systems that own 
hospitals) have legal departments, those legal teams are experts at law and have connections in 
the legal realm.  Especially if the medical team can show that the woman is agitated or makes 
decisions that seem counter to the expert authority (although perfectly within her right to make), 
the framing of the woman as disobedient or unreasonable quickly allows the court to side with 
the reasonable and expert medical professionals.   
Instead of promoting relationships where doctors and patients oppose each other, doctors 
can do more to work with these women so that they feel empowered and safe by the choices that 
they make.  The women in these examples were reasonable, with the exception of Russell.  Even 
Russell may have been reasonable once she was treated.  It is obvious that she was not faking her 
pain and the duty to care for people does not only extend to those who are nice or pleasant.  
Russell’s condition was life threatening and because of her behavior, she was denied care.  When 
women are not able to make decisions on their own, it is perfectly reasonable for doctors to work 
with family members or others who can step in to be a guardian ad litem.  Clearly, in these cases 
threats did not change the minds of the women and only served to exacerbate the situation.   
Finally, I suggest that medical professionals and police may need to work together 
sometimes (to report child abuse, rape, domestic violence, gunshot wounds, etc.) but in cases 
where doctors have any doubts, the doctrine of doctor-patient confidentiality should be upheld as 
the primary duty.  Doctors are not experts in the stigma that the criminal justice system 
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engenders nor do they understand the process by which people get trapped in such a system.  
Allowing their duty to law enforcement to supersede their duty to their patients can have 
disastrous effects for some.   
Promote Continuity of Healthcare.  Today’s American system emphasizes that doctors 
specialize in types of medicine (e.g., surgeons, pediatricians, oncologists, etc.) such that general 
practice and family medicine practitioners are not as common as they once were.  It has been 
suggested in this present study and elsewhere (e.g., Husak, 2002) that women who are substance 
users are less likely to seek treatment for their drug use if their fear punishment or penalties.  
Lester, Andreozzi, and Appiah (2004) suggest that there are three ways to detect drug use during 
pregnancy: 1) by selective or targeted screening, 2) by universal screening, and 3) by self-report.  
Selectively screening patients can lead to legal troubles because hospitals and doctors are not 
allowed to screen pregnant women for the sole purpose of reporting to law enforcement even if 
the ultimate intent is to get women into court mandated treatment programs (Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston (2001)).  Selective screening may be biased and target women of certain types (race, 
ethnicity, class, etc.) or may be left to each doctor individually, not catching some women who 
need care.  Alternatively, universal screening eradicates bias but may be resource intensive 
and/or mandate that doctors report based on their state’s statutes.  A third option is asking the 
women about their drug use (including licit and illicit, prescribed and non-prescription drugs).  
The issue of bias is eliminated if all women are asked, but there is the chance that women will 
not report some or all of the drug use.  Nondisclosure is a serious and worthy issue, but one that 
could be lessened in the right circumstances.  I argue that ongoing care with the same doctor, one 
a woman trusts, will raise the probability that a woman would truthfully report her drug use.  
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This is subject to memory recall issues, but initially knowing if a woman uses any drugs is the 
first step in identifying someone who needs help.   
A second step can then be taken to have the woman document the frequency and quantity 
of her drug use.  Current health care practices should emphasize consistent doctor-patient 
relationships where women and their doctors get to know each other and bonds are formed.  
Doctors should carefully consider the order in which they broach topics with their patients.  It 
may not be appropriate to ask about drug use at the first appointment, but instead only offer 
information to the patient.  I do not suggest a delay to provide care on the part of physicians, but 
rather, that they use their best judgment about when a patient might be the most likely to speak 
candidly about substance use.  Literature has shown that continuity of care does increase 
maternal satisfaction (as described above) but there is a question as to whether seeing the same 
doctor would produce more accurate self-reported drug use than women who see many doctors 
during their care.  Research that focuses on self-reported smoking behavior of women (often a 
dichotomous variable showing smoker versus non-smoker) does not adequately account for the 
kind of care women received during their pregnancies.  Therefore it is unknown if self-report 
could be used in place of drug screening for women who have established, continuous care with 
a sole doctor.  Acknowledging that there is currently a lack of evidence of the efficacy of such an 
approach, it does seem worthwhile to at least see if less invasive practices give way to better 
doctor-patient relationships as measured by trust and healthy outcomes.   
Promote Successful Birth Outcomes.  A major push in the social sciences and policy 
arenas has been to gather data to analyze the effectiveness of programs to ensure that money is 
well spent on improvement and that politics and rhetoric do not overshadow actual results.  So-
called evidence-based programs and policies use multiple techniques to gauge effectiveness.  For 
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example, meta-analyses are used so that the results of many studies are considered and the bias 
or methodological limitations of any particular study are minimized.  One such study shows that 
based on the “results of 22 trials involving 15,288 women, conducted in 16 countries under a 
wide variety of circumstances” (Hodnett, Gates, Hofmeyr, & Sakala, 2012, p. 15) women who 
had some sort of continuous support person (nurse or midwife; doula; partner, family member, or 
friend) were more likely to have a vaginal birth, give birth without an epidural, and less likely to 
be dissatisfied with their experiences compared to women who did not have continuous support.  
Women with support were also more likely to have a shorter labor and less likely to need an 
intervention to help with the birth, such as use of forceps or a cesarean section delivery.  The 
authors explain that overall, across the studies, consistent support was found for having a support 
person and no harmful effects were noted.  They recommend that this be a routine practice for 
hospitals and not the exception.   
Use midwives. Cartwright and Thomas (2001) examine the transformation that childbirth 
has taken from being dangerous to being risky.  First, childbirth has always been dangerous for 
women.  Minor and serious complications for both the mother and the infant are present 
including mortality for one or both.  Cartwright and Thomas argue that danger was a “fatalistic 
outlook on birth” and that by constructing danger as risk, we instead allow for “an activist 
stance” where challenges can be met with science and medical technology (p. 218).  Through a 
process of multiple steps, Cartwright and Thomas show that danger can become risk and can be 
controlled with medical technologies.  The first step is to select which dangers out of all of the 
dangers will become risks.  The next step is to make those dangers quantifiable, measureable, 
and visible.  Finally, once we have the ability to measure those dangers, we must select 
thresholds for which those dangers are normal or abnormal and be able to track the progress from 
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one state to the other.  The danger is now a risk: one we can measure, observe, track, and treat.  
Most importantly, the use of risk instead of danger implies that we have the possibility to control 
it.  In fact, as obstetricians gain greater control over problems during pregnancy and childbirth, 
the failure to deliver perfect results can lead to lawsuits.  Ironically, once technologies have been 
developed to predict and treat problems and those technologies become mainstream, the rates of 
lawsuits increase because now the doctors were supposed to find (and if possible cure) the 
problem.  Moreover, it is not always clear that medical interventions are useful for the average 
pregnancy.  The fetuses of women who have low risk pregnancies do not benefit from electronic 
fetal monitoring and even the use of “safe” and standard technologies still present risks, such as 
epidurals, which can cause sudden drops in blood pressure, ringing in the ears, and difficulty 
pushing (American Pregnancy Association, 2016).   
Since 1969, 99% of American babies have been born in hospitals (Boucher, Bennett, 
McFarlin, & Freeze, 2009).  In 2014 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
reported that 1.36% of all births occurred outside of a hospital (MacDorman, Mathews, & 
Declercq, 2014). Before 1940, most American babies were born at home with the assistance of 
midwives (Boucher, Bennett, McFarlin, & Freeze, 2009).  Currently, midwives are legally 
permitted to practice in 28 states (MANA, 2015). Each state has its own legal requirements, 
ranging from licensure for anyone who wants to be a midwife, to the need for a midwife to have 
nursing degree, to statutes permitting midwives, but red tape effectively not allowing for actual 
practice.   
In 2005, Beckett and Hoffman studied the social movement of birth activists and its 
relationship to the licensure of midwives in order to determine the influence of midwives to 
effect change, but also the ability for this social movement to resist the cultural hegemony of 
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modern medicinal childbirth.  Data from various documents, audio recorded legislative debates, 
observations, and interviews were collected and analyzed.  Directly important for the current 
study is the finding that midwifery, which was normal in the early 1900s (and before), became a 
subject of great debate which led to a determined effort to regulate and license midwives.  As 
norms changed and the default became to go to the hospital, birth activists pushed back to allow 
women to be able to choose to give birth at home.  As midwives were forbidden from practicing, 
women were forced to go to the hospital in order to be in the care of a medical/birth expert.  
While Beckett and Hoffman focus on the social movement to reinstate midwives, they do not 
discuss the point that women were no longer able to make a choice about how they gave birth.  
This disempowerment of women to choose what to do with their bodies reinforces patriarchal 
and hegemonic practices of law and lawmakers to restrict what women can do with their bodies.  
It is therefore not surprising that regulating pregnancy is just a continuation of regulating 
women’s bodies.   
Hatem, Sandall, Devane, Soltani, and Gates (2009) performed a meta-analysis that 
reviewed studies based on midwife-led care compared to medical-led care and combined care 
and found many of the same effects as Hodnett et al. (2012).  Distinctly important for midwife-
led care, patients experienced less medically intensive care than other women, but also were 
more likely to share their birthing experience with a midwife they get to know during pregnancy, 
and the women felt in control of the delivery process.  Thus, midwifery, currently a form of 
resistance against the hegemonic practices of the medical community, should be reframed as part 
of the usual and normal experience for women who are not at risk for major medical 
complications.  Hatem et al. as well as Hodnett et al. do caution that women with risky 
pregnancies or medical histories, which might indicate complications, should still be supervised 
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by medical professionals in a medical setting, but this opens the door for the majority of women 
to use midwives to their benefit.  
Bringing back the practice of using midwives in most birth scenarios offers several 
benefits.  First, it may lead to fewer birth interventions, second it gives power to women to make 
active decisions about their care— important for women who were forced into c-sections, and 
third, and most central to this argument, it provides a person whom the patient can trust.  A 
midwife can offer care throughout and after the pregnancy.  Imagine if midwives acted as 
liaisons between pregnant women and medical staff in the event of an emergency.  Midwives 
would be able to keep the pregnant woman calm and be effective and knowledgeable 
communicators with medical practitioners.  It is also possible that women with addiction, 
financial, abuse, and other types of issues would be able to get referrals for help from someone 
they actually trust to help them. 
Communicate Ahead of Medical Procedures.  Patients and doctors need to maintain an 
open dialogue to discuss the birthing plan before the birth and the progression of the birth during 
the event.  Cesarean sections, epidurals, episiotomies, and other procedures should remain 
options for the patient and doctor to choose, especially in emergency situations, but original 
plans should remain in effect until an emergency or impasse arises.  Pregnancy should be viewed 
as any other medical condition—one where the patient has the right of refusal or acceptance of 
treatment as well as informed consent.   
Power to Make Informed Decisions.  All women deserve the ability to make informed 
choices about their healthcare and wellbeing.  From a medical standpoint, birth control methods 
need to be tested and safe for all citizens of childbearing ages.  The choice of method should 
remain with a woman, counseled by her doctor who can recommend the best method(s) based on 
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a checklist of factors including medical history, risks, costs, failure rate, and routine.  When one 
method is no longer suitable, others should be discussed as desired.  In general, birth control and 
pregnancy should be seen as routine, normal parts of the lives of women.  All women deserve 
information given to them by a qualified physician about reproduction and their bodies at all 
stages of life, including pre-menstrual, childbearing, and menopausal.  Knowledge of available 
options empowers women to make choices about their reproduction that best suits them. 
For a woman who wants to conceive and bear a child, information is crucial before, 
during, and after pregnancy.  While many consider information to literally be at our fingertips 
because phones and computers can easily access search engines, not all women are as lucky.  
Ownership and access to computers, phones, and the internet may not be free.  More importantly, 
the knowledge that can be gleaned on the internet is not always accurate.  It can be very difficult 
to parse out fact from fiction and vetted knowledge from suspected knowledge.  Moreover, 
knowledge does change as medical science advances and what is known about pregnancy may be 
hard to interpret by lay readers.  Doctors need to provide knowledge to patients.  Information 
before and during is crucial to help women achieve the best outcomes possible for themselves 
and their future children.  To name a few items, before pregnancy, information on smoking 
cessation, prenatal vitamins, sexually transmitted infections, diet, all legal and illicit drugs, 
exercise, on-going health issues, and stages of pregnancy should be discussed.  During 
pregnancy a conversation about vaccines, a birthing plan, hormone fluctuations, readying the 
home, possible side effects, genetic testing, and other pertinent advice should be given.  Women 
should be given space to learn information, ask questions, seek more advice, and then have time 
to process and follow up.  Logistic, financial, emotional, and practical assistance may be required 
to get a potential mother care- not just the best that she can afford, but the care that all women 
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deserve.  Doctors may want to couple their services with those who are able to provide legal and 
financial counsel and aid.  
An example of a successful, evidence-based program is the Nurse-Family Partnership.  
This program is specifically designed to help vulnerable, low-income women.  The program has 
several important measurable impacts including fiscal benefits and a number of reductions in 
crime, but it also provides less calculable impacts like care and guidance to first-time mothers.  
Some of the measurable benefits include reductions in child abuse, reductions in juvenile arrests, 
fewer trips to the emergency room for accidents, and less dependence on social safety nets like 
foods stamps and Medicaid (Nurse Family Partnership, 2014).  Some of the benefits that are less 
measurable include the fact that the nurses are well educated (a BSN or higher is required) and 
the services that they provide to the mother start early in the pregnancy and continue until the 
child turns two.  This means that nurses are there to help pregnant women combat issues like 
substance abuse, find appropriate prenatal care, formulate appropriate healthful eating and 
exercise habits, help set up the home in advance of the baby’s arrival, and so forth.  Once the 
baby is born, the nurse can help with breastfeeding, changing, illness, and other routine 
activities.  The nurse can also look for signs of postpartum depression and other early signs of 
problems.  As the baby grows, the nurse continues to visit and can help with discipline, 
milestones, diet, and even family planning.  The nurse may serve not only as a trustworthy guide, 
but she may also function as the mother’s cheerleader: encouraging good habits and other pro-
social behaviors like continuing education and networking with peers.  Overall, this program 
does not seek to replace the mother with a nurse, but rather empowers a new mother by 
providing her with a source of support and guidance that she can lean on when she has questions 
or feels frustrated.    
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Alcohol and Drug Use.  Currently there is no test for chronic or periodic alcohol use 
during pregnancy even though Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (the worst of a spectrum of disorders) is 
well documented and caused by drinking alcohol during pregnancy.  Although science is still 
debating the like between damage and alcohol consumption, when the alcohol is consumed 
during the pregnancy timeline, whether there is a link to race or medical history of the mother, 
and other issues, doctors generally advise complete abstinence during pregnancy.  Blood alcohol 
concentration, alcohol metabolites in urine, and breathalyzer tests are useful to see if a woman 
has recently had a drink, but less helpful to understand chronic use.  Questionnaires that ask 
about alcohol use may be helpful, but depend on honesty and self-report (which may not be 
accurate even when the woman is being truthful).   
Prescription, over-the-counter, cigarette, and illicit drug use and abuse are also important 
considerations for doctors and their pregnant patients.  In 1999, 3.4% of pregnant women self-
identified as using illicit drugs (Lester, Andreozzi, & Appiah, 2004).  This usage is considerably 
lower than the child-bearing population, but should be considered a conservative estimate based 
on the nature of self-report.  While Lester, Andreozzi and Appiah (2004) recommend using 
meconium testing (first stool sample of an infant) coupled with maternal self-report to 
understand a woman’s drug use during pregnancy (based on accuracy and confirmation of 
results), this should be continued for research but not as a basis upon which to understand 
maternal drug use during pregnancy.  This kind of confirmation might help researchers and 
doctors to understand the prevalence, frequency, and drugs used during pregnancy, but testing 
one mother to confirm or deny her use after she has given birth presents a “gotcha moment.”  
More importantly, testing after birth does nothing to curb an addiction during pregnancy.  Using 
the continuity of care model, a woman who trusts her doctor and does not fear consequences of 
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reporting, may disclose issues surrounding all kinds of substance use.  Moreover, little is known 
about polydrug effects on the mother and fetus even though it is more common that single drug 
use (Lester, Andreozzi, & Appiah, 2004).  Finally, illicit drugs are often stigmatized, but abuse 
of prescription pills and over-the-counter drugs can be just as harmful as “street drugs.”  In fact, 
pharmacologically there may not be a large difference between the illicit drug and the 
prescription drug (e.g., marijuana and HTC).  Demonizing one class of drug and categorizing 
women as bad mothers based on an addiction does not get at the root of the problem.  Tools, 
education, and chances to quit or step down use must be prioritized.      
Finally, using the continuity of care model, patients may be able to make more informed 
decisions about waiting to conceive a child until drug/alcohol use (of any kind) has been reduced 
or stopped compared to patients who do not have trusting or ongoing relationships with their 
medical providers.  This approach focuses on prevention of harm before pregnancy even begins 
in order to give the woman and the fetus the best chance at a healthy pregnancy.   
Intervention 
 The sections above focused on reframing how we think about healthcare and prevention 
efforts.  Unfortunately no system, even if ingrained, will be perfect.  Not all women will be 
caught by the “prevention safety net.”  Intervention efforts must be developed in addition to 
preventative schemas. 
  Currently when we consider helping pregnant women who have substance abuse issues, 
the options for drug treatment in the legal arena are through constitutionally mandated health 
care in criminal justice facilities (judicially interpreted in notable court cases such as Newman v. 
Alabama (1972) and Estelle v. Gamble (1976)), drug/family dependency courts, and residential 
and/or community treatment services that are compulsory as part of probation or parole.  The 
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other common way to get help is through the medical arena, through hospitals, doctors, and 
residential and outpatient treatment centers.   As I have argued above, if our country implements 
a systematic and purposeful preventative approach in the medical community then intervention 
becomes a secondary means of help where only women who have fallen through the cracks need 
assistance.   
Assuming prevention is the first priority but that intervention strategies need to be fleshed 
out as well, in this section I will argue that 1) prevention will reduce current costs associated 
with pregnant women and their treatment if only because fewer women will need to be treated 
and more importantly, 2) the medical system is superior to the criminal justice system in its 
ability to offer services that are less coercive and better suited to women’s needs, but steps need 
to be taken to make sure that medicine, not law, is being practiced by the medical community.  
Specifically I show that replicating the ideals of drug courts in the medical setting removes the 
punitive and coercive factors that judges rely on as motivators for the successful completion of a 
program, but moreover that this location is better suited to give pregnant women, as a special 
population, services and help that they need to have healthy babies. 
If women are prevented from becoming substance abusers, prevention efforts, including 
education and resources should cost less in the long run than treating women once they have a 
substance abuse problem.  Even for the women who fall through the cracks and for whom 
intervention becomes necessary, there will literally be fewer of them than currently, reducing the 
fiscal impact of treatment.  Additionally, if the continuity of care model does work generally and 
some women do need special attention (for myriad reasons including health problems, substance 
abuse issues, lack of transportation, mental health issues, etc.) there are fewer women to 
accommodate and better care can be devoted to those who are at higher risk of pregnancy 
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complications.  Currently, the best places for women to get enhanced healthcare, including, but 
not limited to drug addiction support, is in medical settings.  That being said, this dissertation has 
highlighted some instances where the medical and legal systems collude to harm, rather than 
help, women.  Medical care should be the solitary mission of healthcare institutions. Using 
several actors to give “wrap-around” services to women, promotes not only trust and helpfulness, 
but leaves a woman’s dignity intact.  A “one-stop-shop” may be useful for women to get 
coordinated benefits, reduce travel to multiple specialists, combat comorbidity, and reduce the 
likelihood of “falling through the cracks” if multiple points of contact exist. 
Currently, drug courts offer an interesting model for treatment.  Those who have been 
arrested, but face minimal penalties due to the nature of the offense, may be eligible for services 
rather than legal punishment; however, drug courts do rely on punishment as a fallback position 
should a person fail to get through the program.  Even small punishments may be indicated 
during the course of treatment if some standards are not met.   
Using the threat of punishment to underpin treatment, especially in relation to medical 
issues or social myths about gender roles during pregnancy, should not be the goal.  In fact, 
punishment should be abolished as a mechanism to produce compliance.  Consider Tennessee.  
Tennessee’s narcotic problem became a matter of great importance such that the government felt 
it was time to intervene.   From 2001 to 2011 the rate of drug dependent babies delivered in 
Tennessee grew by 10 fold.  In 2012, Alabama and Tennessee tied for the highest rate of 
painkiller prescriptions in the United States.  Per 100 people, 143 painkiller prescriptions were 
written (CDC, 2014).  That’s more than one prescription per person.   Armed with data like 
these, in 2014 Tennessee passed its Fetal Assault law (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107).  The law 
reads: 
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(a) For the purposes of this part, "another," "individuals," and "another person" include a 
human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to 
the victim of any act made criminal by this part.  
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to amend the provisions of § 39-15-201, or  
§§ 39-15-203 -- 39-15-205 and 39-15-207.  
(c) (1) Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any lawful act or lawful omission by a 
pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any 
lawful medical or surgical procedure to which a pregnant woman consents, performed by 
a health care professional who is licensed to perform such procedure.  
(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution 
of a woman for assault under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug, as defined 
in § 39-17-402, while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic 
drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while 
pregnant.  
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by subdivision (c)(2) that the 
woman actively enrolled in an addiction recovery program before the child is born, 
remained in the program after delivery, and successfully completed the program, 
regardless of whether the child was born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug.  
Thus, a pregnant woman may be charged with assault if she gives birth to a narcotic addicted or 
narcotic harmed baby.  She may not be charged with assault if she undergoes a legal surgical 
procedure (code for abortion).  An example of an affirmative defense is if you were charged with 
murder, but the killing happened because you were defending yourself.  Self-defense is an 
affirmative defense to what would otherwise be a crime.  Tennessee has provided pregnant 
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women with a way out of being prosecuted for their drug use: treatment.  The problem is that 
treatment as defined in the statute, active enrollment before the birth, remaining enrolled after the 
delivery, and successful completion of the program are vague requirements.  How much time 
before birth and after birth does a woman need to be enrolled?  What is the definition of success?  
Does it depend on the individual program’s definition of success or does it only mean drug-free?  
Is it something else?  The language of the law itself is vague, presenting problems, but it pales in 
comparison to the logistical problems of actually getting treatment in Tennessee.  According to 
Nina Liss-Schultz (2016)  only 11 of 39 residential treatment centers even accept pregnant 
women.  This means that there are only about 130 spots open to pregnant women statewide.  In 
2005 TennCare (Tennessee’s Medicaid) discontinued methadone clinic services for adults 
(TennCare, 2016).  This means that impoverished women have few opportunities to actually get 
treatment.  Women began to be arrested under the law when their newborns tested positive for 
drugs after delivery.  Several women have already been arrested and charged under this law.  
Liss-Schultz’s news article chronicles the story of Brittany Hudson, who at 24 years old knew 
about the law and actively avoided getting prenatal care because she knew she could get in 
trouble.  She gave birth in the back of a friend’s car.  Eventually she was arrested and charged 
under the Fetal Assault law.  Hudson’s story has a happy ending- she has joint custody over her 
child and she is no longer addicted to prescription drugs, but not all women are as lucky.  
Hudson now works with pregnant drug addicts at a treatment center and says that she encounters 
many women who avoid getting any kind of prenatal care for two-thirds of their pregnancies.  
Tennessee has seen how problematic this law has been such that women actively avoid 
healthcare, the exact opposite of its intention.  On Tuesday, March 22, 2016 the legislature voted 
and the law will not be renewed.  Tennessee’s Fetal Abuse law will expire on July 1, 2016.  
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Why did Tennessee’s punitive law fail?  First, criminalizing help does not work, but 
second it certainly does not work if adequate resources are not in place.  The women in 
Tennessee were afraid of getting in trouble and avoided medical care, but even those who 
became desperate and tried to find help were turned away.  Instead, Tennessee should have 
promoted and enhanced their own legislation that gave pregnant drug addicts priority in drug 
treatment centers and helped to keep mother and baby together after birth (known at the Safe 
Harbor Act of 2013, Tennesee Code Annotated § 33-10-104(f)).  Creating laws to help women is 
not enough; resources must be allocated and developed for women who will fall through the 
cracks. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
Chapter Overview 
In the previous chapter I explored the policy implications of problematic pregnancies and 
some solutions.  I suggested that prevention, not regulation would be a better process for both the 
mother and the baby because it reduces actual harm, but also because it has practical economic 
implications and gives doctors the ability to do what they do best: practice medicine, not law.  In 
this chapter I will relate my project to previous literature, explore the strengths and limitations of 
the project comment, suggest directions for future studies, and conclude. 
This dissertation has addressed the ongoing issue of the formal and informal regulation of 
women’s reproduction in America.  From what is controversial: abortion, contraception 
coverage, and women’s chastity, to what is exciting: pregnancy announcements, gender reveals, 
and baby showers, pregnancy-related issues are constantly discussed in America.  This project 
has highlighted one specific area of pregnancy that is not only uncomfortable to address, but also 
one that may seem to many as completely justifiable considering that we are regulating on behalf 
of an entity unable to protect itself.  The project has shown, though, that despite good intentions, 
this promise falls short and neither babies nor women benefit.  Moreover, even if babies did 
benefit, I argue that the ends do not justify the means.  Women must be given a certain amount 
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of power to ensure their own bodily integrity, freedom from balancing tests that pit their rights 
against their own flesh and blood, and resources that promote successful birth outcomes.  The 
criminalization of women’s status as pregnant is a real issue that many women face and much of 
the added regulation comes from an anxiety that women will make poor choices.  This anxiety is 
rooted in real fears, but ignores actual outcomes for children and does not consider structural 
inequalities; some women are doing the best they can and society judges that effort to be 
inadequate.  A fundamental shift of how we pursue problematic pregnancies is needed.  This 
reframing must involve at least two levels of transition, one that does not depend on punitive 
measures to control birth outcomes and another that rethinks how society treats women such that 
all are entitled to consistent healthcare, quality service, and information to make good choice. 
Previous literature 
Previous literature (Boyd, 2004) has suggested that social justice may be achieved 
through the decriminalization of drugs so that resources are not diverted toward the War on 
Drugs and rather toward social services.  This dissertation suggests that even women who are 
engaged in legal behaviors such as smoking or drinking alcohol may be subject to law 
enforcement penalties such that legalizing drugs is not enough to stop pregnant women from 
being targeted with legal regulations.  In fact, it is not clear that adding or deleting laws will 
enhance the quality of women’s lives when they are pregnant. Roberts (1997) argues that if the 
state were truly interested in protecting a child from harm, especially from women who do drugs 
during pregnancy, they would enact laws that help women to break their addictions while 
pregnant, not after birth, when the damage has been done (assuming there is some type of long or 
short term damage associated with the drug use).  My work supports Roberts’ claim more than it 
does Boyd’s.     
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Dorothy Roberts (1997) asserts that “reproductive liberty” is one avenue that can 
contribute to the fight against “racial injustice” (p. 309).  By exchanging the “negative right” to 
liberty for a definition that favors a “positive right,” Roberts believes that we should no longer 
just be protected from governmental intrusion, where the government is doing its job as long as it 
does not act.  Rather we should insist on a government that is proactive and productive in 
securing resources and structural changes that actually enhance women’s lives.  Roberts 
envisions an “affirmative duty of government to protect the individual’s personhood from 
degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination” (p. 309).  Further, 
Roberts claims that this extension of services and reframing of the government’s affirmative duty 
must acknowledge race as a critical part of reproductive justice and freedom.  By changing the 
structure so that Black motherhood is no longer criminalized, we acknowledge how intertwined 
the fights for reproductive justice and racial equality actually are.  Roberts most firm claim is 
that Black women must be allowed to make the decision to have (or not have) children. While 
these policies that regulate what pregnant women cannot do with their bodies seem 
individualized or scattershot, the history of regulating Black women’s bodies is so entrenched in 
American history that it is necessary to recognize that it is an entire racial group that is harmed, 
not just a few selected members of society.  
Roberts (1997) also argues that “It is the choice of carrying a pregnancy to term that is 
being penalized” (p. 181, original emphasis) but I think that this has changed.  With my data, it is 
not only women who are penalized for doing drugs and having the baby- and although I agree 
that is part of it, it is more.  Women whose babies died after birth were subjected to the worst 
penalties, save Purvi Patel, whose dual convictions of feticide and neglect of a dependent made it 
so that she was penalized both for conduct during the pregnancy and at the birth.  While there is 
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an appeal forthcoming, Patel’s conviction shows that she was neither allowed to have a baby nor 
allowed to not to have a baby.  In both cases she was doomed.  My data show that many kinds of 
pregnant women suffer consequences: noncompliant patients, women who do drugs, women who 
contemplate abortions, women who try to commit suicide, and even women who just want to be 
in control of their own reproduction (literally have a say in how they give birth).  Roberts’ 
research indicates that women who smoke crack are targeted.  Again, she is right; it is easy to see 
how society frames Black women as unfit to procreate with all of the political rhetoric constantly 
referring to them as welfare queens, bad mothers (e.g., see Patricia Hill Collins’ concept of the 
“mammy” who is a good surrogate mother to white children but neglects her own), and the 
mothers of crack babies.  In my work, women who are poor, of any color, but especially women 
of color and women who are immigrants or children of immigrants, are prosecuted.    
Strengths and Limitations 
This study, like all research, has strengths as well as shortcomings.  First, the data in this 
study were gathered from published pieces of scholarly works, journalism, and court cases.  
Published news sources are fact-checked and reviewed by editors, scholarly pieces are peer-
reviewed and/or critiqued before publication, and official court documents contain background 
information of the case that has been established under the threat of perjury.  These sources have 
been vetted but may lack voice or original quotes from the women themselves.  To complement 
this shortcoming, I also used blogs and other online content. These sources suffer from the lack 
of confirmation of facts, but offer the rich, context-based perspectives of the women and/or their 
friends.  For all cases I attempted triangulation where once I knew a woman’s name, I 
endeavored to find many sources that told her story.  In many cases I was successful and was 
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able to compile a narrative based on two or more published pieces (with the addition of online 
content in some cases).   
Second, bias may have been present at the collection, data analysis, and interpretation 
stages.  To avoid issues at the collection stage, I used the process of triangulation to verify my 
facts from multiple sources.  At the data analysis and interpretation stages I was careful to ask 
consistent questions of the data.  Because the data were collected via secondary sources, I did not 
suffer from biasing my research subjects nor did I lead them in any way.  Further, because of the 
multiple pathways into regulation, I have avoided using causal language to show that one action 
caused another. Another tactic I used to shore up internal validity was to check for outliers (or 
the negative case).  It is important that one makes sure that the full story is told and to not just 
use data that fit a predetermined message.  Moreover, looking for cases that do not fit the general 
pattern helps to refine one’s analysis such that all cases are better captured by a more complex 
and refined explanation.  Overall, I let the data guide my work.  
While rigorous in the attempt to accurately report the facts of each woman’s story, I am 
limited in external validity, or generalizability. Due to the limited number of cases and the 
inability to control the selection of cases, 1) how pervasive coercion is in the population of 
pregnant women is unknown and 2) it is not known how representative these case studies are of 
women who have experienced regulated pregnancies.  Even if these women are not 
representative, this study does show that women face a spectrum of penalties for their actions 
and statuses.  As George and Bennett (2005) explain, “in view of these trade-offs case study 
researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop 
cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases 
with a high degree of explanatory richness” (p. 31). While these 26 women may face unusual 
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circumstances and penalties, their stories are not simply anecdotal.  Instead, through systematic 
analysis of these cases, I unearthed underlying threads of coercive treatment and problems that 
plague the criminal justice system.  Indeed, this work confirms some of the findings and histories 
documented by Paltrow and Flavin (2013), but also adds to them.   
This study was also limited by time and feasibility.  To add further richness to this study, 
my future plans include interviewing women in this study to give more insight to how they 
viewed their experiences and the meaning they ascribe to the events surrounding their 
pregnancies.  In addition, changing the unit of analysis from individuals (i.e., pregnant women) 
to systems (i.e., medical offices, hospitals, courts, and police) would allow for a more thorough 
investigation, and offer a broader perspective of the problems with implementation of treatment 
and birthing plans, successful deliveries of healthy babies, and daily obstacles faced by medical 
and legal actors.  I have argued in this piece that the context of pregnant women’s lives must be 
contemplated when considering their conduct, but I have not investigated the quotidian routine of 
a maternity ward to suitably understand the balance between a pregnant woman’s wishes and 
needs and the hospital’s demands and necessary practices.    
Finally, the current study benefits from a holistic point of view that allows for the 
integration of several different literatures on the subject of pregnancy; however, this work could 
not address all situations of pregnancy and family life that have been explored in the work done 
by other legal scholars, sociologists, and criminologists.  Pregnancy and its characterization as a 
disability within the legal framework, paid family leave, women’s continued role as the primary 
caregiver for children, domestic violence against a pregnant woman, and the treatment of women 
in jail/prison are all subjects that are worthy of deeper treatment than could be provided in this 
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manuscript.  Certainly each of these topics is relevant to issues of law and could be expounded 
on by future works.   
Future Studies 
This study has attempted to shed light on the multiple ways in which pregnant women are 
regulated and criminalized by social control actors in the medical and legal spheres using 
qualitative analysis of the case studies of the pregnant women.  Future studies should embrace 
alternative ways to continue the work that has begun here.  I was unable to assess the magnitude 
to which pregnant women are coerced into having medical procedures that they are unwilling or 
inadequately prepared to have.  Future studies could be designed to understand this trend in a 
given area, and thus an in-depth qualitative study, or throughout the United States as a whole 
using quantitative measures.   
Second, although there are studies that have documented the medical treatment that 
women receive in jail and prison, including shackling during the birthing process, further work 
could ascertain the overall extent to which jail and prison are beneficial and harmful to the 
pregnant woman and her fetus.  All medications cleared by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) must indicate what they know about the effects of a medication on the fetus and a 
conclusion about whether that drug is safe during pregnancy.  Like this labeling policy by the 
FDA, future research can classify imprisonment policies and procedures, including birthing 
procedures, as appropriate, risky, or not recommended for pregnant inmates.  A classification 
system may help jails and prisons meet the needs of pregnant inmates without compromising the 
goals of maintaining order and safety for all inmates.   
Finally, while my task has been to bring together multiple lenses of scholarship, consider 
different types of cases, and add policy relevant information, I have done very little by way of 
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theory testing using case studies.  A future study may consider why it is that we regulate 
pregnant women and subject those theories to testing through case studies.  Where the theories 
do not fit the actual events, theory refinement must occur to account for the discrepancies 
between the prediction and the real world events.  Moreover, George and Bennett (2005) indicate 
that theory testing using case studies gives rise to understanding the “scope conditions of 
theories” (p. 75), that is, when theories are more and less likely to apply to real cases.  
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